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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the notion that tikanga is well positioned to address issues 
confronting Māori and other indigenous groups who strive to achieve self-
determination and the freedom to be and to do.  This work is inspired by the late 
John Te Rangi-āniwaniwa Rangihau’s statement, “Ko te rongoā kei roto i ō tātau 
ringa” (1987, p. 24), which promotes the notion that through culture and identity 
Māori already have within their grasp the answers to contemporary matters of 
import in te ao Māori.  This thesis inverts that statement and presents it as a 
question querying whether indeed the remedy is at hand and, if so, could tikanga 
and cultural identity be that remedy.  To that end this study deliberately sets out to 
examine if the rongoa of self-determination, power and freedom can be achieved 
by the assertion and application of Māori ways of being and doing, that is to say 
by exercising tikanga. 
Understanding notions of tikanga, sovereignty, and indigeneity is pivotal to this 
study as is articulating the notion of third space.  This thesis argues that these four 
notions are interconnected when considering ideas of self-determination for 
disempowered groups.  A case study forms a large part of this work and focuses 
on an indigenous group operating from a pre-contact tupuna worldview and based 
on He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835/Declaration of 
Independence of New Zealand 1835.  This particular group was chosen because it 
presented as being a point of intersect for the four notions of tikanga, sovereignty, 
indigeneity and the third space. 
This thesis argues that whilst tikanga is a powerful mechanism for determining 
and rationalising ways of being and doing it has less to offer at a pragmatic level 
when it comes to effecting change in the status quo.  However, when overlaid 
with the third space lens new perspectives can be enunciated and new 
opportunities detected which in turn can lead to determining new actions.  
Through this study it becomes clear that the assertion and application of tikanga 
contributes to, but on its own is not, the whole answer. 
  
iii 
He pepeha 
 
Ko Tainui te waka; 
Ko te Nehenehenui te rohe; 
Ko Ngāti Runga-te-rangi te hapū; 
Ko Maniapoto te tupuna; 
Hou! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ko te āhuatanga o taku tirimoko tēnei.  E mau nei ia i aku kōrero 
whakapapa, kōrero-ā-whānau, kōrero-ā-hapū hoki (Source: Taitoko, 2008). 
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He mihi 
 
Rere ana taku mihi ki te uru, ki te takenga mai o ngā waka o ngā tūpuna; ka topa 
whakarunga ki te tonga, ko reira te paenga taonga.  Hiki ake, ka hāro whakawaho 
ki te marangai, ki te aranga ake o te rā; hoka whakararo ki te raki, ko ia tērā te 
rerenga wairua… reia atu. 
Tēnei te maioha ake ki te hunga nā rātou ahau i āwhina, i tautoko ki te 
whakatutuki i tēnei kaupapa nui, mai i tōna tīmatanga tae noa ki te putanga ake o 
tēnei tuhingaroa. 
Tuatahi ake, ka mihi atu au ki a John (Hoani) Te Rangi-āniwaniwa Rangihau 
BEM mō ana kupu whakaoho i taku wairua hei ranga wairua mō te hirikapo, hei 
horopaki hoki mō ngā kaupapa matua i roto i tēnei tuhinga. 
Tēnei te tuku aroha atu ki taku tuakana a JJ me tana tono kia tuhi ai au i ēnei 
kōrero e pā ana ki tēnei kaupapa nui a ō tātou mātua tupuna.  Kāore e ārikarika 
ana aku kupu whakamihi mōu me tō kaha ki te whāngai kupu mai hei 
whakaarotanga mō te hunga e ngākau nui ana, e kimi māramatanga ana.  E te hoa 
whanaunga, ko te tūmanako ia kua purua kau ētehi piere o te kaupapa nei i ēnei 
kōrero āu, i ēnei tuhinga āku hoki. 
Me mihi ka tika a Pania Melbourne mō tana māia ki te arataki i ahau i runga i 
tēnei huarahi kōpikopiko.  Tēnā koe e hoa mō tō kaha, me tō manawanui ki te 
ārahi, ki te whakatenatena hoki i ahau i roto i ēnei mahi. 
Nei hoki te mihi ki aku hoa mahi o Te Wānanga o Aotearoa mō tā rātou 
whakawātea mai i ahau kia whai wāhi ai ahau me tēnei kaupapa.  Heoi, nui 
whakaharahara aku mihi ki a Pani Berghan mō ana karu miromiro me tana āta 
pānui i ēnei tuhinga āku, me tōna kaha ki te karawhiu pātai mai.  Tau kē koe e te 
hoa. 
Heoi, mokori anō te mihi ki a koe e taku teina Glenn, me tō kaha whakatikatika 
mai i aku mahi tuhi whakapānga.  Nōu te taumahatanga ki te whakarite mai kia 
tika aku kupu whakamana i ngā puna mōhiohio nā rātou kē te nuinga o ngā kōrero 
tautoko i ōku nei whakaaro.  He toki koe me tēnei mahi. 
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And lastly but by no means least I extend my heartfelt gratitude to Albie and his 
beautiful getaway bungalow in Rarotonga.  Thanks for the thirteen days of peace 
and tranquillity which allowed me the undisturbed space to take my musings and 
put them into some sense of order.  E te hoa, mei kore ko koe me tō kāinga 
ātaahua rā kua kore pea ēnei tuhinga āku i whai wāhi ki te ao nei.  Meitaki maata. 
Pai mārire 
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1.0 CHAPTER ONE – HE KŌRERO TĀTAKI 
Māku anō e hanga tōku nei whare 
Hei whakatau i te ara, 
Hei whakangungu i ngā moemoeā; 
Kia ora, kia mura, ko te ahi-kāroa. 
(Taitoko & Waitai, 2004, p. 1) 
1.1 He kupu whakataki 
It will likely be apparent to any reader of this thesis that I use two languages 
throughout, te reo Māori and English.  I have done this in the belief that I am 
better able to express my thoughts and musings through the language in which 
they appeared in my mind.  I do this quite happily believing it is reflective of me, 
the author, and my ethnic, cultural, historical, social, political and educational 
make-up. 
No translations of any tuhinga reo Māori are provided save for a glossary 
appended at the end of this work, which is offered merely as a guide to 
comprehending my interpretation of some kupu and kīanga as used by me in this 
work.  I fear that to do more by way of offering English translations for all 
tuhinga reo Māori only privileges the status of one language whilst marginalising 
the other.  Hence the deliberate effort to, “regain a speaking position that is not 
determined by the coloniser” (Gilbert & Tompkins, 1996, p. 166).  This is also the 
reasoning behind my decision not to translate any title or sub-title used in this 
work and to let them stand as they are.  I believe that in doing so the reader is left 
unfettered from my proffered interpretations allowing them to develop and 
enunciate their own understandings of that which is presented before them. 
Each of the seven chapters contained in this thesis all commence with a portion of 
a composition that I, either solely or in collaboration with others, created in earlier 
years.  Each of these selected portions has been included for the deeper messages 
contained within the reo huahuatau used, which speaks to their relevancy to the 
overarching kaupapa of each chapter and offers a deeper philosophical approach 
to perceiving the situation.  The inclusion of reo huahuatau is a deliberate strategy 
to magnify the contributions that each selected portion can make to discussions 
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and to celebrate and pay homage to the worldviews, language and wisdom of my 
tūpuna. 
1.2 Te hanganga o te whare 
In an effort to articulate how tikanga influences and informs the nature and 
perceptions of other human constructs, namely sovereignty and indigeneity, a 
number of theories and notions are discussed throughout this thesis.  During this 
process the suitability of each of these theories and notions when engaging with 
this kaupapa has become evident.  Initially it seemed to me that post-colonial 
theory (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1995; Fanon, 1965; Freire, 1993; Said, 1978) 
had the capacity to provide a sound platform from which to launch a robust 
examination of such a kaupapa.  Unfortunately it soon became apparent that 
although post-colonial theory does make a contribution to the discussion it 
struggled to move beyond reinforcing already existing diametrically opposed 
positions.  Post-colonial theory’s eagerness to focus on events, chronologies, 
circumstances, and the protagonists involved left me little opportunity to venture 
below the surface and to delve into critical elements such as culture and identity, 
which, I contend, are intrinsic to discussions around tikanga, sovereignty and 
indigeneity.  Since the purpose of this thesis did not involve generating such a 
constricted, and I hesitantly propose impotent, result post-colonial theory was in 
the main put to the side in favour of home-grown theories such as Kaupapa Māori. 
Kaupapa Māori theory, which I would argue, is rooted in both culture and identity 
by being intrinsically linked to principles, values, and worldviews (Barnes, 2000; 
Bishop, 1996, 1999; C. Royal, 2006; Saba, 2007; G.H. Smith, 1997, 2003), 
presented itself as a viable theory option inasmuch as it offered a framework from 
which kaupapa such as this can be approached, unpacked, and interpreted from a 
te ao Māori perspective in a culturally safe and robust fashion.  This thesis does 
not explicitly claim to be a Kaupapa Māori theory-based work but it does 
acknowledge Kaupapa Māori theory for what it brought to an examination of this 
nature.  As work progressed it became clear that to frame this thesis purely within 
my understanding of what Kaupapa Māori theory is might well mean that 
opportunities to go to places not explicitly recognised by Kaupapa Māori theory 
could be missed, an example of which is alluded to shortly.  There was a nagging 
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suspicion within me that should I hitch my wagon to Kaupapa Māori theory 
exclusively then three things would likely happen.  Firstly, a great portion of this 
work would be given over to arguing why it should even be considered to be a 
Kaupapa Māori theory-based piece of work.  Secondly, using Kaupapa Māori 
theory on which to base my arguments was, in my opinion, tantamount to 
positioning the argument within the orbit of one of those existing diametrically 
opposed positions inherent in post-colonial theory.  This meant potentially 
dragging the work back to a post-colonial type discussion tethered to arguments 
about this side says this and that side says that.  Lastly, to locate this work within 
Kaupapa Māori theory threatened to expose it to the debate around varying 
perceptions, interpretations and understandings of what exactly Kaupapa Māori 
theory is. 
For these reasons I sought out an alternative that made available to me the best-
suited aspects of both post-colonial theory and Kaupapa Māori theory, a blending 
one might say, hence my attention shifted to the notion of hybridity.  Interestingly 
it was found that the notion of hybridity has both its supporters and detractors and 
this is considered further in Chapter Five.  Relief was finally realised in the work 
of Homi K. Bhabha whose interpretation of hybridity, which although itself is an 
off-spring of post-colonial theory, focuses more on negotiating the difference in 
matters such as culture and identity (Meredith, 1998).  Assuming that culture and 
identity play a critical role in determining the nature of sovereignty and 
indigeneity it was decided to examine the notion of hybridity and the third space 
(Bhabha, 1994) which interrupts processes, interrogates situations and enunciates 
new understandings (Bhabha, 1996). 
Whilst examining third space theory I felt compelled to muse that maybe third 
space is not an unfamiliar concept or practice to te ao Māori cultural practitioners. 
I suggest instead that third space is endemic to, and underpinning of, tikanga, both 
formalised ritual and commonplace habitual behaviour inasmuch as it is the direct 
result of the interruption of a process, the interrogation of a situation and the 
enunciation of an understanding.  In support of this suggestion I propose that the 
practice of pōwhiri is an example of a formal and ritualised process from te ao 
Māori that occupies a third space and then interrupts, interrogates and enunciates.  
Likewise I put forth the practice of hongi as an example of third space in action at 
4 
a common-place habitual level.  My reasons for making these assertions are 
presented in greater detail in Chapter Two.  Third space presented itself as 
offering the opportunity for other voices to be heard above the dinning roar of 
post-colonial theory’s seemingly irreconcilable positioning.  It also gives shape 
and form to a process that Kaupapa Māori theory implies but does not explicitly 
define or describe. 
Since it is the relationship between tikanga, sovereignty, indigeneity and third 
space that is being examined in this thesis, there has been a deliberate attempt 
made in this work to apply third space theory throughout.  This work sets out to 
identify an unoccupied space in the commentaries and articulations so as to 
interrupt processes, interrogate situations, and enunciate new perceptions.  This is 
done in the hope that the outcomes of this study might bring new perspectives to 
those who struggle to be heard and seen. 
I propose here that this thesis is in some measure an example of the application of 
the notion of third space.  Originally the intent was to examine the history of a 
Māori Incorporation and attempt to understand how tikanga influenced its origins, 
its ways of being and acting, its worldview, its underpinning philosophies and its 
visions for the future.  It was initially positioned in the context of a critical 
examination of why ‘this’ works and the ‘other’ does not – a somewhat 
essentialist view, hence the initial leaning towards post-colonial theory.  As work 
progressed that position slowly morphed into an examination not so much of what 
is there but more so of what isn’t there and what could be.  My attention turned to 
attempting to find out what could occupy the space in between opposing stances.  
This work quite deliberately set out to attempt to extricate itself from the mire of 
trying to understand two sides of a story and instead focussed on listening out for 
a voice from the void in between.  It was assumed that any detectable voice could 
potentially indicate the existence of a different way of interpreting the situation.  
This in turn might provide an alternate way of feeling, theorising, doing and being. 
1.3 Methodology 
This body of work is the result of a two-pronged approach to information 
gathering.  The search commenced with a series of literature reviews to identify 
what current canon says about tikanga, sovereignty, indigeneity and third space 
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theory.  The second part involved a series of three one-to-one interviews with the 
Chairman of a Māori Incorporation, who is hereafter referred to simply as JJ.  The 
resultant data of the interview was then thematically analysed to detect any 
recurring or dominant themes and these themes were then reviewed using the third 
space lens, and the findings are herein presented. 
The literature reviews focussed on tikanga, sovereignty, indigeneity and third 
space and elicited a range of understandings and insights which provided the 
context-suite in which this examination could occur.  This context-suite covered 
pre-contact, post-contact and present-day understandings and perceptions of both 
tikanga and sovereignty, along with post-contact and present-day understandings 
and perceptions of indigeneity.  The interviews furnished this study with 
information on the recent past and present-day endeavours of a group at a local 
hapū level – a Māori Incorporation. 
Why this approach?  As mentioned earlier, the focus of this study was, in part, to 
understand how tikanga influences and informs sovereignty and indigeneity, two 
constructs arguably at the core of the Māori Incorporation concerned.  In 
considering the part that culture and identity play in the make-up of tikanga, 
sovereignty, indigeneity and Māori Incorporations, I saw these constructs as 
natural affiliates in a study of this kind and their interconnectedness deserving of 
understanding. 
To have supposed that the Māori Incorporation examined in this study is just 
another ‘sovereignty movement’ or just another Māori Land Court structure, 
could have prejudiced this study.  Making such an assumption presupposes the 
aims and objectives of that group of people and denies oneself the opportunity of 
understanding what it is they strive to achieve.  However, of more importance to 
this work is that such a stance would enfeeble this study by limiting the scope in 
which this group can be approached and engaged with.  Equally debilitating 
would be any assumption that this hapū-based organisation is only capable of 
acting in the interests of those directly linked by whakapapa to an eponymous 
tupuna.  It has been made clear to me that this is not the situation for this group 
and this is examined in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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The one-to-one interviews, which took place at a date, time and location of the 
interviewee’s choosing, were structured around a guided question set.  All 
questions were slanted towards eliciting tikanga-focussed responses.  Despite 
others being invited to participate only one finally opted to do so.  Although only 
conducted with one individual, JJ, the interviews produced a wealth of 
information, which was not too surprising in light of the fact that the one 
interviewee was a co-founder of a local Māori Incorporation and had intimate 
knowledge of the structures, processes and objectives of such groups.  A lot of 
JJ’s articulations I initially failed to recognise as relevant to the kaupapa of this 
study, however during the transcribing phase of the data gathering process I had 
the chance to review and carefully digest exactly what had been said.  It was at 
this point I realised the responses provided did indeed have pertinence and 
relevance to the enquiry, just not in the way that I had expected.  In fact they were 
at a far deeper and more profound level than I had anticipated.  This added a 
degree of ihi to this study that I had not until that stage appreciated and provided 
yet another aspect of enquiry worthy of exploration.  This is expanded upon in 
Chapter Six. 
It is fitting at this point that I declare my relationship to the interviewee.  JJ is a 
cousin of mine as we share a common great-grandfather and furthermore I am a 
registered beneficiary of the Māori Incorporation concerned.  I do not perceive 
any conflict of interest in this situation since this specific part of the enquiry is 
about attempting to understand how tikanga influences and informs the being and 
doing of this group and is not an exposé about the group and its constituent 
membership. 
Part of the initial intent of this thesis was to explore whether the findings of this 
study could lead to the development of a framework or model that could assist 
other groups engaged in similar struggles to advance their causes.  This specific 
aim was abandoned towards the latter stages of the study in the realisation that it 
was a project of such a magnitude that precluded it from being actioned within the 
time constraints of this thesis’ requirements.  However, it is not abandoned totally; 
it is merely deferred to another yet to be determined time and study, where it can 
be given the attention and diligence it deserves.  What this thesis gladly offers to 
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that project are the findings, understandings and insights contained within these 
chapters. 
1.4 Te aronga matua 
The preceding is all intended to guide the enquiry into being able to answer the 
principal question – ‘Kei ō tātou ringa te rongoa? Is the remedy already at hand?’  
John Te Rangi-āniwaniwa Rangihau offered up the statement, “Ko te rongoā kei 
roto i ō tātau ringa” (1987, p. 24) when considering the challenges confronting 
teachers of te reo Māori of that time.  In proffering this statement I believe he 
expresses his belief that Māori destiny lies in Māori hands, tacitly urging Māori to 
be more self-reliant and to be aware of those things that make-up their ancestral 
heritage – culture and identity, two things that can never be taken; only 
surrendered.  I have taken that phrase and rendered it here as a question which 
opens up the opportunity for a study to occur that seeks out answers for both it 
and the ancillary questions such as, what is the remedy required to treat, will it 
work, who is it for and who has access to it?  Whilst Rangihau proposes we 
already have within our grasp the foundation to develop responses to te reo Māori 
teaching challenges, I wish to explore whether the same axiom can be applied in 
the political/legal spheres of this ao hurihuri with particular focus on notions of 
self-determination, hapū sovereignty and freedom as indigenous people. 
This desire is premised on a notion that potentially tikanga is enough, meaning 
that Māori do not need to turn to constructs of another paradigm to enable Māori 
to be self-determining through exercising actual power and authority with mana 
whenua, mana rangatira and mana tangata intact.  To that end this study 
deliberately sets out to examine if the rongoa of self-determination, power and 
freedom can be achieved by the assertion and application of Māori ways of being 
and doing, that is to say by exercising tikanga. 
1.5 Te whakatau ara 
This thesis sets out to build an argument that sees tikanga positioned as the tāhuhu 
kōrero to which the other themes of sovereignty, indigeneity, and third space are 
positioned as pou linked to and supportive of that tāhuhu.  Therefore the chapters 
of this thesis are presented using the metaphor of constructing the central load-
bearing structure of a whare; in this case a whare kōrero in which to house this 
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study.  I would argue that the use of metaphor and the imagery of a whare are 
typical and representative of both Kaupapa Māori theory and the notion of third 
space.  I propose it as typical of Kaupapa Māori theory because the metaphor 
posits this study in a cultural setting which is familiar to Māori (Irwin, 1994; 
Ka’ai, 2004; Poata-Smith, 1996; C. Royal, 1998; L.T. Smith, 1999), and 
representative of third space because it doesn’t engage in normative practice 
(interrupts), it instead seeks out a culturally appropriate alternative (interrogates), 
and then declares itself to be in a different location (enunciates new 
understandings) (Edwards, 2009).  The Māori Incorporation studied in this thesis 
is examined as potentially being representative of such a whare built around that 
same load-bearing structure. 
Chapter One, which deals with theories, methodologies and introductory 
discussions, is likened to the process of scoping out, planning and preparing the 
site where the whare kōrero will be located inasmuch as it contemplates 
construction tools, methods, blueprints, foundations and rationales. 
Chapter Two sets out to shape and fashion the tāhuhu of the whare kōrero by 
seeking to articulate what tikanga is, its essence, its origins, its purpose, and 
application.  I suggest here that since its principal function is to bear the entire 
weight of the whare, creating a robust tāhuhu is critical to the stability of that 
whare, just as clarity around articulating the nature of tikanga is pivotal to 
comprehending this study. 
Chapter Three establishes the first of three interrelated pou directly connected to 
the tāhuhu by sculpting the discussion around sovereignty and identifying what 
sovereignty is and then examining how tikanga informs, influences and 
determines the shape and nature of this pou. 
Chapter Four installs the second pou that supports the tāhuhu, that of indigeneity 
and its affinity to tikanga through culture and identity.  Although tikanga is a kupu 
of this whenua and its indigenous people, it is the make-up of tikanga that is 
applied to all indigenous groups no matter where they come from.  I would argue 
that it is not the word but the concept that finds commonality amongst indigenous 
groups. 
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Chapter Five introduces third space as the third pou but willingly allows it to 
position itself, rejecting notions of prescribed and predetermined locations.  It is 
my contention that such is the nature of third space that it is not of one position or 
the other but that it is from a place not yet discernible to the planner. 
Chapter Six examines what is arguably an example of a house built on such a 
structure and aligns the learnings from earlier chapters to the situation of a local 
Māori Incorporation.  Without living beings to philosophise and practice tikanga, 
sovereignty, indigeneity, and third space theory the very existence of the tāhuhu 
would likely be imperilled. 
Chapter Seven steps back to gaze upon and ponder the work completed thus far.  
It articulates and exhibits the new understandings gleaned from this study and 
attempts to reiterate the interconnectedness of all the pou with the tāhuhu. 
All these combined, the tāhuhu and the three pou, comprise the load-bearing 
structure that supports and houses this study to this point.  As can be surmised, 
there are as yet no poupou or heke to complete the base frame of the whare.  That 
is simply because although this study may be concluded the story remains as 
unfinished as does a house without framing or cladding.  Those yet to be 
completed sections of this whare, the poupou and heke, are representative of those 
concepts yet to be addressed, such as viability and sustainability: the viability of 
that which is practiced by the examined Māori Incorporation in today’s socio-
economic and legal/political climate, and its sustainability in an ever-changing 
world.  It is likely at this point the development and testing of a model or 
framework, mentioned earlier as a specific aim of this study that was abandoned, 
could make a contribution to understanding both viability and sustainability. 
1.6 He āka roa 
I roto i te ao Māori kua mōhio whānuitia te mana o tēnā iwi, o tēnā hapū, ki te 
whakatau i āna ake tikanga mō ōna ake pori, whenua, awa, moana, tāngata hoki.  
Kāore i te tika mā iwi kē atu e whakahou tētehi iwi anō kia huri āna ake tikanga ki 
ērā e pai ana ki te rāwaho. 
Mai rā anō tēnei tūāhuatanga whai mana ai i te ao tūroa nei engari he āhuatanga 
tēnei i takea mai i ngā mahi a ngā atua i te orokohanga mai o te ao, arā, i te 
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wehewehenga o ngā mea katoa ki ngā kauwhanga ngahuru-mā-tahi (Best, 1976; 
Whatahoro, 1913-1915), me te tāinga o ngā kawa ki tēnā kauwhanga, ki tēnā 
kauwhanga, mō ngā āhuatanga tipu, ora hoki i roto i ia kauwhanga o ngā rangi-
tūhāhā. 
Koia pea te tauira i whāia nei e ō tātou mātua tupuna mō te noho o ngā iwi, o ngā 
hapū i runga anō i te whakaaro he ōrite te noho motuhake o ngā mea katoa i ngā 
kauwhanga ki tō te noho motuhake o ngā iwi me ngā hapū i roto i ō rātou ake rohe.  
Arā, mā tēnā iwi, mā tēnā hapū āna ake tikanga e whakamārama, e whakatau hoki 
mō ngā whakahaeretanga katoa i tōna ake takiwā – kāhore rawa mā tētehi atu. 
I te taenga mai o Tauiwi i tere te huri o te ao o ō tātou tūpuna i ngā whakaaro hou, 
i ngā hangarau hou, i ngā tikanga hou hoki i kawea mai e ngā tauhou.  Hou mai ko 
te Rongo Pai, he mea wero tērā i te ahurea o ō tātou tūpuna me tō rātou noho 
motuhake i ngā pā-tūwatawata (A. Awatere, 1969).  Hou mai hoki ko te tikanga o 
te Kuinitanga me te Kāwanatanga, ā, riro noa atu te mana rangatira o ngā iwi me 
ngā hapū i ngā ringa o iwi-kē. 
Koinā ngā hua i puta mō ngāi tātou i tēnei mea te whakawaimehatanga i ngā 
tikanga-ā-iwi me te whakawhenumitanga, ā, kua motuhia te kaha-mārōrō (A. 
Awatere, 1969), arā, ko te taura e here nei tātou i a tātou anō, hei whānau, hei 
hapū, hei iwi. 
Heoi, i ngā tau 1970 i tīmata te haumanutanga mai o te ahurea Māori me te tutū o 
te Māori ki te whakahoe o te Pākehā ki ngā take Māori.  Ahakoa he rōpū anō tēnā 
me tāna kaupapa ake, he rōpū anō tēnā me tāna kaupapa ake, kotahi tonu te aronga, 
ko te hāpai ake me te whakangungu i ngā taonga a ō tātou mātua tupuna kei ngaro 
i te ngaronga o te moa. 
Ahakoa kei te kite tātou i te hē o tēnei mahi a Tauiwi, kei whea he ara hei whai 
mā tātou hei haukoti i tēnei mahi, kia mau pū tātou ki ā tātou ake tikanga? 
Mehemea ka whai tātou i te ara o te mana whakairo hinengaro Māori me te takahi 
i te ara ki te Whakakotahitanga o ngā Whenua o te Ao whakatakoto ai ō tātou 
nawe, e kore pea e ea tēnei kaupapa i a rātou, i te mea, kāore he mana o te United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2008. 
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Mehemea ka whakahouhia e tātou ngā mema Māori o te Whare Pāremata ki te 
wero atu me te kōkiri i tēnei kaupapa ki te aroaro o te Kāwanatanga, e kore pea e 
ea tēnei kaupapa i a rātou hoki, i te mea ko te whare mīere te kāinga o te hoariri. 
Mehemea tātou ka whakapuaki atu i ō tātou whakaaro ki te hāpori whānui o 
Aotearoa mā te hunga pāpāho, e kore pea e ea tēnei kaupapa, i te mea, kāore te 
nuinga o ngā tāngata o Aotearoa, me te hunga pāpāho, e mārama ana ki ngā uara 
me ngā mātāpono Māori. 
Ina kua haukoti ēnei ara i a tātou kei whea kē mai he huarahi hei putanga mō tātou 
me ō tātou wawata?  Tērā pea me ui atu tātou i ngā pou o tō tātou nei whare, arā, 
me titiro anō tātou ki ngā tikanga i waihotia mai e kui, e koro mā hei ārahi i a 
tātou kia eke panuku, eke tangaroa tātou me tēnei kaupapa whakahirahira.  Kei 
reira pea he rongoa hei oranga mō tātou – kei roto i a tātou anō. 
1.7 Te whakangungu moemoeā 
I believe it worthwhile at this point to attempt to create a snapshot overview of the 
New Zealand political/legal landscape in which Māori are making efforts to be 
heard and the range of responses these efforts achieve.  This is so done as I 
believe it brings another perspective that informs the sovereignty and indigenous 
freedom discourse beyond the protest and activist rhetoric which tends to polarise 
opinions. 
Tino rangatiratanga!  Mana Motuhake!  Sovereignty!  Ka whawhai tonu mātou, 
ake, ake, ake!  These are just a sample of phrases that over the last 40 years have 
elicited, and continue to do so, a wide range of emotional responses within the 
citizenry of Aotearoa.  Heightened passions amongst the disenfranchised 
indigenous population; a feeding frenzy within the media; weariness and angst in 
Parliament; aggravation in those who insist they remember the ‘good old days 
when we all got along’; even apathetic grunts of boredom from those whose 
indifference leads them to assume their settler heritage is unassailable and 
inviolate.  All manifest themselves in varying degrees when Māori strive to have 
their say; a voice which I propose is often misunderstood or misinterpreted by the 
majority. 
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The coloniser-sponsored notions of settler-state hegemony and hegemonic settler-
sovereignty (J.T. Johnson, 2008) as a means of packaging the New Zealand 
resident population at large belies the tensions that lay just beneath the surface.  A 
cursory glance at the diverse nature of cultures and ethnicities occupying this land 
suggests that each might well perceive themselves in a way that doesn’t conform 
to a single sameness.  Such, I argue, is the situation for the indigenous population 
of this whenua.  Māori have a long record of attempting to transform their 
condition from being subjects of colonisation to being determiners of their own 
future and masters of their own destiny, albeit with various degrees of success. 
Legislated efforts such as redress through Te Rōpū Whakamana i te Tiriti o 
Waitangi/Waitangi Tribunal claims process, and more recently direct negotiations 
with the Office for Treaty Settlements, provide a veneer of reasonable and 
reasoned settlement for issues dealing almost exclusively with claims over 
resources, mostly whenua and more recently wai.  However, when considering 
natural justice these two efforts present an almost surreal situation where the 
accused doer of wrong has the power to set the rules of engagement and to make 
final determinations.  That most hapū and iwi actively engage in these processes is 
arguably more representative of their frustration and eagerness to at long last 
achieve some resolution to past wrong-doings rather than as a testimonial to the 
just and honourable nature of the process. 
Alternatives have been proposed and promoted over the years, some claiming 
links to pre-Treaty times.  Some even dismiss entirely the notion of the Tiriti o 
Waitangi 1840/Treaty of Waitangi 1840 as this nation’s founding document, 
relegating it instead to the status of nothing more than an international trade 
agreement (JJ, personal communications, 2004-2012).  These rōpū instead prefer 
to place their trust in the mana of He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu 
Tireni 1835/Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand 1835.  The actions 
of some who subscribe to this belief have become notorious over recent years for 
their apparent proclivity to engage in brazen status quo challenging activities that 
ultimately are decried in the media as being nothing more than money-making 
criminal ventures.  The best publicised of these include passports for sale (NZPA, 
2009; Ruscoe, 2009; Sharples, 2009), or the issuing of Maori driver licenses 
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(Davies, 2010; Ihaka, 2010), and even the adoption of over-stayers into my own 
iwi, Ngāti Maniapoto (Gay, 2010; Radio Waatea, 2011). 
Beyond the hype and sensationalism that make such good media fodder lies a core 
of tikanga driven collectives who, whilst not denying the right of hapū to make 
such determinations under mana rangatira and mana tupuna authority, prefer 
instead to focus on more flax root realities.  Living and exercising mana rangatira, 
mana tangata, mana kaitiaki, and mana whenua – these are some of the flax-root 
realities that have their origins in times long gone but not forgotten, namely in 
tikanga.  It seems that to those involved in such collectives the act of asserting and 
applying tikanga to address contemporary issues promotes the relevancy and 
normalcy of concepts such as mana atua, mana rangatira, mana whenua, mana 
tangata, and mana kaitiaki.  These tried and tested principles and values that 
underpin how our tūpuna rationalised and made sense of te ao kōwhatu and the 
many phenomena contained therein are informing an understanding in our 
perception of the issues and phenomena of the present-day. 
1.8 Kia mura te ahi-kāroa 
Māori Incorporations play a critical part in this study but understanding what a 
Māori Incorporation is and what it does probably more so, and this is addressed 
more fully in Chapter Six.  There are two types of Māori Incorporation discussed 
in this study and both have their genesis in New Zealand law, namely Te Ture 
Whenua Māori 1993/Māori Land Act 1993.  Both use whenua Māori as a focus 
for their existence and both employ the legal mechanisms provided for in this Act 
to avail themselves of the protection and advantages the Act offers.  However 
there are a number of differences.  Critical amongst these is a philosophical 
difference inasmuch as while one draws it authority and powers directly from the 
New Zealand Government, through Article the Second of the Tiriti o Waitangi 
1840, the other claims to draw its authority and powers from ngā tūpuna rangatira 
and the British Crown, via He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 
1835/Declaration of Independence of New Zealand 1835.  This is borne out by 
understanding that one type of Māori Incorporation goes through the Māori Land 
Court to receive its constituting document whereas the other has its constituted 
mana rangatira status ratified by affiliation to Ngā Tikanga Māori Law Society 
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(Inc.) o Aotearoa (NZ), and endorsed by all other affiliates.  The structure, 
processes and procedures of Ngā Tikanga Māori Law Society (Inc.) o Aotearoa 
(NZ) are explored in Chapter Six. 
Yet another difference is that one type of Māori Incorporation is established in a 
structure similar to that of a company, with the express purpose of facilitating and 
promoting the “use and administration of Māori freehold land on behalf of the 
owners” (Maori Land Court, 2009, p. 2).  The other type, such as that co-founded 
by JJ, acknowledges that same purpose but goes further by claiming sovereignty 
over that land in all matters concerning the exercise of tikanga Māori, tino 
rangatiratanga, mana whenua, and mana tangata (JJ, personal communications, 
2004-2012).  These differences see one type of Māori Incorporation operating 
strictly within the legal/political confines of the Act, whilst the other feels 
empowered by specific sections in that same Act to go beyond the boundaries 
prescribed by legislation, striding not only into the legal/political forum but also 
into those of sovereignty, unextinguished Native Title, indigeneity, culture and 
identity. 
The establishment and purpose of Māori Incorporations is a subject that has 
particular interest to me inasmuch as my cousin, JJ, presents himself as something 
of an authority on this subject, as well as being a driving force behind, and co-
founder of, a local Tainui Māori Incorporation.  JJ is a staunch proponent of the 
kaupapa and resolute in his belief that hapū never surrendered their sovereignty 
and are still sovereign lords and masters in Aotearoa under the guaranteed 
protection of the British Crown, and not the Colonial Settler-Government of New 
South Wales Resident at Wellington, as he regards the institution that most people 
commonly recognise as the New Zealand Government.  JJ is quite simply 
passionate and committed, seizing any opportunity to get the message across. 
JJ has always been adamant on the primacy of tikanga that stems from kawa, 
which itself is imparted by te ao wairua, coupled with the significance of the roles, 
responsibilities and obligations of those who claim to hold mana whenua, mana 
tangata and mana kaitiakitanga within their respective rohe (JJ, personal 
communications, 2004 - 2012).  When planning permission for a number of 
subdivisions on land five minutes-drive from JJ’s Māori Incorporation land base 
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was granted by the local District Council, JJ used all the Māori Incorporation tools 
at his disposal to have the planning permission thrown out.  This happened not 
once but twice: once in the Environment Court 2006 and once in the High Court 
2007.  The Environment Court case involved the proposed development of land 
for housing above a burial cave.  Such a development would, in JJ’s eyes, mean 
the desecration of that wāhi tapu, rendering any subsequent housing built on that 
site as unfit and unsafe for human occupation (JJ, personal communications, 2004 
- 2012).  The High Court case again involved proposed land development where 
resource consent had been granted by the local district council, but in doing so it 
ignored and then tried to circumvent the resource consent process, particularly in 
relation to consultation with local hapū.  It did not consult fully with local hapū, it 
then tried secret negotiations, which it then denied and tried to cover up (JJ, 
personal communications, 2004 - 2012).  JJ’s success in these two cases saw most 
in the whānau, much to our shame, finally begin to take notice.  JJ’s actions were 
motivated not by greed or indignation but by an overwhelming sense of duty to 
the preservation of the wāhi tapu, to the memory of the tūpuna who lay there, and 
to honouring the reciprocal obligatory relationship to the decedents’ living 
descendants.  All these, in JJ’s view, were imperilled by such developments 
(Personal communications, 2006-2012). 
How was JJ able to succeed in the New Zealand Court system?  Identifying and 
articulating the aspects or strategies that seemingly make this kaupapa successful 
is critical to realising the potential for successful and positive outcomes for all 
hapū throughout the land who are struggling through the minefield of the court 
system and other bureaucracies.  The mere fact of knowing that it has been 
successful at a local level elsewhere allows hapū to go about the business of 
defending, protecting, retaining and reclaiming their customary rights with an 
increased expectation of success – a situation that, I would argue, currently 
doesn’t exist. 
1.9 Killing cows 
The whānau has been listening on-and-off to JJ’s message for almost ten years.  
Few within the whānau ever took it seriously especially not when JJ was 
espousing some radical and controversial ideas such as Māori Incorporation 
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beneficiaries having no need for New Zealand driver licences, nor New Zealand 
car registrations and license plates, and perhaps most outrageously no debt 
liability (JJ, personal communication, c2004).  On one occasion he summoned the 
local District Police Commander to a Native Assessor’s Court held at a local 
marae.  Although the District Police Commander did not attend the Court still sat 
and went through the motions of hearing evidence. 
JJ’s persistence is unrivalled, as is his knowledge recall in matters pertaining to 
historical events that inform and influence the operations of his Māori 
Incorporation, and he never misses an opportunity to share this kaupapa with 
anyone who will listen.  It happened so often that many in the whānau ignored 
him, whilst others rolled their eyes and laughingly dismissed his lengthy offerings 
as, ‘Oh, there he goes, killing cows again’, a kōrero whakatoi that implies JJ talks 
so incessantly and so long that cows would die waiting for the message to end. 
While the whānau generally found this situation humorous and most pooh-poohed 
the whole idea it suddenly became quite real when JJ started winning in court. 
It is a desire to unpack and attempt to finally understand what JJ has been saying 
all these years that has motivated me to engage in this study.  In all likelihood 
though it would be overly ambitious on my part to assume that at the conclusion 
of this work I would have all the answers regarding what Māori Incorporations 
such as those co-founded by JJ will achieve in today’s world.  I do anticipate 
however that I will have a clearer picture as to whether or not through asserting 
and applying tikanga this kaupapa of Māori Incorporations, as explained by JJ, 
offers a plausible remedy to some of the issues confronting whānau, hapū and iwi 
in the present-day. 
1.10 He kupu whakahiato 
Ki taku mōhio kua oti te mahere tuhingaroa nei te whakatakoto.  Kua 
whakamōhiotia atu te kaupapa o te tēnei tuhingaroa, tana kaupapa rangahau, me 
āna pātai hei whakautu.  Kua tūtohungia te whānui o te titiro me te aronga matua 
hei arohaehae, hei tātari mā te hinengaro.  Kua whakaatuhia te hanganga o tēnei 
tuhingaroa me āna upoko e whitu.  Ko te tūmanako ia ka whai māramatanga, ka 
whai hua hoki tātou i roto i ngā kupu kōrero, i ngā whakaaro hoki e whai ake nei.  
Hei aha?  Hei oranga ngākau, hei oranga hinengaro, hei oranga wairua hoki mō te 
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hunga e kimi rongoa ana.  Me te whakaaro anō, tērā pea ko ā tātou tikanga Māori 
taua rongoa. 
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO – TIKANGA 
Whakawātea ngākau kia tau pai ai te wairua Māori, 
Kia huhua ai ngā taonga tuauriuri whāioio. 
Ruia te kākano o te mātauranga Māori ki tō hinengaro 
Kia tupu, kia whanake, kia pua te māramatanga tāukiuki. 
(Taitoko & Rangihau, 1997, p. 4) 
2.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to present a number of articulations about what tikanga is, its 
origins, how it is validated, and how it is positioned in relation to notions of 
sovereignty, indigeneity, Māori Incorporations and contemporary issues.  In doing 
so it is hoped that new understandings can be enunciated about how tikanga 
contributes to the interrupt, interrogate and enunciate formula of third space 
theory. 
This chapter celebrates perspectives of tikanga sourced from te ao Māori whilst 
Western definitions and interpretations are for the most part avoided.  This is done 
because it is too easy in a study of this nature to allow the discussion to be shaped 
and confined by notions of the relationship between tikanga and legal/political 
concepts which draw upon interpretations and definitions of tikanga as furnished 
by Western academics and commentators.  These non-Māori worldview 
interpretations and definitions are not of the same paradigm as that which birthed 
the notion of tikanga.  I would argue they are void of any mātauranga Māori 
underpinning and of any ao Māori perspective, and therefore ill-suited to make 
any significant contribution to this study.  Accordingly, it seems sensible to 
contemplate tikanga based only on those articulations and commentaries that can 
reliably be acknowledged as coming from a Māori worldview and informed by 
mātauranga Māori. 
This study is not an invasive dissection and unpacking of individual tikanga with 
the intention of interpreting, or re-interpreting, efficacy and relevancy.  Indeed, it 
is the stance of this study that all tikanga are relevant.  Nor is this study a survey 
of the health of tikanga, i.e. how many people teach or practice which types of 
tikanga; which tikanga are most actively and regularly engaged with and in 
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whatever specific geographical regions or contexts; and which tikanga should be 
abandoned and consigned eternally to the past.  Such a survey would require a 
huge investment of time, effort and funding, and leaves me wondering what 
benefit could possibly be derived at the end, and for whom. 
I propose that critical to any undertaking of this nature is first gaining an 
understanding of the essence of tikanga, its origins, purpose, and application, and 
in attempting to achieve this, this study draws upon the collective wisdom of those 
who can confidently be recognised either as cultural practitioners and/or culturally 
informed.  One such contributor is Mead whose book Tikanga Māori: living by 
Māori values (2003) is drawn upon heavily throughout this study inasmuch as the 
first three chapters of his work offer insights that lay the groundwork allowing for 
a structured examination of tikanga to occur.  However, in this study I have taken 
the liberty to consider in reverse Chapters Two and Three of Mead’s book by 
examining the underlying principles and values in the first instance and through 
that, attempt to describe the purpose and function of tikanga.  I suggest this then 
provides a platform from which an understanding of how the assertion and 
application of tikanga can be posited as a credible and valid response to 
contemporary issues currently facing tikanga-based societies. 
2.2 He taonga tuauriuri whāioio 
That pre-contact Māori society was underpinned by principles and values is 
difficult to refute, as I contend this is so for any society.  I propose that which 
distinguishes difference between societies are the specific collective aspirations 
embodied in each society’s principles and the profound beliefs encapsulated in 
their values.  It is these principles and values, I suggest, that inform decision-
making, which in turn dictate ideal actions to achieve optimum outcomes that 
ultimately most closely align to the principles and values espoused by the 
collective.  In Māori societies this is discussed in terms of being tikanga, that 
which is tika.  Any action or belief that did not align with the acknowledged 
principles and values would be incongruous, and as discussed later in this chapter, 
could well be risky too.  But where do these principles and values come from and 
who determines the validity and appropriateness of such? 
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It is argued here that tikanga is not only representative of those principles and 
values but also the actions involved are the very embodiment of those aspirations 
and beliefs.  In his introduction to understanding tikanga Mead seems to support 
this representative notion of tikanga when he offers that, 
Tikanga is the set of beliefs associated with practices and 
procedures to be followed in conducting the affairs of a group or an 
individual.  These procedures are established by precedents through 
time, are held to be ritually correct, are validated by usually more 
than one generation and are always subject to what a group or an 
individual is able to do. (Mead, 2003, p. 12) 
Marsden (as cited in Pihama, 2001) compliments the preceding offering by adding 
that, 
The cultural metaphysics or basic convictions which provide a 
people’s guidelines to life evolve over generations of life experience 
in which succeeding generations add their quota of knowledge and 
fresh discoveries to the corpus of their cultural heritage.  The 
customs and traditions of previous generations based on their 
beliefs and attitudes regarding the nature of ultimate reality, of the 
universe, and of man are the foundation stories upon which the 
mores, standards and values comprise the body of the cultural 
physics. (p. 131) 
Eruiti (as cited in Roughan, 2009) contributes to the discussion by identifying 
some of the spheres directly linked to tikanga when he notes that tikanga includes 
“matters that cross into religious, moral, and spiritual modes of regulation in 
breach of the codes of the ancestors and creators” (p. 143). 
Other spheres with direct links to tikanga, that I believe should not be ignored, 
include the physical, mental and societal realms.  These will be addressed further 
later in this chapter.  In returning to principles and values Marsden (1992) offers 
that, 
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Tikanga Maori translates as Maori custom.  They denote those 
customs and traditions that have been handed down through many 
generations and have been accepted as a reliable and appropriate 
way of achieving and fulfilling certain objectives and goals.  Such 
proven methods together with their accompanying protocols are 
integrated into the general cultural institutions of society and 
incorporated into the cultural system of standards, values, attitudes 
and beliefs. (p. 15) 
Mead contributes the following when considering a conference presentation by 
Chief Māori Land Court Judge Joseph Williams (as cited in Mead, 2003) noting 
that, “Williams (2000) argues that tikanga Māori deals not so much with rules and 
regulations but with values which are subject to various cultural tests of 
appropriateness, correctness and adequacy” (p. 27). 
The preceding statement nudges this discussion towards the tikanga and 
political/legal definition discourse but still contributes to this discussion by 
offering a perspective of the difference that exists in the essence of what tikanga is 
and what it is not.  Durie (as cited in Mead, 2003) contributes to the conversation 
by offering that, 
The question might more aptly be whether there were values to 
which the community generally subscribed.  Whether those values 
were regularly upheld is not the point but whether they had regular 
influence.  Māori operated not by finite rules alone, or even mainly, 
but as in Christian law, by reference to principles, goals, and values 
that were not necessarily achievable.  They were largely idealised 
standards attributed to famous ancestors. (p. 26) 
2.3 He māramatanga tāukiuki 
From the preceding articulations two distinct elements have appeared on the 
tikanga discourse horizon inasmuch as it would seem to have been indicated by 
most of the previous commentators that there is a time or intergenerational 
consideration relevant to tikanga.  Phrases such as, ‘established by precedents 
through time’, ‘validated by usually more than one generation’, ‘codes of the 
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ancestors’, ‘customs and traditions that have been handed down through many 
generations’, and ‘attributed to famous ancestors’, all lend an air of time-tested 
validity being an essential part of tikanga, and give us our first reference point 
from which to measure validity.  Mead (2003) addresses and celebrates this by 
explaining that, 
Tikanga Māori are not frozen in time although some people think 
that they ought to be… It is true, however, that tikanga are linked to 
the past and that is one of the reasons why they are valued so highly 
by the people.  They do link us to the ancestors, to their knowledge 
base and to their wisdom. (p. 21) 
So it would seem that in response to the first question about where these 
principles and values that inform tikanga come from, a likely answer is that they 
come from learnings gleaned through the lived-experiences of the preceding 
generation, or generations, some possibly extending back through millennia.  
These learnings are deposited into a society’s collective memory, into its 
knowledge bank, and constitute a living repository of a society’s total knowing 
from, I would suggest, possibly before the time a society recognised itself as a 
separate collective entity.  I propose that this knowledge bank provides a reference 
point on which a society’s worldview compass is calibrated and serves to give 
credibility to the self-determining behaviour of the society that created it. 
This leads the discussion into another dimension, one that relates to the 
knowledge bank and its relevance to tikanga and indicates two more reference 
points from which, I suggest, validity and credibility can be measured.  Mead 
(2003) informs the discussion by commenting that, 
A different approach is to look at tikanga Māori as an essential part 
of mātauranga Māori, or Māori knowledge.  In point of fact tikanga 
cannot be understood without making use of mātauranga Māori.  
All tikanga Māori are firmly embedded in mātauranga Māori, which 
might be seen as Māori philosophy as well as Māori knowledge.  
While mātauranga Māori might be carried in the minds, tikanga 
Māori puts that knowledge into practise and adds the aspects of 
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correctness and ritual support.  People then see tikanga in action, 
and they do it, feel it, understand it, accept it and feel empowered 
through experience.  Tikanga Māori might be described as Māori 
philosophy in practice and as the practical face of Māori knowledge. 
(p. 7) 
The positioning of mātauranga Māori as critical to understanding tikanga and the 
correctness of enacting through appropriate ritual give two more reference points 
from which to gauge validity and credibility.  If some custom or practise is 
proposed to be tikanga yet it has no evident foundation in mātauranga Māori then 
it would be found lacking in cultural integrity and would not be regarded as pono.  
Similarly is the fate that awaits supposed tikanga where there is confusion or 
discord regarding the correct manner in which a particular tikanga should be 
enacted and the appropriate ritual that should be applied to it.  It would be lacking 
in general comprehension and acceptance by the society and accordingly would 
not be regarded as tika.  Pono and tika are equally as important as longevity in 
measuring the validity and credibility of tikanga and are examined in more depth 
later in this chapter. 
Returning to mātauranga Māori, Marsden (1992) seemingly acknowledges the 
critical role it plays in informing a Māori knowledge-based philosophy inasmuch 
as he celebrates the role of myth and legend as transmitters of such vital 
information when he offers that, “Myth and legend are an integral part of the 
corpus of fundamental knowledge held by the philosophers and seers of the 
Maori” (p. 2). 
It is argued here that even if a custom or practise has gained some measure of 
longevity, and even if it is acknowledged as pono and tika, there is no guarantee 
that it will continue to be treated as tikanga if the body of knowledge (mātauranga 
Māori) and accompanying philosophies (Māori worldview) that underpin and 
support it are not transmitted to subsequent generations. 
2.4 He kākano i ruia 
So where then does this Māori philosophy come from?  As indicated earlier there 
would seem to be an inter-generational link which influences tikanga but is that as 
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far as it goes?  One contributor is quite clear that it traverses time to an epoch that 
humankind has been hypothesising about since time immemorial, back to 
creation.  In discussing the role of myth and legend in the Māori worldview 
Marsden (1992) offers they, 
were deliberate constructs employed by the ancient seers and sages 
to encapsulate and condense into easily assimilable forms their view 
of the world, of ultimate reality and the relationship between the 
creator, the universe and man… Cultures pattern perceptions of 
reality into conceptualisations of what they perceive reality to be: of 
what is to be regarded as actual, probable, possible or impossible.  
These conceptualisations form what is termed the ‘world view’ of a 
culture. (p. 2) 
The world view is the central systemisation of conceptions 
of reality to which the members of culture assent and from which 
stems their value system.  The world view lies at the very heart of 
the culture, touching, interacting with and strongly influencing 
every aspect of the culture. (p. 3). 
The role of narrative through myth and legend as the transmitter of perceptions of 
reality forms a large part of the discussion in Chapter Six when attempting to 
understand JJ’s worldview articulations, which for him validates and gives 
credibility to his Māori Incorporation’s way of being and doing. 
As well as the progenitive contribution the knowledge bank makes in establishing 
tikanga one is compelled to also consider the players involved in divining the 
mysteries and complexities presented by the phenomena they are confronted with.  
This function is arguably a responsibility mainly reserved unto the most 
knowledgeable members of a society, those who have a broadly acknowledged 
and proven understanding of the records held within the knowledge bank.  They 
are, as a matter of course, of the society and in being so it seems reasonable to 
assume they have a vested interest in increasing the collective memory of their 
society and working towards realising that society’s aspirations and upholding 
their beliefs. 
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Kruger (as cited Waitangi Tribunal, 2009) joins in the discussion by contributing, 
Tikanga is the way we conduct our lives consistent with our beliefs, 
with our philosophical baselines, as they manifest themselves in our 
behaviours, our relationships, our way of life.  The practice of 
tikanga must be grounded in an understanding of the philosophy 
that underlies it. (p. 80) 
Sadly though, observers and commentators not affiliated to that same society 
and/or lacking in understanding of its underpinning philosophies tend to derogate 
this collective memory by denouncing aspects of it as outdated and irrelevant to 
the modern day and age.  This they do primarily by asserting that a pre-colonial 
society could not have had any knowledge whatsoever of 20th century 
developments, such as genetic engineering or motorways.  In 2002 AgResearch 
applied to produce transgenic cows (containing synthetic human genes) at its site 
at Ruakura in Hamilton.  The hapū of that area, Ngāti Wairere, took the lead in 
opposing this application based on their worldview and philosophies concerning 
whakapapa and mauri.  Also in 2002 Ngāti Naho opposed the development of a 
three-lane motorway at Meremere, in Waikato.  The site was the dwelling place of 
a malevolent taniwha, whom they held responsible for the high death rates on that 
stretch of road.  They contended that building the motorway there would expose a 
greater number of road users to increased risk. 
General opinion of the day to these culturally valid and credible articulations 
reflected a “frustration that a ‘primitive culture’ is being allowed to halt 
development because politically correct Pakeha are too afraid to tell Maori to get 
real, get over it or get lost” (Corbett, 2002, para. 7). 
I argue that ill-informed outbursts such as this are simply attempts to render the 
entire contents of a society’s knowledge bank as irrelevant and immaterial and in 
doing so visit the same fate upon that entire society.  Whilst it is accepted that 
there were no motor vehicles or studies in deoxyribonucleic acid sequencing back 
in the societies of early 19th century Aotearoa, neither were there likely to be any 
in early 19th century anywhere-else-in-the-world societies. 
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So how could a stone-age and illiterate society possibly develop appropriate and 
applicable tikanga for such things in any subsequent day and age?  This appears to 
be the main thrust of the criticism laid against tikanga responses put forward by 
societies endeavouring to rationalise new phenomena via their own tried and 
tested processes.  I would suggest the problem with criticisms of this nature is that 
they are formulated and provisioned by postcolonial amnesia, a blinkering malaise 
that leaves the afflicted misguided and ill-informed.  Gandhi (1998) comments on 
this affliction noting that, 
The emergence of anti-colonial and ‘independent’ nation-States 
after colonialism is frequently accompanied by a desire to forget the 
colonial past.  This ‘will-to-forget’ takes a number of historical 
forms, and is impelled by a variety of cultural and political 
motivations.  Principally, postcolonial amnesia is symptomatic of 
the urge for historical self-invention or the need to make a new start 
– to erase painful memories of colonial subordination. (p. 4) 
Put more plainly, I propose that the wrong question is being asked and those 
asking don’t even realise it.  In short, there were no tikanga in existence that 
related directly to motor vehicular transportation requiring motorways or studies 
in deoxyribonucleic acid sequencing.  However, I argue that the worldviews, 
philosophies, principles and values that inform how new phenomena should be 
approached, unpacked and interrogated, did. 
Motorways exist to serve mankind’s dependency on motor vehicles for land 
transportation and motorways require land on which to be built.  Most land in 
Aotearoa is not flat and uninterrupted but is curvaceous, undulating and lacerated 
by streams, swamps, gullies and ravines.  Whilst no mātauranga Māori existed 
relating to motor vehicles and motorways there was an abundance of mātauranga 
Māori relating to whenua.  It was this accumulated knowledge that allowed for the 
creation of tikanga relating to matters pertaining to the whenua and not the mode 
of transportation.  Likewise, where no mātauranga Māori existed relating to 
deoxyribonucleic acid sequencing there was a plethora of data about whakapapa, 
mauri, and the interconnectedness of all species known to exist in Aotearoa, 
including humankind.  It was this knowledge that allowed for the development of 
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tikanga relating to matters concerning all living beings, not just cows.  It was this 
same knowledge that allowed for the examination and interpretation of these new 
phenomena of motorways and deoxyribonucleic acid sequencing and ultimately to 
the establishment of tikanga responses that were tika and pono to the contents of 
the knowledge bank and the worldview.  Much of this mātauranga Māori data was 
and still is stored in the knowledge bank, which allows for the formulation of 
society’s attitudes to the onslaught of ever newer developments.  I propose that it 
is this perspective that informs the development of tikanga. 
I suggest this whole process is yet another form of validating the appropriateness 
of tikanga inasmuch as it serves to reinforce the notion that only those who are of 
the society in that time and in those circumstances can rightfully determine the 
above, as it is based on the knowledge bank, principles and values of that society 
at that time.  External commentators who venture to proffer opinions on such 
matters do so from a tenuous position, in so far as they are not of the society and 
have no vested interest in its wellbeing.  They have nothing to lose and everything 
to gain.  Here perhaps we have the strongest argument against allowing those of 
‘other’ paradigms to make comments from the far side of the fence. 
The preceding would seem to indicate that tikanga “are not frozen in time” (Mead, 
2003, p. 21) but can be created or can evolve, a condition that I argue can only 
occur if it is accepted that tikanga are not static and are in fact fluid, even organic 
things.  If this is the case then it indicates that tikanga changes, evolves and 
responds to meet the events and conditions of the time and the environment a 
society finds itself living in.  Where no tikanga relevant to a specific matter exists 
then it seems quite plausible that a society’s knowledge bank would be scoured 
and its principles and values consulted.  This would all be done with the goal of 
formulating appropriate tikanga responses to achieve optimum outcomes in the 
face of unanticipated and/or unfamiliar circumstances. 
If one accepts that tikanga can be created and/or adapted to meet specific 
conditions then one should be open to the notion that tikanga can also be 
discarded.  I propose that such is the destiny of tikanga that no longer hold any 
relevance to the aspirations and beliefs of a society.  Being no longer relevant they 
soon fall into disuse and eventually disappear from the societal landscape.  I 
28 
suggest that such was the fate of kaitangata and certain funerary practices of pre-
contact and immediate post-contact societies.  Many of this present-day 
generation, including myself, would quite likely find these types of tikanga 
distasteful, even repugnant, but I argue that these extinct practices would more 
rightly be seen in the light of being no longer necessary or relevant to today’s 
conditions.  When these tikanga disappear I suggest it does not necessarily follow 
that the knowledge, principles and values that informed their evolution and 
application would also disappear.  I argue that the knowledge of all tikanga, 
whether extant or extinct, is stored in the knowledge bank and as long as the 
principles and values that brought them into being still remain relevant, then I 
propose that those records are always accessible by that society. 
2.5 Ngā ao e rua 
I propose that tikanga belongs to, and is a construct of, the human mind.  It is a set 
of human ideas and beliefs manifested in human-initiated practices and rituals.  
This having been said, I suggest that tikanga is also a mechanism deliberately 
contrived to straddle two worlds – te ao wairua me te ao kikokiko.  It appears to 
me that it is a stratagem designed to safely navigate the space between the proven 
and the imagined, the natural and the supranatural, which, interestingly enough, I 
believe a tikanga-based society’s worldview would treat as being totally natural.  I 
would argue that tikanga operates on two levels – thought and deed.  It appears to 
be the direct product of a worldview that divides the big picture into two major 
realms and then establishes a device that can facilitate ideal outcomes for 
humankind at the points in time and space where both realms intersect.  To a large 
degree it seems to be the antithesis of the attitude of only believing in that which 
can be seen or touched.  In contrast, this worldview seems to liberate its adherents 
enabling them to embrace the notion of the existence of the ‘other world’, one that 
holds ultimate sway over all things in creation and beyond, both seen and unseen. 
These points compel one to explore the relationship tikanga has with te ao wairua 
and te ao kikokiko in an attempt to understand what part spiritual and temporal 
influences have on tikanga, and perhaps vice versa.  Here again we return to the 
discussion on the worldview and its significance to understanding tikanga.  
Paterson (2008) notes this relationship and provides us with a hint of the function 
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of tikanga in relation to the two realms by stating, “Māori possessed a holistic 
worldview, where the spiritual and temporal concerns impacted upon each other.  
The spirit world was appeased or cajoled, and forms and rules were followed in 
order to safeguard physical well-being” (p. 233). 
This articulation seems to cast tikanga in the light of being not so much an 
intermediary or intercessory force but as more of a formalised structure or system 
occupying a buffer zone between both realms, which I will venture to put forward 
as being representative of Bhabha’s third space (1994).  However, with this done 
it then creates the need to re-examine the interrupt, interrogate, and enunciate 
formula he also proposes (1996) as being critical to the third space.  This shift, I 
argue, is due to the mysterious supranatural perception of te ao wairua, a place or 
thing that can be influenced to a certain degree by humankind but never controlled 
by it.  I propose then that it is more useful to interpret the process as not so much 
interrupted but more as engaged with, and not so much interrogated but more as 
negotiated, and the response not so much enunciated but more as celebrated.  At 
this point I raise my suspicions that these encounters take place in a perilous space 
fraught with risk for the inexperienced, and accordingly I put forward the notion 
that it is understandable then that these encounters are cloaked in formality, ritual 
and protocols, and overseen by the select few steeped in such knowledge. 
Illness through disease is an example of how this aspect can be evidenced.  Pre-
contact societies in Aotearoa believed that the diseases that afflicted humankind 
were due to the machinations of elements in the “supernatural world” (Lange, 
2012, para. 4) and “their treatment of disease lay in the sphere of magic and 
shamanism” (Goldie, 1999, p. 5).  Illness, whether physical or mental afflictions – 
since within my own people no such differentiation was made until post-contact 
times, was most commonly attributed to some transgression in tikanga, mostly 
incidents where tapu was breached (Goldie, 1999; Lange, 2012; Mead, 2003).  It 
seems that when a transgression occurred the transgressor’s spiritual/temporal 
balance was disturbed, causing them to suffer in some discernible manner (Mead, 
2003).  Sadly though, worse than this is the belief that in some instances the 
‘punishment’ was meted out not to the transgressor but to an individual or 
individuals close to him or her, particularly in the case of whakamā.  The remedy 
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almost always required the intercession of one or some of those select few (Lange, 
2012; Mead, 2003) whose profound knowledge in dealing with tikanga in the 
third space offered the afflicted the best opportunity for recovery. 
Accordingly, I argue here that tikanga exists primarily to maintain a balance or 
equilibrium between the influences of both te ao wairua and te ao kikokiko acting 
upon the individual.  I also propose that if one should focus too much on matters 
of te ao kikokiko they would be susceptible to the illnesses of individualism, 
selfishness, gluttony and self-importance, which in turn impacts on his/her 
society.  I believe that as a result of his/her illness the individual abrogates his/her 
reciprocal responsibilities as obliged by the principles of manaakitanga and 
whanaungatanga.  On the other hand, should one focus too much on te ao wairua 
and lose their connection to te ao kikokiko they run the danger of being overcome 
by ‘other world’ influences, rendering them afflicted in a manner I suggest that 
this generation would recognise as being mentally ill.  In te ao Māori, it is widely 
understood that transgressing tikanga invites consequences (Mead, 2003), ranging 
from the benign and momentary to the catastrophic and enduring.  Thankfully I 
have only personally experienced momentary whakamā as a consequence of 
transgressing tikanga – however its impact was profound and provided a lifelong 
lesson. 
2.6 He āhuatanga nō te tikanga 
This understanding then leads me to propose that anything labelled as a tikanga, 
yet fails to address te ao wairua, is not in fact tikanga.  I argue it is little more than 
a ture inasmuch as it only concerns itself with matters of te ao kikokiko.  Marae 
auahi kore is probably the best example of a ture that some treat as a tikanga.  
Ture of this nature seem to be concerned purely with the physical realm and lack 
any te ao wairua connection, thereby voiding themselves from qualifying as 
tikanga.  I argue that they could never be anything more than ture.  Likewise, I 
propose that tikanga that have no consideration for te ao kikokiko are not tikanga, 
they are not even of the human realm and, I suggest, impossible for the human 
mind to conceive let alone comprehend. 
It would then seem to follow that tikanga plays a critical role in people’s everyday 
lives, particularly for those who are culturally aware, since influences of both te 
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ao wairua and te ao kikokiko would be ever-present.  I suggest that this Damocles 
sword type of existence would be almost intolerable save for the existence of 
commonly-shared societal concepts that govern the behaviour and conduct of its 
members and thereby furnishing a sense of collective security.  I would argue that 
these too are sometimes referred to as tikanga.  The concepts I refer to are things 
such as aroha, tautoko, and whai koha.  I further propose that these are framed in 
guiding notions designed to provide clear parameters in which such successful 
engagements can take place and, as a prerequisite, must be reflective of that 
society’s principles and values.  Some of these notions are addressed in this study 
and known as mana, tapu, tika and pono. 
Irwin (as cited in Paterson, 2008).notes and expands on this by offering that, 
Māori life was regulated by the concepts of mana, the numinous 
authority of chiefs, and tapu, restrictions affecting individuals and 
human activity.  Both mana and tapu emanated from divine sources, 
and the observance of tapu ensured the physical and spiritual well-
being of Māori people, their society, and resources. (p. 220) 
I propose that mana, whether that of the individual or the collective, was fiercely 
guarded.  Barlow (1991) connects mana to te ao wairua by defining it as, “the 
enduring, indestructible power of the gods” (p. 61).  This having been said, he 
goes on to acknowledge a different and more contemporary view of mana by 
stating that, “In modern times the term mana has taken on various meanings, 
including the power of gods, the power of ancestors, the power of the land, and 
the power of the individual” (p. 61). 
When considering mana and te ao kikokiko, mana as used in the language also 
refers to privilege and status that is derived by individuals and collectives who are 
competent in meeting their responsibilities and obligations (Mead, 2003).  Here I 
propose that mana is one of two measuring tools that aid people in determining 
their response to any matter of significance inasmuch as it compels them to 
consider how a potential action in te ao kikokiko might impact upon te ao wairua, 
with, I suggest, the view towards maintaining a balance between the two. 
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I also propose tapu as another measuring tool inasmuch as it delineates the 
parameters in which actions born of te ao kikokiko can impact on the 
requirements of te ao wairua.  Again I turn to Barlow (1991) who provides us with 
the following definition, “First and foremost, tapu is the power and influence of 
the gods” (p. 128), a clear link to te ao wairua, and a connection that he reinforces 
in his closing sentence, “the important thing to remember is that tapu comes from 
the gods, and embraces all the powers and influences associated with them” (p. 
129). 
Mead (2003) acknowledges a connection between tapu and te ao kikokiko when 
he contributes that, 
The concept of tapu is an important element in all tikanga… Tapu is 
everywhere in our world.  It is present in people, in places, in 
buildings, in things, in words, and in all tikanga.  Tapu is 
inseparable from mana, from our identity as Māori and from our 
cultural practices. (p. 30) 
Examples of how mana and tapu act as measuring tools can be found in 
whakataukī stored in the knowledge banks of all hapū.  Some allude to the 
potential non-physical consequences, namely whakamā, brought about by the 
actions of those who imperil their own and others’ mana, whilst others delineate 
the sphere of influence of tapu upon the physical.  I suggest the following as 
examples of both concepts.  “Kāore te kūmara e kōrero mō tōna māngaro 
(Brougham & Reed, 1999, p. 93) condemns self-praise and promotes modesty 
whilst “He amorangi ki mua, he hāpai ō ki muri” (Brougham & Reed, 1999, p. 
120) indicates the separate yet complimentary roles of the sacred and the temporal. 
If mana and tapu act as measuring tools to gauge the efficacy of tikanga in 
mediating the intersection between te ao wairua and te ao kikokiko, then I propose 
that the longevity of a particular custom or practice attests to its validity.  To 
determine the credibility of a specific tikanga I return to examine tika and pono. 
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2.7 Te tika me te pono 
It would seem that while mana indicates likely outcomes in te ao kikokiko when 
interacting with te ao wairua, tapu indicates parameters surrounding the extent of 
that interaction.  However, there are two other concepts worthy of consideration 
when dealing with tikanga, those being tika and pono.  Mead (2003) addresses 
these two concepts by contributing that, 
The concept of tika, or being correct, is a base principle that applies 
to all tikanga.  So the practice of a particular tikanga needs to be 
correct and right.  But in making a judgement about the correctness 
there is another key term that should be considered.  This is the 
concept of pono, which means ‘true’ or ‘genuine’, that is, true in 
terms of the principles of Māoritanga. (p. 25) 
Here then, we have articulated for us an important link between tikanga and the 
society that practices it.  I again propose that while the mana and tapu of a 
particular tikanga can be weighed against likely outcomes, one would do well to 
also consult the society’s knowledge bank to establish whether or not a proposed 
action is pono to its principles and accurately reflective of its beliefs.  I suggest 
that initiatives such as Te Kōhanga Reo, Kura Kaupapa Māori, Wharekura and 
Wānanga Māori are examples of initiatives based on tikanga, supported by the 
knowledge bank and embraced by the society because, I argue, it was seen as 
being tika and pono.  These tikanga-based initiatives also have an ao wairua 
aspect which is fundamental to their very existence inasmuch as they all 
deliberately set out to instil those beliefs and values practiced by tūpuna Māori 
and acknowledged as being influenced by atua, and therefore attracting both mana 
and tapu. 
I humbly leave the penultimate word on this matter to Mead (2003) who 
summarises the preceding notes by stating that, 
Tikanga are tools of thought and knowledge.  They are packages of 
ideas which help to organise behaviour and provide some 
predictability in how certain activities are carried out.  They provide 
templates and frameworks to guide our actions and help steer us 
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through some huge gatherings of people and some tense moments in 
our ceremonial life.  They help us differentiate between right and 
wrong in everything we do and in all activities that we engage in.  
There is a right and proper way to conduct one’s self. (p. 12). 
As a framework then, I propose that tikanga offers space and time to interrupt 
uncertain or tense situations, interrogate those situations and enunciate new 
understandings.  At this point I return to my earlier propositions from Chapter One 
that pōwhiri and hongi are examples of how tikanga acts in the manner that 
reflects the purpose attributed to third space theory.  When considering the formal 
and ritualised process of pōwhiri I argue that its composite stages of karanga, 
whaikōrero, and whakaratarata are reflective of the interrupt, interrogate and 
enunciate stages as prescribed by Bhabha (1996).  As for the common-place 
habitual practice of hongi I propose that the stages of initial touching with the 
hand, and then the pressing of ihu, followed by the exchange of hā are also 
reflective of the interrupt, interrogate and enunciate process.  In both cases, I 
would argue, what is occurring is a negotiation of positions at both a physical and 
spiritual level to articulate the quality of a relationship. 
This then leads to considering another aspect inherent in third space theory, that of 
hybridity.  The notion of hybridity proposes that in the encounter between 
coloniser and colonised there will be some type of social, cultural, political and 
even language exchange and this is examined in Chapter Five.  There are a number 
of practices evident in today’s pōwhiri process that I propose as being 
representative of such an exchange inasmuch as they are adoptions and adaptations 
from the ‘other’ paradigm.  Shaking hands and kissing, offering koha of cash and 
cheques, the establishment of dedicated pae tapu and pae manu, even the presence 
and role of Māori Wardens, are likely the most obvious of these hybridised 
practices.  Rather than criticising these practices as non-traditional and foreign, 
and therefore having no place in pōwhiri, I suggest that their very existence attests 
to the fluid and organic nature of tikanga.  Moreover, given the length of time 
these practices have endured on marae across the country, easily more than fifty 
years, they attract unto themselves an aura of general acceptance, appropriateness, 
credibility and validity. 
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For tikanga-based societies suffering under colonisation I would suggest that being 
tika and pono is paramount as it allows them to remain loyal to the legacy of their 
ancestors and to their inherited collective memory.  It is this stance of loyalty that I 
propose does to a large degree motivate indigenous groups and those seeking 
sovereignty, such as JJ’s Māori Incorporation, which itself is arguably an example 
of hybridity operating in the third space.  These points are explored in greater 
depth in Chapter Six. 
2.8 He kupu whakahiato 
Throughout the preceding discussions of this chapter a number of articulations 
about tikanga have been explored.  The first was that of considering the manner in 
which discussions occur about tikanga and the concepts and definitions employed 
to contextualise and guide those discussions.  It is argued here that to make a 
meaningful effort to appreciate what tikanga is, where it originates from, its 
purpose and application, one is better positioned to do so from within the paradigm 
from which tikanga emanates.  Doing so locates the discussion within the same 
sphere as the knowledge bank of the tikanga-based society concerned. 
Second, is about understanding the nature of tikanga and what underpins it, which 
I believe the commentaries have shown to be a society’s worldview and 
philosophies.  This worldview furnishes a society with its principles, values and 
beliefs, allowing its members to rationalise their world in their present time and 
condition.  Furthermore, I believe, it has been shown that it is this worldview that 
informs decision-making, which in turn dictates ideal actions to achieve optimum 
outcomes, remembering that tikanga is itself a physical manifestation 
representative of those same principles, values and beliefs. 
Thirdly is the notion that tikanga is a non-static, fluid and organic way of being 
and doing.  I would argue here that this is probably one of its strengths inasmuch 
as in having such a characteristic it is well positioned to respond to new or 
unanticipated challenges and innovations constantly being cast forth from this ao 
hurihuri.  Also it is proffered here that this coupled with a society’s commonly-
shared expectations and aspirations furnish it with a sense of assuredness and 
collective security, even a sense of balance and continuity, particularly in matters 
concerning points of interface between te ao wairua me te ao kikokiko. 
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I contend that it is important to note also the functions of mana and tapu in relation 
to tikanga.  Often these seem to be treated as separate and exclusive of each other 
however, I would argue that, this examination has confirmed for me that there does 
and always did exist an intimate and inextricable link between all three.  As mused 
earlier mana compels tikanga practitioners to consider how an action occurring in 
te ao kikokiko might impact upon te ao wairua, whilst tapu delineates the 
parameters in which actions occurring in te ao kikokiko could impact on the 
requirements of te ao wairua.  I propose that all this contributes towards stressing 
the importance of the notion that this all happens in an effort to maintain balance. 
Equally significant, I argue, is appreciating the importance of tika and pono to not 
only enacting tikanga but also to even considering the act.  I accept the 
commentaries that argue that for tikanga to be recognised as tika and pono the 
practitioner must remain tika to their cultural heritage and the legacy of their 
tūpuna whilst enacting tikanga in a manner that is distinguishable as pono.  It is 
here that there could well be some disagreement between tikanga-based societies 
as to which tikanga are tika and pono.  This is not unusual as many hapū have 
different ways of being and doing which all within their respective societies see as 
being tika and pono. 
That indigenous groups and others seeking sovereignty can and do operate in the 
third space has raised the issue of hybridity of tikanga, which attests to its non-
static nature. 
All of the preceding would seem to present as prerequisites for any group, such as 
JJ’s Māori Incorporation, who lay claim to being a tikanga-based entity.  Is his 
Māori Incorporation a tikanga-based society and are the tikanga they enact 
informed by that society’s knowledge bank and clearly aligned to that society’s 
principles, values and beliefs?  When considering the non-static nature of tikanga 
as enacted by JJ’s Māori Incorporation, is this manifested by seemingly radical 
actions such as the issuing of Māori driver licenses, Māori car registration plates, 
and tangata whenua passports?  Does the maintenance of balance between the 
temporal and spiritual realms play a significant part in forming JJ’s worldview and 
if so does it influence the ways of being and doing as espoused by his Māori 
Incorporation?  Given that JJ’s worldview differs somewhat from other tikanga-
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based entities, is it safe to assume that JJ’s Māori Incorporation observes and 
enacts different tikanga in the belief that it is tika and pono?  Is JJ’s Māori 
Incorporation an example of a tikanga-based entity operating in a hybridised 
manner, whilst occupying the third space?  All of this is examined in Chapter Six. 
As to the question about the validity and credibility of tikanga, it is the contention 
of this thesis that it is the sum of all the qualities and characteristics of tikanga 
discussed in this chapter that attribute validity and credibility to it.  Its origins, its 
underpinnings, its intent and its application all serve to validate it and, I contend, 
position it as potentially a credible response to contemporary issues facing tikanga-
based societies. 
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3.0 CHAPTER THREE – SOVEREIGNTY 
Koia tērā te kōingotanga, 
He paoa kōmiro, kauruki tōrino, 
Ka puta mai i te ngarahu muramura e. 
He konga tahutahu, he kounga kakā; 
Ko taku manawa kakapa, panapana, 
I tāwhiria e te hau mātaratara e. 
(Taitoko, 2006, p. 1) 
3.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to present a number of articulations about what sovereignty 
is, how it is acquired, how it is exercised, and how it is positioned in relation to 
communities, nations and states.  In doing so it is anticipated that through 
applying the lens of the third space new understandings can be enunciated about 
how tikanga might be perceived as a transformative agent to address issues 
confronting those seeking sovereignty. 
Reviewing literature encompassing notions of sovereignty involves navigating a 
morass of legal and political terms.  Although it is not the intent of this study to 
unpack, examine and then interpret, or re-interpret, these terms it quickly becomes 
apparent that for the lay person to attempt to engage meaningfully in a study of 
this nature knowledge of the current definitions of these terms is a pre-requisite.  
Somewhat more daunting is the realisation that these legal and political terms are 
the linguistic product of the dominant player in the coloniser versus colonised 
phenomenon and as such, I contend, anchor the current discourse squarely within 
the coloniser’s paradigm.  Therefore, to have any hope of being able to perceive, 
discern or appreciate any potential alternative to that being prescribed and 
promoted by the dominant player, I contend that, one would be well served to 
have at least a modicum of cognisance of such terms. 
In attempting to understand sovereignty I can attest that one must be prepared to 
undertake the task of unravelling the lexical tangle that shrouds sovereignty 
discourse.  The conventional definitions available from published authorities such 
as dictionaries have been deliberately avoided in this review in an effort to not 
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restrict the exercise to a mere comparison of conventional definitions to the range 
of other interpretations provided by commentators, and in doing so be free to 
focus on and then gain a greater understanding of what is being said and how 
these terms are being used in the context of the commentaries reviewed.  The 
variety of words used, the lack of a singular definitive explanation for each, and 
most challengingly, their seemingly liberal interchangeability, all contribute to 
fostering an almost overwhelming sense of inadequacy within the reviewer.  
However, coming to grips with and being able to discern the usage of these terms, 
I found, was critical to developing what I propose to be a cohesive and 
comprehensible position that produces a coherent examination of the complex and 
abstract construct that is sovereignty. 
3.2 Te uku me te rino 
Without exception all commentators reviewed in this study at some point discuss 
the term sovereignty in conjunction or association with the notions of nation 
and/or nationhood, nation-state and/or state, citizen and/or citizenship, 
constitution and/or constitutional, corporate or central body politic and/or body 
politic, unified political authority, the Crown and/or the Crown-in-Parliament, 
Parliament, and Treaty.  I would argue that these notions have been transported 
from the northern hemisphere and inculcated by various colonising powers into 
the realities of long-established societies residing on ‘newly discovered’ lands 
(Caldas & Alcadipani, 2003; Pihama, 1997, 2001).  However, I contend that the 
wisdom of transplanting these unfamiliar notions into societies that arguably did 
not require such offerings is worthy of being challenged, especially in light of the 
events of the past one-hundred and seventy-seven years in this land.  One’s 
thoughts immediately turn to the whakatauākī, sometimes credited to Taranaki 
peace activist and prophet Te Whiti-o-Rongomai, a prophetic utterance that, I 
propose both then and now, declaims the futility of attempting to meld two 
distinct and inapposite elements, 
‘E kore te uku e piri ki te rino; ka whitihia e rā, ka ngahoro’ 
I suggest that it could be argued that introducing such ‘civilising’ influences on 
indigenous populations is likely the root cause of those populations’ subsequent 
injury, pain and suffering.  However that is a subject for another study and will 
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not be explored to any great extent here beyond attempting to understand the 
influence that these attitudes have had on the sovereignty discourse. 
3.3 He kōingotanga 
Commentaries reviewed in this study involving the above notions led to the 
realisation that these discussions were introducing qualifying concepts, which are 
likely to be more familiar (if not the actual words then at least what they 
represent) to those not occupying the coloniser’s paradigm.  Those concepts 
include independence, legitimacy, autonomy, authority, power, control, 
incommunicability and inseparability, the rule of law, politics, customs, mutual 
welfare and security.  All of these ‘new’ concepts, I suggest, are mirrored in 
indigenous people’s perceptions of themselves and their world.  In the Aotearoa 
context, these are reflected in terms such as mana motuhake, mana heke, mana 
tupuna, mana rangatira, mana, mana pūmau, tapu, tikanga, mana whakahaere, 
kawa, mana whatu āhuru, and whakangungu.  It is not proposed here to attempt to 
furnish, what I suggest are, introduced terms with equivalent translations but 
rather to make the point that a fair measure of familiarity with these ‘new’ 
concepts already existed in the worldview of pre-colonised societies of Aotearoa. 
Pre-contact societies represent this notion inasmuch as their independence and 
autonomy were drawn from the legitimacy of authority, power and control 
(Barlow, 1991; Mead, 2003) imbued in their rangatira who were established by 
whakapapa (Barlow, 1991), and linked to geographical locations (A. Awatere, 
1969).  Kawa dictated the inseparability of these (A. Awatere, 1969) whilst 
tikanga defined acceptable ways of acting to realise mutual welfare and security 
(A. Awatere, 1969; Barlow, 1991; Mead, 2003). 
Whilst arguing for the existence of some conceptual commonality between both 
coloniser and colonised I suggest that the same cannot perhaps be said when 
discussing the application of the word sovereignty.  Although some commentators 
make reference to “tribal sovereignty” (M. Johnson, 2011, p. 106), or “Māori 
sovereignty” (McHugh, 2002, p. 79), or “independent sovereignty” and “original 
sovereign status” (McHugh, 2002, p. 81), or “each chief’s sovereign status within 
his territory” (Moon & Biggs, 2005, p. 70), this, I argue, is generally done so 
when discussing the presumed secession or even non-existence of such ideas.  A 
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prime example of this attitude is supplied by McHugh (2002) when he identifies 
Chief Justice Prendergast’s 1877 decision in the matter of Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington, which insisted “that the Crown could not call into existence that 
which did not exist – original Māori sovereignty” (p. 79).  Durie (1998) seems to 
swim against the tide, albeit in isolation, when explicitly referring to the pre-
Treaty Māori mind-set he proffers that, “Māori self-determination was securely 
bound to collective Māori sovereignty” (p. 3). 
3.4 He paoa kōmiro 
With most commentators seemingly confined to discussing sovereignty in 
Aotearoa from what I argue to be the dominant player perspective and for some 
reason, possibly the restrictions of observing sovereignty through a historical lens, 
unable to acknowledge the pre-Treaty existence of Māori sovereignty, it is 
doubtless worth examining sovereignty more closely in an attempt to understand 
its origins and character. 
In struggling to understand the notion of sovereignty some relief is drawn from 
the statement that “Sovereignty is a relatively mysterious word in English” 
(Cleave, 1986, p. 385).  The mysterious nature of the word presents a somewhat 
precarious situation inasmuch as it leaves the quest for understanding susceptible 
to interpretation and misinterpretation.  To add to the mystery Fleras and 
Spoonley (as cited in J. T. Johnson, 2008) perceive sovereignty as being akin to 
power and self-determination inasmuch as it “is an intangible, which cannot be 
seen or touched” (p. 46).  An interestingly pictorial image of sovereignty is 
presented by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer (as cited in 
Durie, 1998), who states, “Far from being the indivisible omnipresent concept that 
Hobbes made it in Leviathan, sovereignty is more like a piece of chewing gum.  It 
can be stretched and pulled in many directions to do almost anything” (p. 219). 
Others however have a more prescriptive view.  In his 19th century treatise on the 
law of nations de Vattel (1852) defines sovereignty as follows, “Every nation that 
governs itself, under what form so ever, without dependence on any foreign 
power, is a Sovereign State.  Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other 
state” (para. 4). 
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In the above we see an example of a commentator connoting the notion of 
sovereignty with that of nationhood or statehood.  Without abandoning that 
connotation de Vattel (1852) continues, 
Such are the moral persons who live together in a natural society, 
subject to the law of nations.  To give a nation a right to make an 
immediate figure in this grand society, it is sufficient that it be 
really sovereign and independent, that is, that it govern itself by its 
own authority and laws. (para. 4) 
So it would appear, in the dominant paradigm at least, that sovereignty can only 
follow nationhood.  Could this be Hobbes’ 17th century notion of Leviathan 
(1651), which I would propose is later referred to in the twentieth century as ‘the 
system’, or ‘the man’, or ‘nanny state’?  Whatever the response it seems that de 
Vattel’s position supports Article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen 1789 (as cited in Hawksley & Howson, 2011) which states, “The 
principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.  No body nor individual 
may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation” (p. 
247). 
Given that this declaration was drafted during the French revolution it is 
understandable that it reflects the attitudes of the day.  Particularly so when 
considering that from the preceding statement it appears that sovereignty 
emanating from an individual, such as an absolute monarch or ruler, contravenes 
this declaration and is therefore invalid.  Present-day constitutional monarchies, 
such as those in Belgium, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland that draw their 
authority from the nation or state seem not to contravene this declaration. 
The previous commentators return to reassert the absoluteness of the authority of 
the state by offering that, “In political theory sovereignty denotes absolute legal 
and political authority, the right of the state to make and enforce law, collect taxes 
and so on, over its defined territory” (Hawksley & Howson, 2011, p. 249). 
In Aotearoa the New Zealand Government’s journey to achieving sovereignty was 
a staggered and somewhat drawn-out process.  According to New Zealand 
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Parliamentary Library research analyst, John Wilson (2007), Aotearoa/New 
Zealand was first treated as a colony eventually gaining some measure of self-
administration through representative government in 1854; however it still drew 
its sovereignty from Britain.  In 1857 more autonomy was realised when the 
Parliament at Westminster passed the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act 
(UK) but this still didn’t furnish it with sovereignty.  After petitioning King 
Edward VII New Zealand’s designation was changed from a colony to a dominion 
in 1907, however sovereignty was not achieved until Royal Assent from Britain 
was received for the New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and 
Consent) Act 1947.  It is from this time the New Zealand Government dates it 
claim to sovereignty ultimately leading to the Constitution Act of 1986 where it 
claims New Zealand to be “a free-standing constitutional monarchy whose 
parliament has unlimited sovereign power” (Wilson, 2007, p. 11).  For any of the 
preceding to have occurred I would argue that there needed to be no existing 
sovereignty being exercised.  Successive New Zealand governments have asserted 
that such was the situation once the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 was signed, whilst 
groups such as JJ’s Māori Incorporation refute this passionately. 
As will be seen in Chapter Six the question of sovereignty in Aotearoa plays a 
significant part in understanding the perception held by JJ’s Māori Incorporation 
as to the invalidity of the New Zealand Government’s claim to sovereignty and 
therefore its legitimacy and authority to act. 
3.5 He ngarahu muramura 
To achieve the aforementioned state of absoluteness, I argue that, an array of tools 
is at the coloniser’s disposal ranging from constitutions, to charters and 
legislation, even military force.  Therefore, perhaps the question is can 
sovereignty only be discussed in terms of nation-state authority, and if so does it 
then deliberately set out to exclude those not recognised by others as possessing a 
nation-state appearance or appellation?  If the answer is affirmative, then this will 
always sound the death knell for those not of the dominant paradigm, indigenous 
people in particular, who wish to argue to the contrary, and could quite possibly 
give rise to an adherence to Turkish soldier, politician and writer Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk’s (n.d.) assertion that, “Sovereignty is not given, it is taken” (para. 22).  
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Fortunately, in a less strident tone comes an offering from McHugh (as cited in 
Cox, 1993) which seems bereft of any allusions to nation or state.  He offers that, 
Fundamental to the concept of sovereignty is the acknowledgement 
of that sovereignty, from both within the community and without.  
It is essential that members of a population act in accordance with 
the designated administration and adhere to its direction.  Further, 
sovereign bodies must accept each other’s autonomy and authority.  
Thus sovereignty may be rendered as the acknowledged political 
power of a social group acting in concert for their mutual welfare 
and security. (p. 3) 
I would suggest that the above sounds strikingly like a reasonably accurate 
representation of the pre-contact situation of this land’s indigenous inhabitants. 
Despite the momentum of the discourse seeming to orbit the concept of 
nationhood as a precursor to sovereignty, it seems that once the discourse space 
has been claimed opportunities arise for the addition of other qualifiers. These 
qualifiers appear to extend, even refine, the sovereignty notion, teasing out threads 
that I argue align with the mores of the coloniser’s paradigm.  In discussing 
common law McHugh (2002) identifies two new qualified notions, legal 
sovereignty which is held by the Crown and political sovereignty which is “vested 
in the electorate” (p. 70).  He goes on to identify the notion of “the sovereignty of 
Parliament” (p. 75), which of itself seems somewhat distant from the definition as 
provided by de Vattel and Article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen.  This would seem to be the case unless the community or populace 
had determined to vest sovereignty in a body such as a Parliament. 
It is at this juncture in history that the term democracy enters the sovereignty 
discourse.  Moran (as cited in J. T. Johnson, 2008) offers that “hegemonic settler 
sovereignty” (p. 47) refers to the way that descendants of colonial settlers have 
adopted and adapted the notion of sovereignty to their way of being, embracing it 
and exalting it as the dominant and therefore right way of being, without the need 
to consider the situation of the indigenous population.  Any claims to the contrary 
easily cause angst amongst this group as former German Chancellor Gerhard 
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Schroeder (n.d.) observes, “Nothing enrages citizens more than the suspicion of a 
creeping loss of sovereignty” (para. 2). 
3.6 He kounga kakā 
It would appear that the redefining of sovereignty continues over time arriving at 
a point in the twentieth century where some commentators propose the notion of 
shared sovereignty, represented as either indigenous people acquiring a status of 
being “semi-sovereign” or having “limited sovereignty” (Hickford, 2010, p. 182).  
As a compromise this seems a plausible solution in addressing the coloniser 
versus colonised situation.  However I am left to query why these concepts 
weren’t proposed or implemented in the 19th century at the height of tensions 
between both groups.  Moreover, there are warnings about such a relationship that 
I argue should be considered.  The eighteenth-century poet, critic and writer 
Samuel Johnson (n.d.) warns that, “In sovereignty there are no gradations” (para. 
420).  The British peer and politician Michael Ancram (n.d.) provides two 
statements in opposition to the notion of shared sovereignty asserting that, 
“Shared sovereignty doesn’t work, because sovereignty depends on being able to 
exercise authority”, and, “If you share with someone else, and you don’t agree 
with the person you share with, there’s no sovereignty” (para. 3).  Perhaps these 
same sentiments formed part of what Donna Awatere (1982) was trying to convey 
when, considering the Māori condition of the time, she stated “It is not 
sovereignty or no sovereignty.  It is sovereignty or nothing, we have no choice" 
(p. 42). 
A less dire and I would propose more positive interaction is claimed by post-
colonialism theorists proposing the notion of hybridity.  Hybridity acknowledges 
that a third space (Bhabha, 1994) exists between the coloniser and the colonised, 
an interruptive, interrogative, and enunciative (Bhabha, 1996) space straddling 
“two cultures and the consequent ability to negotiate the difference” (Meredith, 
1998, p. 3).  Although hybridity focuses primarily on culture and identity I would 
argue that it relates to the sovereignty discourse inasmuch as during the 
colonisation process both culture and identity are impacted upon.  Hybridity 
allows for a third space to open up and to be acknowledged, a place where the 
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colonisation process can be interrupted, the situation interrogated and new 
perceptions enunciated for new understandings to emerge. 
Kaupapa Māori theory is offered here as one such ‘new’ understanding and 
proposed as another stage in the evolution of Māori self-determination and 
sovereignty reclamation.  Kaupapa Māori allows for mātauranga, āhuatanga and 
tikanga Māori to claim the position of being normal, as opposed to being 
abnormal or “other” (R. Mahuika, 2008, p. 16).  Perhaps Kaupapa Māori is even 
that which occupies the third space.  Mead (as cited in Rautaki Ltd & Māori & 
Indigenous Analysis Ltd, n.d.).states, 
Kaupapa Māori is concerned with sites and terrains.  Each of these 
are sites of struggle.  Each of these sites have also been claimed by 
others as ‘their’ turf.  They are selected or select themselves 
precisely because they are sites of struggle and because they have 
some strategic importance for Māori. (para. 9) 
Pihama, K. Smith, Taki and Lee’s (2004) offering seemingly aligns Kaupapa 
Māori with Bhabha’s notion of the third space as an interruptive, interrogative, 
and enunciative space by stating that, 
Kaupapa Māori thus challenges, questions and critiques expressions 
of dominant Pākehā hegemony.  In doing so Kaupapa Māori 
engages with and seeks to intervene in and transform unequal power 
relations that exist within Aotearoa and which continue to 
subordinate Māori aspirations (p. 10). 
Seen in the light of the preceding two statements it would seem that Kaupapa 
Māori can be recognised as a transformative agency.  This then seemingly has the 
capacity to occupy the third space, to interrupt the current process, to interrogate 
the situation, to enunciate perceptions, and in doing so allow for the emergence of 
new understandings that ultimately change the conversation.  This transformative 
process might be what Foucault (1981) alludes to when he comments, “as soon as 
people begin to have trouble thinking things in the way they have been thought, 
transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely 
possible” (p. 457). 
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3.7 Te manawa kakapa 
From my review of literature it seems compelling that most of the sovereignty 
discourse revolves around the concepts of all authority and power residing in the 
body politic. This is something I would argue which is entrenched firmly in the 
coloniser’s constitutions, charters and legislation, ostensibly tools that strive to 
control behaviour and maintain the status quo.  These tools serve to memorialise 
nation-state perceptions, values, beliefs and ways of being and doing, as informed 
by their own knowledge bank and worldview.  This they leave as a legacy to their 
future generations.  Tikanga-based societies, particularly those with a strong 
practice in oral tradition, had no need for such written memorialisations.  I would 
argue that for tikanga-based societies no such documentation is required or even 
appropriate since their continued existence and the continued exercise of their 
ways of being and doing confirm and maintain a contract with the past (their 
tūpuna) and the future (ngā uri whakatipu).  I propose that such a contract is far 
more sacred and compelling than written words on paper could ever be.  It would 
appear then that sovereignty might well be more about being and doing rather 
than politics and paper. 
The mere existence of these written memorialisations, I suspect, discourage 
dissenters from peeping beyond the colonising paradigm’s borders to imagine 
broader interpretations of sovereignty, such as individual sovereignty, a notion that 
seems actively frowned upon as fractious and contrary to the common good.  
However some have already taken a step towards exploring such ideas and offer 
emancipatory statements such as, “The sovereignty of one’s self over one’s self is 
called liberty” (Pike, n.d., para. 1).  For those afforded the opportunity to opine 
alternative interpretations of sovereignty `there is guidance and encouragement 
available in the following offerings, “The simple step of a courageous individual is 
not to take part in the lie.  One word of truth outweighs the world” (Solzhenitsyn, 
n.d., para. 1) and “The strongest man in the world is he who stands alone” (Ibsen, 
n.d., para. 15). 
As will be addressed in Chapter Six these statements seem to resonate with the 
situation pertaining to JJ’s Māori Incorporation inasmuch as the members both 
individually and collectively refuse to participate in what they see as the lie, the 
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sovereignty of the Parliament of New Zealand.  The truth for them is that their 
sovereignty remains intact under the protection of the British Crown.  That they 
take this stance differentiates them from other groups seeking redress from the 
coloniser and can see them isolated and therefore requiring considerable courage. 
It would appear then that from Solzhenitsyn and Ibsen’s statements there is a 
degree of bravery required to venture beyond the norm, the accepted or the status 
quo.  Such actions defy conventional acceptances of the notion of hegemonic-
sovereignty and its interpretation of the concepts of power and authority which it 
seems to jealously reserve unto itself.  I would suggest that this act of defiance 
gives rise to questions that challenge whether or not that power and authority is 
real or merely imagined.  It is JJ’s contention that the sovereignty of the New 
Zealand Parliament is indeed imagined (Personal communications, 2004-2012). 
One aspect of this study that is not imagined is the evolving vernacular during the 
pre, post and contemporary periods of the colonising process, particularly in the 
Aotearoa/New Zealand context.  However that too requires a separate study and is 
only alluded to here. 
I propose here that the exercise of defining sovereignty is of itself an assertion of 
one’s sovereignty inasmuch as it furnishes the opportunity to determine for oneself 
the most relevant, plausible and defendable understanding based on the knowing 
of one’s own position, situation, and condition.  Moreover, the examination of 
existing definitions is an exercise in empowerment in that it furnishes the seeker 
with the opportunity to acquire clarity around the foundations and cornerstones of 
the ‘other’ (coloniser’s) reason for being and doing. 
This review does not aim to be critical of those commentators whose offerings 
have been the subject of this study, indeed I am simply grateful that these 
commentaries even exist.  My purpose has been to gain a better understanding of 
the parameters in which the sovereignty discourse operates and through that gain a 
more Aotearoa/New Zealand relevant viewpoint of how sovereignty is perceived, 
discussed and approached. 
However a warning has been sounded.  It has been signalled that sovereignty as a 
principle is diminishing and its use in political dialogue should be avoided 
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because it can mean whatever the speaker wants it to (Durie, 1998).  As for this 
study, quite simply put, I would argue that this review is critical to preparing to 
engage in dialogue with those who were interviewed as part of this study.  
Therefore, although not actively seeking out and articulating the alternative 
perspective of the ‘other’ (colonised) paradigm, it is still a place where enquiries 
can begin and be built upon, including the examination of that which is crucial to 
understanding the situation, and can be found at the very core of the ‘other’ 
paradigm, in its own tikanga. 
As has been presented in Chapter Two tikanga is a way of being and doing.  I 
suggest then that sovereignty too is an action as well as a notion, a way of being 
and doing.  To be regarded as a sovereign entity, I propose that one must first act 
in a manner reflective of possessing sovereignty, something that indigenous 
people across the world have attempted through the assertion and application of 
their own ways of being and doing. 
3.8 He kupu whakahiato 
If transformation of the perception of sovereignty, and through that reclaiming 
sovereignty, is the desired outcome, how then can tikanga be employed as the 
transformative agency?  I propose that any society that enacts its own time-tested 
and proven tikanga, and does so in a way that is tika and pono to their worldview 
and their collective aspirations, is functioning in a manner that acclaims them as 
possessing sovereignty. 
I would argue that what appears to be the broadly accepted attitude that 
sovereignty is the sole preserve of bodies politic such as nations and states serves 
only to undermine the place and position of those groups that require neither 
nationhood nor statehood.  Such groups include JJ’s Māori Incorporation.  
However JJ’s group could also be referenced as a product of hybridity inasmuch 
as it recognises the position of both the coloniser and the colonised, then 
interrupts that process, interrogates the situation, and enunciates new 
understandings, which are manifested in its ways of being and doing.  This is 
representative of occupying the third space. 
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As has been mentioned earlier and will be addressed further in Chapter Six this 
local group makes claims of possessing sovereignty in their local area.  It has 
acted in ways that assert their sovereignty and challenges the status quo.  
However, if acquiring sovereignty is dependent on the acknowledgement of and 
acceptance by those already possessing sovereignty (Cox, 1993), and those 
possessing it cannot perceive any advantage in sharing it, then groups such as JJ’s, 
or any other small and relatively powerless groups, will most likely continue to 
struggle to gain any measure of self-determination. 
I propose that sovereignty is a perception of the collective, just as are their 
perceptions of their own culture and identity, which as has been argued already, 
are based on a society’s values, beliefs and worldview.  If then a group of people 
who fit the above criteria and act accordingly, I propose, they are exercising and 
proclaiming their sovereignty.  Where this proclamation would likely be 
challenged is in the lack of any memorialising documentation declaring and 
supporting that perception.  As a rebuttal to any such challenge I put forward the 
notion that memorialisations do already exist through the practice of oral tradition, 
a practice common to indigenous communities across the world. 
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR – INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
Tērā te haeata e kuku nei i te pō; 
Mea kau ake, ka māroharoha he ao hou. 
Nau mai, nau ake e Rongo, e Tioro e, 
Hikina te matapōrehu kia mārama te titiro. 
(Taitoko & Waitai, 1997, p. 1) 
4.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to present a number of articulations about what being 
indigenous is, how some indigenous groups act, and how indigenous groups 
generally are positioned in their relationships with nation-states.  Once again 
using the third space lens to overlay these articulations it is anticipated that new 
perceptions can be enunciated about how alternate approaches can be made in 
addressing issues confronting indigenous groups in the present day.  Political 
disenfranchisement, cultural disaffection, and identity discord will be shown to be 
issues facing all indigenous groups seeking sovereignty and the freedom to be and 
to do. 
The thought of reviewing literature concerning the present-day condition of 
indigenous peoples across the world presented itself as a truly inviting and 
attractive prospect.  This feeling was due mainly to an expected spiritual uplifting 
that would be experienced by me through reviewing and celebrating the 
anticipated advances made by indigenous peoples over the last thirty to forty 
years.  There had been, at least in my mind, significant and real shifts in 
advancing the causes and aspirations of a wide range of people who self-identify 
as being indigenous.  However, it soon became quite clear that the only things 
significant and real were the sameness of the present-day situation of most 
indigenous peoples when compared to their pre-struggle condition.  
Disappointingly, despite high profile publicity achieved by indigenous people in 
the international arena, particularly with the adoption of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2008, very little 
change seems to have occurred for indigenous people, indeed, as is presented later 
in this chapter, it has arguably worsened to the point of being perilous.  Generally 
speaking, the struggles of indigenous peoples now are the same as before.  The 
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protagonists, the locations, the rhetoric, the sites of engagement are all the same 
and the fight for recognition and self-determination continues. 
Understanding both the pre-struggle condition and present-day situation of a range 
of indigenous peoples from across Asia, the Pacific, and the Americas, is one 
focus of this review.  What is it they fought for and to whom did they carry the 
fight?  What strategic approaches did they employ and how effective were these in 
realising their objectives? 
It is not the intent of this review to pick the scab off festering wounds by 
revisiting and unpacking a range of claims of wrong-doing – that would be far too 
painful, far too toxic and, more pragmatically, far too time-consuming to be 
covered in this study.  Nor is this study an exercise in developing a chronological 
catalogue of indigenous people’s histories of struggle and action.  This is instead a 
reflection on the struggles engaged in by a small number of indigenous peoples, 
the nature of those struggles, the battlefields where these encounters took place, 
and the outcomes, whether positive or negative.  Kaupapa Māori theory is applied 
to occupy the third space to interrupt the situation, to interrogate the conditions, 
and then enunciate ‘new’ understandings, since I contend there is still a place for a 
study that would see the development of a framework or model incorporating 
third space theory that could assist indigenous peoples and other groups engaged 
in self-determination struggles to advance their causes. 
4.2 I te pōuri kua koa, i te mate kua ora 
It would appear the appellation ‘indigenous people’ is a relatively new construct, 
making its appearance in the late-twentieth century in titles such as the World 
Council of Indigenous People in 1974, the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations in 1982, and in documents such as the ILO Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989, No. 169, and the World Bank Operational 
Directive 4.20 – Indigenous Peoples, September 1991.  It appears that the title 
‘indigenous peoples’ serves as an alternative to other descriptors such as tribe, 
native, aboriginal, first people or first nations, and here in Aotearoa the term iwi 
taketake has become a commonly used translation. 
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The concept of these indigenous groups having specific rights and the 
accompanying movement to reclaim these, would according to Graham and 
Wiessner (2011), appear to have its origins in one of the most traumatic and 
cataclysmic events in the history of humankind when they offer that, 
The atrocities of World War II and the realization by nation-states 
that countries could not always be relied on to protect the basic 
rights of their citizens internationalized claims to universal human 
rights.  This post-war human rights agenda provided a platform 
from which to launch an international Indigenous rights movement.  
However, it was the perseverance of Indigenous peoples themselves 
that kept this struggle alive through the generations. (p. 404) 
In acknowledging the role indigenous people have played in maintaining the 
momentum of asserting the existence of particular rights through the “worldwide 
Indigenous rights recovery movement” (Gayman, 2011, p. 23), it is probably more 
interesting to acknowledge that which is conspicuous by its absence – any 
acknowledgement of state-sponsored promotion of these indigenous rights in 
either local, regional or international fora.  I would argue that to a large degree 
this is a stance that remains to this day.  Indeed I suggest that in the present-day 
climate of fear born out of violent acts of terrorism, indigenous people’s rights are 
perceived as a threat to nation-state sovereignty and treated with heightened 
suspicion.  This situation is examined in more depth later in this chapter. 
This study considers the manner in which indigenous people found visibility on 
the world stage and notes they achieved effective mobilisation by taking 
advantage of new and emerging cross-border networks.  Graham and Wiessner 
(2011) offer up a summary view that touches upon this development by 
commenting that, 
It wasn’t until the 1960s when the UN turned its attention to the 
question of racism and racial discrimination that Indigenous peoples 
actually gained a voice in the international arena.  Indigenous 
peoples were able to internationalize their efforts at resistance by 
building on the pan-Indigenous movement that had taken hold in 
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countries such as the United States and Canada, and by taking 
advantage of improved communications across borders. (p. 404) 
It appears then that the perpetration of violence, such as the horror inflicted on 
populations by Nazism and irrational race-based prejudice, was the catalyst for the 
emergence of resistance and struggle by many disaffected groups, including 
indigenous populations in many countries.  In the glow of international efforts 
towards protecting universal human rights and an ever growing movement seeking 
rights for indigenous peoples, visibility and recognition of indigenous groups 
would appear to be the critical first steps needed to be achieved.  A summary on 
the evolution of this part of the journey notes that, 
First formally recognised in ILO conventions 107 (1957) and 169 
(1989), the indigenous peoples’ movement only really took off after 
it entered the UN system in the 1980s and 1990s.  At its origins, 
indigenous peoples’ rights became part of the international agenda 
after mobilization in the Americas.  By 1977, the international 
network was launched when representatives from more than sixty 
indigenous groups met in the International NGO conference on 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations. (Bertrand, 2011, p. 
853) 
At its 1957 General Conference in Geneva, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) produced Convention 107; a document that served to bring the existence of 
indigenous populations into the limelight of the international arena, and required 
its member nations, upon ratification, to afford protection to these indigenous 
groups and their well-being.  Later, in 1989, its General Conference adopted 
Convention 169, an international instrument that specifically acknowledged the 
existence of indigenous and tribal people’s rights, and as stated in Part 1, Article 1. 
s1(b) with particular regard to “their own social, economic, cultural and political 
institutions” (International Labour Organization, 1989). 
I would suggest however that as a mirroring of generally held societal attitudes of 
the time towards indigenous peoples and their causes, the rights of indigenous 
peoples were more of an after-thought rather than an initial goal of the ILO.  The 
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plight of indigenous peoples seems to have taken a backseat to greater concerns of 
the ILO regarding working conditions, violence against workers, and even the 
practice of child labour (International Labour Organization).  Out of the first 50 
conventions created by the ILO only Convention 50 addresses matters specifically 
concerning indigenous people.  In all there are seven conventions to date 
addressing indigenous people’s issues, out of 189 conventions in total.  It would 
also seem that both Conventions 107 and 169 were originally intended to provide 
a wider protection mechanism for people who were being discriminated against 
because of gender, age, and ethnicity rather than indigeneity.  Another pressing 
area of concern for the ILO at the time would appear to be bio-piracy where 
indigenous people’s knowledge of their natural environment was being 
appropriated by outsiders without permission and used to generate profit.  This 
drew attention to the potential harm that could result from uncontrolled economic 
development of rainforests and its impact on flora and fauna, particularly in 
regions such as South America, Africa, and Asia. 
A combination of events in the late 20th century particularly in information and 
communication technologies, including mass-media telecommunications and 
Internet accessibility, plus strengthened developments in worldwide indigenous 
networks, all contributed to a growing global awareness that it wasn’t just 
rainforests and wildlife being decimated but also clusters of little heard-of and 
even less thought-of indigenous peoples as well.  I propose that it is due in the 
main to changing times and hard fought battles using access to ever evolving 
technologies at local, regional, national and international levels that indigenous 
people’s struggles have achieved recognition in the present-day. 
Perhaps not surprisingly few nations ratified either of the ILO Conventions – 
Convention 107 only 18 countries and Convention 169 only 20, whilst the 
remainder seemingly struggled to reach a consensus understanding of an 
appropriate definition of what constitutes an indigenous people.  It is not the intent 
of this study to engage in that quandary and is happy instead to adopt the 
definition as provided by Kenrick and Lewis (as cited in Debelo, 2011), who 
propose that, 
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According to the existing working definition, indigenous peoples 
are groups of people who: a) have priority in occupancy of a 
particular territory; b) demonstrate cultural distinctiveness, 
continuity and attachment to their traditional land; c) identify 
themselves and are identified by mainstream society and state 
authorities as distinct collectivities; and d) have experiences of 
subjugation, dispossession, marginalization, exclusion or 
discrimination whether or not these conditions persist. (p. 260) 
I would argue at this juncture that the most critical element contained within the 
above definition is in the third point that expresses the importance of self-
identification of a group as indigenous, and the need for acknowledgement of 
such by others.  This act of self-identification is, I propose, an intrinsic part of the 
larger act of self-determination, an act that recurs repeatedly throughout the 
stories of all indigenous peoples, and seemingly informs and drives their 
resistance strategies and recovery efforts.  This practice of self-identification is 
important in avoiding the pitfall of creating a homogenised indigenous identity.  I 
suggest that it was this one-size-fits-all collective concept that was to the fore of 
his mind when Rangihau, “warned of the cultural dangers of collectivising to the 
extent that whānau, hapū and iwi are denied” (Pihama, 2001, p. 133). 
The preceding statement gives rise to a situation I propose is worthy of 
addressing.  Although it might appear that there is a measure of commonality in 
the colonisation stories of all indigenous groups I argue that each group’s 
occupation stories, cultural expressions and practices, relationships to land, and 
legacies of suffering are distinct and particular to them.  Accordingly, I argue that 
there should be no attempt made on the part of others to cloak all groups under a 
single perspective or interpretation.  To do so, I suggest, is to ultimately remove 
the individuality and uniqueness of these groups from sight, making them and 
their distinctness invisible, and thereby nullifying their existence.  Lumping all the 
clans of Australia’s original inhabitants under the collective term of Aborigines 
denies the existence of each of the approximately 600 clans or nations present at 
the time Europeans arrived (Australian Government, 2008).  Similarly, the 
aggregation of all whānau, hapū and iwi into a single entity called Māori, 
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undermines my right to expect others to recognise my distinctive status and 
heritage as a member of the whānau Taitoko, of the hapū Ngāti Runga-te-rangi, 
and of the iwi Ngāti Maniapoto. 
4.3 Tērā te haeata 
The quest for self-determination has exhibited itself in the different ways 
indigenous groups action their resistance and this in turn has to a large extent 
determined the arena of engagement.  Historically, indigenous groups such as 
those of Australasia, Scandinavia, and the Americas, tramp the path to the doors 
of the coloniser’s palaces of power, seeking to create an opportunity to give voice 
to their claims via political and legal means.  Sometimes the door remains firmly 
shut, as evidenced on the occasion of Kīngi Tāwhiao being denied an audience 
with Queen Victoria in 1884 (Kirkwood, 2000) at the direction of the New 
Zealand Government.  Sometimes they gain admittance to the inner sanctum but 
in such small numbers so as to be ineffective at instigating change, as seemingly 
pre-ordained by the 1867 Maori Representation Act.  I propose that as a result 
some groups finding little, or no, satisfaction via this route will turn to the laws of 
the land in their search for justice as was the case in Wi Parata v the Bishop of 
Wellington 1877. 
After finding the organs of their nation-state law to be impotent in advancing their 
cause, I suggest that, some groups looked hopefully towards the augustness of 
international legal and political fora for relief.  It is in these international fora that 
I contend indigenous groups have made the most significant gains to date, 
particularly in achieving some measure of recognition, as witnessed by the 
ratification of UNDRIP by all member states of the United Nations.  However, as 
will be seen shortly, this success does not afford indigenous groups a solid 
guarantee of realising their aspirations, as this is still ultimately subject to the will 
of individual member states.  Debelo (2011) notes that, “Although the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples on 13 September 2007, the success of this legal instrument strongly 
depends on genuine recognition and its practical implementation at local and 
national levels” (p. 259), and that, “the adoption of the declaration does not make 
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a difference unless genuine recognition of indigenous people’s status is put in 
place practically at all levels” (p. 268). 
Kariyawasam (2010) contributes the following that provides explanation of how 
such a dilemma could possibly be.  “Article 46 (1) specifically denies any action 
that may impact the ‘territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent states’.  This section stresses that the right to self-determination 
should be exercised within its own ‘sovereign’ state” (p. 8).  Kariyawasam 
continues, “Therefore, reading Articles 3, 4 and 5 along with Article 46 makes the 
Declaration appear vague and, at times, conflicting, leaving the issue of self-
determination versus territorial integrity and state sovereignty unresolved” (p. 9). 
This seeming contradiction in the Articles leaves the definitiveness of the 
Declaration in a state of limbo, hanging somewhere between hope and 
disappointment, depending on how the protagonists perceive it.  Kariyawasam 
(2010) provides further clarity on this matter by identifying that, 
the central difficulty with the Declaration is that it does not have 
any legally binding obligation or legal force and therefore, the 
operation and the enforcement of the law is in question.  It was not 
drafted as a legal instrument or as a binding set of obligations – 
rather, it creates basic moral principles and broad political 
commitments and thus, its enforceability depends substantially on 
Member States’ compliance with their obligations and their bona 
fide desire to act on them. (p. 16) 
Interestingly the extent of adoption of the Declaration by some member states 
ranges from total adherence to selective application.  By way of example, in 
considering the situation in two countries, one in South America and the other in 
Central America, Graham and Wiessner (2011) note, 
Recently, Bolivia incorporated all of the provisions of the 
declaration into its constitution, and the Supreme Court of Belize 
relied on key aspects of the declaration to affirm the land and 
resource rights of the Maya people.  Yet in other recent land and 
resource disputes involving indigenous peoples of the Amazon, 
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basic tenets of the declaration on the rights to consultation and prior 
informed consent were ignored. (p. 406) 
Seeking satisfaction through the dominant versus subordinate legal and political 
arenas seems to be the most popular approach adopted by indigenous groups and 
doesn’t always produce a negative outcome.  As can be seen from the following 
contributions, in those situations where indigenous groups are a numerically 
significant force, or where they can create a critical mass, they can achieve 
surprising results.  Chong (2010) reflects briefly on the advances of indigenous 
groups in political arenas in two South American nations, Bolivia and Ecuador 
when commenting that, “In Bolivia, the arrival of indigenous power through 
popular elections has opened a new sea of expectations” (p. 265), and, “In 
Ecuador they have demonstrated great capacity for controlling mass mobilizations 
and establishing political alliances in the institutional context” (p. 266). 
These advances have brought with them their own dynamics which potentially 
threaten the gains made by the indigenous groups within those countries.  As far 
as Bolivia is concerned it is a problem of maintaining a balance of the interests 
and expectations set by seemingly opposed agendas; economic prosperity and the 
rights of indigenous peoples, whereas in Ecuador, “setbacks for indigenous people 
in past elections have led them to propose ways to build strong organizations and 
alliances without depending on national, mestizo1 political parties” (Chong, 2010, 
p. 266). 
Some indigenous groups, such as those below, have made claims of rights under 
the banner of the freedom of religious practice; however, these religious claims 
are not heard in any ecclesiastic court but in the secular realm of common law 
courts, an arena that seems incapable or ill-disposed towards making legal 
determinations on cultural practices of a spiritual nature.  Ahdar (2003) provides 
us with some examples of such encounters and their outcomes, and as one can see, 
these are examples drawn from two nations that have relatively large and active 
indigenous populations, the United States and Canada.  In Bowen v Roy, 
                                                            
1 mestizo: of mixed heritage or descent 
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the Abenaki Indian parents of a two-year-old girl… refused to 
supply their daughter’s social security number in order to secure 
certain welfare benefits.  The welfare agency’s use of the unique 
number would, they believed, rob the spirit of their daughter.  The 
Supreme Court held that this state requirement did not violate the 
Indians’ religious rights under the First Amendment. (p. 612) 
In Lyng v North-western Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Yurok, 
Karok and Tolowa Indians fought against the building of a road through sacred 
high country that would, 
‘virtually destroy’ the ability of the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa 
Indians’ to practice their religion.  The Supreme Court found no 
infringement of the Indian’s free exercise rights, the majority stating 
rather tersely, ‘however much we might wish that it were otherwise, 
government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy 
every citizen’s religious needs and desires’. (Ahdar, 2003, p. 612) 
In Kelly Lake Cree Nation v British Columbia, 
two First Nations peoples sought to have set aside government 
approvals for exploratory drilling for gas in an area of land that was 
of ‘the utmost spiritual significance’ to those peoples.  The Kelly 
Lake Cree Nation and Saulteau First Nations argued that the gas 
well by its mere presence defiled the image of sanctuary that they 
were, by their prophesies, entrusted to preserve.  The British 
Columbia Supreme Court in dismissing their petition held that the 
Canadian Charter right of religious freedom in section 2(a) had not 
been breached and [noted] the Charter did not protect a concept of 
stewardship of a place of worship within its religious liberty 
guarantee. (Ahdar, 2003, p. 613) 
The only conclusion I can draw from my readings thus far on this matter is that 
any advances or gains made by indigenous peoples are ever vulnerable to being 
undermined and/or dismissed by legislative means. 
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I feel obliged at this point to raise a matter concerning the ways in which different 
indigenous groups act or, in some cases, do not act.  In countries such as New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada and the United States, where the body politic tends to 
see itself as enlightened and accommodating, it is a reasonably straightforward 
matter for their indigenous populations to advance their causes before the 
politicians or the judiciary.  I suggest however that it is not so straightforward a 
matter in countries where to raise your head and call for indigenous rights could 
be interpreted as subversive, seditious, reactionary or even rebellious.  There is a 
long list of instances where nation-states have reacted adversely and brutally to 
their indigenous populations’ calls for recognition of their rights, eliciting state-
sanctioned responses.  A small representation of those instances range from 
displacement (Soguk, 2007), to disappearing (Bertrand, 2011), to beatings 
(Becker, 2010; “Military Madness”, 2002; Tilly, 2007), to rape (Ledebur, 2005; 
Tilly, 2007), to torture (Ledebur, 2005; “Military Madness”, 2002; Tilly, 2007), to 
imprisonment (“Military Madness”, 2002; Tilly, 2007), and even murder and 
assassination (Bertrand, 2011; Klein, 2006; Ledebur, 2005; Leech, 2002; Soguk, 
2007; Tilly, 2007).  That some indigenous peoples have endured this brutality and 
yet continue to promote their cause is, I contend, a living testament to their 
stamina and their conviction in the validity of their claims. 
Another point I propose here is that despite the general commonality in the 
colonisation process enacted upon indigenous groups I suggest that there has been 
little commonality in the consequent losses suffered by each.  That is, I propose 
that not all indigenous groups lost their language and not all have lost their 
cultural practices or access to traditional resources.  However, that having been 
said, I argue that it is a difficult thing to attempt to quantify exactly what amount 
constitutes a loss. 
Thus far it would appear that indigenous groups tend to promote their struggles 
through a limited range of approaches, predominantly resulting in encounters in 
the legal or political arenas.  In doing so, I contend, indigenous groups validate 
and give credibility to these fora, which by default are constructs of the ‘other’ 
paradigm, and accordingly intolerant of non-paradigm conducive perspectives and 
ways of being and doing.  Accordingly, this leads one to muse that as long as 
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indigenous peoples engage with their colonisers in these fora, can they truly ever 
expect to achieve anything beyond that which they have historically received.  
The old adage of, ‘If you always do what you’ve always done, then you’ll always 
get what you’ve always got’, resounds clearly in one’s ears.  If the mechanisms 
that will facilitate positive change for indigenous peoples aren’t offered on the 
current nation-state citizen support menu then, I argue, need necessitates that 
alternatives be either sought out or created.  Perhaps this is where application of 
the third space lens could assist indigenous groups in identifying and enunciating 
new understandings that would inform different approaches. 
I propose that for indigenous peoples the creation of alternatives should be 
premised on the dreams and aspirations of each group.  Likewise, effective 
strategies to realising their goals should be informed by their cultural beliefs and 
actions – their ways of being and doing and be tika and pono.  Anything else, I 
suggest, would be contrary to their culture and therefore susceptible to being 
challenged and undermined, both from within and without.  Before being able to 
identify effective strategies, I propose that, one requires an understanding of what 
it is that indigenous people want. 
4.4 Ka māroharoha he ao hou 
Whilst acknowledging the distinctiveness of individual indigenous groups as 
important, I argue, one should not make the mistake of assuming that this 
precludes these groups from sharing some common beliefs and aspirations.  It is 
these, I suggest, that are deserving of examination and articulation since it would 
seem these beliefs and aspirations direct the thinking towards why these are 
important.  A number of commentators recognise that self-determination is 
consistently positioned as a priority for indigenous collectives.  Debelo (2011) 
offers that, “it suffices to draw attention to the central concerns of most 
indigenous organizations for self-determination; that is, to gain representation at 
local, regional and national political decision-making processes that affect their 
livelihood” (p. 266). 
Kuppe (2009) concurs and contributes by noting that a commonly held goal 
amongst disaffected groups is that, “self-determination of indigenous peoples 
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regarding all aspects of their lives that have been subjugated to the colonial 
system of external control is restored” (p. 111). 
Freedom from rule is an aspect of self-determination proffered by Volmert (2010), 
who states that, “indigenous peoples have substantial moral rights to self-
determination because they can credibly claim that their moral right to equal 
freedom from rule is not adequately protected within settler states” (p. 53). 
But how legitimate is this call for the right to be self-determining in light of the 
advantages that can be attained through conforming to the norms and 
requirements of the greater collective of the nation-state?  Holder (2008) goes 
some way towards addressing this by highlighting the illegitimacy of 
compunction when she offers that, 
states, groups and persons violate human rights when they compel 
indigenous peoples and the persons that constitute them to abandon 
a way of life or to restrict the development of their way of life to 
terms or pathways of someone else’s choosing. (p. 18) 
This stance is supported by Kuppe (2009), who affirms that, “indigenous peoples 
do not seek out measures that would see them assimilated into the mainstream of 
their colonizing nation” (p. 109). 
Two earlier commentators return to extend our thinking around self-determination 
by linking it to culture and identity, which, I would argue, for indigenous peoples 
is the very soul of their distinctiveness, their difference, their uniqueness.  In 
making this link, Graham and Wiessner (2011) assert that these two things, 
culture and identity, are inseparable from self-determination inasmuch as one 
demands something the other naturally offers.  They explain that, 
Claims to self-determination and autonomy are closely linked to the 
Indigenous peoples’ struggle for cultural integrity.  Indeed, these 
concepts are indivisible, at least where Indigenous peoples are 
concerned.  As Vine Deloria Jr notes, ‘To the degree that a nation 
loses its sense of cultural identity… it suffers a loss of sovereignty’. 
(Graham & Wiessner, 2011, p. 413) 
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Second only to self-determination as a high priority item on the indigenous rights 
agenda would seem to be the expectation that their respective culture and identity 
is not the ‘other’, but that in its own right, is deserving of equal acknowledgement 
and unfettered freedom of practice.  Kuppe (2009) notes this and more when 
contributing that, “the protection of their culture-specific characteristics will be 
advanced by the official promotion of proper institutions and the exemption from 
the validity of general legal standards by which indigenous peoples are 
structurally and systematically disadvantaged” (p. 112). 
It appears then that indigenous people’s calls for self-determination are 
inseparable from their respective culture and identity, and as such, I would 
propose, it should not be surprising that these things top their list of items to be 
recovered.  For indigenous groups, freedom seems to be key – their freedom from 
the rule of the ‘other’, freedom to celebrate and cultivate themselves, and freedom 
to express themselves and be recognised as a member of their indigenous group.  I 
would contend that freedom is not an enigma to democratic nation-states; indeed 
many make great publicity about their commitment to live by and defend it.  This 
having been said, it would appear to be an enigma that those same nation-states 
who proclaim their defence of freedom are so strident in denying it to certain 
sectors of their own populations.  When challenged on this point, nation-state 
governments proffer the stock standard answer which implies that rather than 
being simple and straightforward, the issue is actually a deeply complex one. I 
argue that the tardiness of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia 
in signing the UNDRIP is a case in point.  I propose that most of the delay was 
caused by internal debate over what relevance this had to each nation-state and its 
relationship with its indigenous populations compounded by fear about the 
potential consequences for the status quo.  The choice of freedom or no freedom 
is not complex but it would seem that coloniser self-interest spawns the litany of 
excuses that delay its delivery. 
4.5 What stops it? 
In attempting to understand that which motivates nation-states to laud their power 
over the less powerful inhabitants who share occupancy of the same territories, I 
contend that in the first instance, one need look no further than a seemingly 
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insatiable hunger for wealth and the assumed power it brings with it.  This, I 
propose, can be evidenced by simply acknowledging that indigenous people 
would never have been noticed had it not been for their habit of resisting private 
sector and state-sponsored wealth generating schemes, particularly in the 
rainforests, which directly impacted on their traditional lands and way of life.  
Debelo (2011) alludes to this when noting that, “modern forces such as 
globalization, industrialization, mechanized agricultural expansions, oil 
explorations, logging, conservation projects and dam constructions threaten 
cultural practices, economic subsistence and overall livelihoods of these groups” 
(p. 266). 
Debelo (2011) continues to offer a reason as to why this should impact indigenous 
peoples more than other land holders, “In economic aspects, indigenous peoples’ 
territories are among a few peripheral areas where untapped resources remain” (p. 
269). 
The intimate relationship of indigenous groups to land is a matter of record; 
indeed, I would venture to suggest that, it is often misinterpreted by onlookers as 
the real reason these groups even came into being in the first place, as 
opportunists with an eye for a windfall.  However, I contend that, this is an 
uninformed view as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (as cited in 
Holder, 2008) states in its Awas Tingi decision, 
The close ties of indigenous peoples with the land must be 
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their 
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity and their economic 
survival.  For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not 
merely a matter of possession and production but a material and 
spiritual element that they must fully enjoy. (p. 17) 
However, there are other factors beyond economics that are worthy of 
consideration and Debelo (2011) draws our attention to two of these when stating 
that, “It becomes uneconomical to delve on specific factors behind each nation 
state’s reluctance to accept and recognize the rights of these groups, but on a 
broader level, three central factors can be cited: political, economic and 
conceptual confusion” (p. 268). 
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For nation-states economic and political factors are intrinsically intertwined and 
the glue that binds them together, I argue, is legislation.  I would also argue here 
that this triad exists for two specific purposes – the preservation of the nation-state 
as a viable wealth-producing and power-brokering unit, and the maintenance of 
the sovereignty of common law.  Debelo (2011) recognises aspects of this 
relationship when commenting that, “The political dimension of the resistance to 
recognition has been the major obstacle, emanating mainly from the perception of 
nation states of the right to self-determination as a threat to national integrity” (p. 
268). 
That courts of law are ill-disposed towards entertaining claims that could 
potentially impinge on either of the two purposes as proposed above is something, 
I contend is, well-known to indigenous peoples across the world and will not be 
dwelt upon in this study.  However, Kariyawasam (2010), when considering the 
Australian High Court decision in the 1992 Mabo v. the State of Queensland in 
case, which overturned the notion of terra nullius and gave rise to the Native Title 
Act 1993, and then the subsequent inconsistent application of the law by the 
Australian judiciary, notes that, 
There is strong evidence that the courts have not been reliable in all 
applications of the law, and there is wide confusion over the scope 
of the principle in some native title cases, which is a very different 
path from that followed in other international jurisdictions. 
(Kariyawasam, 2010, p. 14) 
Following on from the above I suggest that it is worthwhile to explore Debelo’s 
earlier mentioned notion of “conceptual confusion” (2011, p. 268), a seemingly 
benign condition but one that, I argue, lies at the heart of nation-states’ attitudes 
and behaviour towards indigenous groups.  Many elements contribute to this 
malaise and it is not exclusively endemic to nation-states – indigenous groups are 
also susceptible to contracting this ailment, as will be examined shortly.  The 
following commentators contribute their understanding of, what I would argue 
are, both causes and symptoms that pertain to this disorder.  Kuppe (2009) offers 
the notion of the fiction of homogeneity in stating that, 
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the recognition of these indigenous rights can result in conflicts 
with some of the basic principles of modern ‘Western’ 
constitutional democracy: the declared equality of all citizens; the 
legitimization of the state being based on the common good of all; 
and the legal fiction of one homogenous people making up the state. 
(p. 103) 
Another condition worthy of note is ‘cultural bias’, which I contend contributes 
towards conceptual confusion, inasmuch as it is irrational and serves only to 
debilitate others.  Kuppe (2009) again offers that the “state is not neutral in regard 
to culture.  The cultural bias of the state – the specific set of values on which state 
organization is based – necessarily causes that the state promotes certain cultural 
identities, and disadvantages others” (p. 113). 
Kuppe finds an ally when quoting Kymlicka (as cited in Charters, 2010) notes that 
a, 
multicultural state which accords universal rights to all its citizens, 
regardless of group membership, may appear to be neutral between 
various national groups.  But in fact it can (and often does) 
systematically privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental 
ways.  All of these decisions can dramatically reduce the … cultural 
viability of a national minority, while enhancing that of the majority 
culture. (p. 233) 
The question now arises about where these confused concepts originate.  Kuppe 
(2009) returns to furnish this study with what seems an interesting notion that 
delineates the social modus operandi of the primary protagonists into two distinct 
spheres and offers an insight into understanding the root from which this 
phenomenon springs. 
The (social) world is divided into two spheres: public and private.  
The private sphere is dominated by desires, beliefs and irrationality, 
while the public sphere is the place for rational procedures for the 
attainment of defined goals.  Culture, just like religion, is assigned 
to the private sphere, which is dominated by subjective criteria like 
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aesthetics, faith or impulse force, while public life is based on the 
rational functions of the social contract of citizens.  Modern 
constitutionalism views the recognition of indigenous cultures as a 
violation of its principles because by definition culture falls into the 
private sphere.  At the same time, the public sphere is not 
considered to be an expression of the respective mainstream culture, 
but rather as an expression of law and order based on rational 
decision-making. (p. 117) 
If it was accepted that nation-states would most likely argue indigenous people’s 
claims originate from the ‘private sphere’ then they present as the antithesis of 
‘rational’, indeed they could be perceived as violators of everything the majority 
culture holds to be valid, credible and real.  I would argue that in maintaining this 
narrow view nation-states assume unto themselves an entitlement to dominate, to 
make decisions, and thereby, to rule.  Volmert (2010) addresses the notion of 
ruling and the consequences it has on the ruled, when offering that, 
Rule can be defined as the imposition of one party’s will on another 
with regard to the other’s affairs… Rule is a coercive relationship 
not a voluntary one… Rule is a moral harm because it undermines 
the individual’s ability to live her life as she sees fit, in accordance 
with her own preferences, desires, and commitments – in short, in 
accordance with her own will…the same harm is also perpetrated in 
cases in which rulers act without regard to the interests of the ruled. 
(p. 54) 
In reflecting on the preceding points one is led to suggest that the combination of 
factors such as preserving the nation-state, maintaining the sovereignty of 
common law, protecting wealth generation, plus conceptual confusion, 
compounded by the fiction of homogeneity, cultural bias, and the presumption to 
rule, creates, what I would argue is, a notional cocktail.  I further suggest that it is 
this cocktail that is promoted and consumed universally within nation-states but 
presents to indigenous people as a poisoned chalice from which they are expected 
to imbibe.  Given the harmful nature of this brew, I propose that, it is worth 
celebrating the fact that any vestige of indigeneity and difference remains, albeit 
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in varying degrees of well-being.  The volumes of nation-state statistics indicating 
indigenous people’s over-representation in the deficit range of social indicators – 
health, education, employment, housing, income, and crime – all bear testament to 
some form of malaise running rampant throughout these societies. 
However, one factor that is yet to be examined, and one that I propose is possibly 
the most challenging for indigenous groups, is that of ‘internalised oppression’.  
In discussing the situation of the Ainu people resident in the nation-state of Japan, 
Gayman (2011) picks up on this point, noting that, 
Nowadays, passing, in which the Ainu hide their identity, has 
proceeded to an advanced degree… Coupled with feelings of 
humiliation and inferiority, lack of solidarity among the Ainu … 
has presented a major issue for the progress of the Ainu rights 
recovery movement.  This lack of enthusiasm might derive from the 
structures of discrimination and ‘internalized oppression’ (Duran 
and Duran 1995), the system of welfare colonialism (Siddle 1996), 
or from divisiveness spurred by federally run policies which pit 
Ainu against one another (Ponpe Ishii, personal communication, 
June 26, 2008). (p. 19) 
I would suggest that this is evidence of how indigenous groups too can suffer 
from ‘conceptual confusion’ particularly where culture and identity are concerned.  
Gayman (2011) goes on to denounce the Japanese government’s role in actively 
and passively enabling this condition and its failure to counter the effects it has 
had within Ainu communities, and offers that, 
it is these very issues, namely, internalized oppression, 
empowerment, and physical distance, which are being dragged into 
perpetuity as the Japanese government hedges Indigenous policy 
legislation upon the conditions of Ainu solidarity, instead of 
empowering the Ainu people to recognize the above barriers as 
obstacles to their own group cohesion. (p. 24) 
I propose that a study into the notions of conceptual confusion and internalised 
oppression presented here by Gayman would avail indigenous peoples with a 
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greater awareness and ability to consider and address this modern-day 
phenomenon that informs the worldview of some within their societies. 
As if all these weren’t enough of an obstacle to indigenous people realising their 
dreams and aspirations, I present an unrelated development on the international 
stage that has furnished nation-states with yet another tool that can be, and has 
been, applied to indigenous people’s acts of resistance and claims of self-
determination. 
4.6 He atirū i te paerangi 
Whilst some indigenous groups still survive in perilous conditions I propose it is 
appropriate to acknowledge that there have been shifts in the nature of 
engagement between indigenous peoples and nation-states, some even for the 
better as can arguably be evidenced by the Australian Government’s apology to 
the ‘Stolen Generations’ of aboriginal children on the 13th February 2008, and the 
US Congress passing the 1993 Apology Resolution for the overthrow of the 
Kingdom of Hawai’i one hundred years earlier.  However, I would argue that as a 
direct result of recent events unrelated to indigenous people’s struggles a 
foreboding spectre, that once seemed far off and disconnected from the whole 
indigenous rights recovery movement, has swooped over the horizon and landed 
squarely at indigenous people’s feet – and it is potentially lethal to all and any 
who would raise their voices in dissent. 
After the violence perpetrated upon the citizens of New York on September 11 
2001, many nation-states have taken unto themselves the right to draft and enact 
radical laws ostensibly designed to protect their citizenry.  I have elected here to 
focus on the four countries with large indigenous populations, and as it happens 
the same four who were last to sign UNDRIP.  The United States of America 
passed the Uniting (and) Strengthening America (by) Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required (to) Intercept (and) Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act in 
2001 followed by the Homeland Security Act in 2002; Canada the Anti-Terrorism 
Act in 2001; Australia the Anti-Terrorism Act (No.2) in 2005; and New Zealand 
the Terrorism Suppression Act in 2002 followed by the Counter-Terrorism Bill in 
2003. 
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These Acts are a two-edged sword striving to secure protection for the nation but 
at the expense of their citizens’ liberty.  The USA PATRIOT Act 2001 is a case in 
point in that whilst presenting itself as a tool against terrorist activities it also 
allows for federal agency intrusions into the lives of its citizens.  An online article 
entitled 10 scary things about the Patriot Act (Admin, 2011) lists ten provisions 
within the Act which allow for “expanded access to personal information held by 
others” (para. 2) such as doctors, banks, schools, or internet providers; “gag rules” 
(para. 3) applied against those who have supplied your information; “secret 
searches” (para. 4) of your property, “secret confiscations” (para. 5) of your 
property, “church and political gathering surveillance” (para. 6) without probable 
cause, “extended wiretap authority” (para. 7) without probable cause, “roving 
wiretaps” (para. 8) of any phone or computer a suspect might have access to, 
“untargeted wiretaps” (para. 9) of computers belonging to universities, libraries 
and individuals associated with a suspect, “unknowing associations deportations” 
(para. 10) of non-US citizens legally in the country who have some association 
with a terror suspect, and “uncharged detention authority” (para. 11) allowing 
arrest and indefinite detention without being charged with a crime or having 
access to legal counsel. 
Despite some aspects of these laws being direct breaches of generally held human 
rights, in the afterglow of the horrific nature of the terrors brought to the doors of 
powerful nation-states, this move towards protection and self-preservation could, I 
suggest, be seen initially as a reasonable response to external aggression.  
However, some nation-states have now seen fit to apply these same measures 
internally against sections of their own populations all the while citing counter-
terrorism as justification for doing so.  Wakeham (2012) recognises this and 
contributes, “the expansion of the rhetoric and resources of state 
‘counterterrorism’ in these settler states has been similarly utilized to suppress 
Indigenous anticolonial activism” (p. 22), meaning that, “Indigenous struggles for 
justice are evacuated of their particular political content and framed as obstacles 
to national healing and threats to national security” (p. 22). 
Just what this means for indigenous groups within nation-states is potentially 
disastrous as Wakeham (2012) goes on to point out, stating that, 
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The implications of terror’s connotations for Indigenous self-
determination struggles in settler states are profound: when 
Indigenous anticolonial resistance is spuriously denounced as 
terrorism, autochthonous nations are denied recourse to the 
principles of national self-protection and autonomy that European 
nation-states hold as sacrosanct for themselves. (p. 8) 
For evidence that this can happen, and indeed already has happened, one need 
look no further than nation-states’ armed reactions to supposed internally 
fomented terrorism.  Two specific cases are examined, one in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand and the other in the Canada.  In the Aotearoa/New Zealand case, under 
the guise of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 2002, Police conducted, 
a series of early morning raids across the country on Indigenous, 
peace, and environmental activists who allegedly participated in a 
weapons ‘training camp’ and were supposedly involved in the 
planning of future assassinations of New Zealand and US political 
leaders. (Wakeham, 2012, p. 10) 
There were eighteen arrests and much publicity but in the end only two of those 
arrested were imprisoned – on gun possession and participation in a criminal 
group charges and not on charges relating to the suppression of terrorism 
(Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2012).  There is a lot more to tell about this 
case however it is not the intent of this study to analyse this sad tale any further 
than to note that it happened and to highlight the potential risks that now exist for 
those who have cause to protest and resist. 
In the case of Canada, in 1990, the Kanien’kehaka people – called Mohawk by 
their colonisers, resisted the illegal appropriation of land in their ancestral territory 
known as Kanehsatake, for the development of a golf course and luxury 
condominiums “upon sacred pine trees and the site of traditional burial grounds.  
The Kanien’kehaka erected a road blockade to prevent the development” 
(Wakeham, 2012, p. 14).  However a court injunction was secured by local 
government authorities and one hundred police officers were used to pull down 
“the blockade and surround the Kanehsatake reserve – actions that resulted in the 
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death of one police officer” (Wakeham, 2012, p. 14).  During a press conference 
the Canadian Prime Minister of the time, Brian Mulroney, “denounced the 
Mohawks as a ‘band of terrorists’ while simultaneously issuing his own threat of 
the potential for ‘loss of life’ if the protesters were to fight back against military 
force” (Wakeham, 2012, p. 15). 
I would argue that these heavy-handed responses on the part of nation-states have 
resulted in a truly unusual situation.  That being, that something once perceived as 
a wide almost unbridgeable divide between two protagonists, both claiming the 
right to self-determination, has suddenly been redefined as a fine line, but a fine 
line, I suggest, between life and death.  This situation leaves indigenous groups 
vulnerable and exposed to escalated incidences of ‘counterterrorism’, which, I 
would propose, is most likely to come from a nation-state’s need to maintain 
control whilst responding to a fear-filled citizenry.  The threat of counterterrorism 
action against indigenous groups and others seeking sovereignty, as a tool of 
control and maintaining the status quo is, I propose, a subject most pressing and 
real and therefore deserving of further attention and examination. 
I would suggest that nation-states and their citizens react in this way because they 
feel exposed and vulnerable.  In a strange twist, it might well be this perceived 
state of vulnerability that provides an opportunity for indigenous groups to 
achieve that which they have long sought. 
4.7 Hikina te matapōrehu 
Colonising nation-states have a long history of undermining the constructs and 
systems of indigenous groups.  The strategies employed range from assimilation, 
as in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, to subjugation as in Wales, Ireland and 
some South American countries.  For whatever reason, I argue, they have set a 
determined course of imposing the architecture of their paradigm upon those who 
are not of their way of being and doing.  The colonising power’s willingness to 
exploit any advantage their technologies and knowledge can afford them over that 
of others is, I suggest, primary in their strategies.  In doing so they are able to 
discern deficiencies, weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the ‘other’ upon which 
they can capitalise.  So it is with any contest, that in the pursuit of victory one 
either seeks out or creates a weakness, a point of vulnerability in the opponent’s 
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defences.  In the main, indigenous people are numerically inferior, a condition, I 
propose, democracy happily exploits. 
Many, such as the hundreds of thousands of urban-dwelling indigenous people, 
are dislocated from their histories, cultural heritage and traditions, a condition, I 
propose, national pride and loyalty to the state and its symbols sets out to foster.  
Such, I contend, is the purpose and function of stirring anthems, solemn pledges 
of allegiance, and flags.  These, I argue, are rallying points for expressions of anti-
difference and as such are ever-present indicators of the vulnerability of 
indigenous groups whose protestations are primarily founded on their points of 
distinctiveness and difference.  That nation-state sponsored notions of anti-
difference have been successful and continue to be so are, I would argue, due 
mainly to numerical superiority and a sense of national cohesion and commonality 
built around the mythology of their nation’s history.  In considering JJ’s Māori 
Incorporation it would appear that given the small numbers involved and localised 
sphere in which they operate, it seems they have an even greater battle ahead of 
them to be heard, let alone realise their aspirations.  How this numerical factor and 
collective loyalty to a common purpose impacts on this group is explored further 
in Chapter Six. 
Where notable gains have been made by indigenous groups it seems due to them 
having developed either numerical superiority or loyalty to a collective.  These 
were then used to exploit a detected weakness in their nation-state’s structure.  For 
examples of this approach we turn to South America and South-East Asia. 
That indigenous groups have capitalised on nation-state vulnerability can perhaps 
best be evidenced by the dynamism of South American indigenous groups, who 
also happen to be coca leaf growers, but who organised themselves and their 
collective strength to achieve a position of authority and decision-making power 
in their respective nation-states.  Warren and Jackson (as cited in Albro, 2005) 
furnish this study with clarification around the events that occurred in late-
twentieth and early twenty-first century Bolivia, and offer the following insights, 
Coca growers have articulated their goals with those of the 
hemisphere’s indigenous movements, namely self-determination, 
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autonomy, recognition of cultural distinctiveness, political 
restructuring of the state, territorial rights, access to natural 
resources and greater control over their own local economic 
development. (p. 438) 
Albro (2005) continues to expand on how these events brought about change in 
the Chapare region by commenting that, 
With the early institutional absence of the Bolivian State in the 
region, agrarian unions became a collective form of local 
governance responsible for the distribution of land grants, the 
establishment of boundaries, the building of small-scale public 
works and the maintenance of the scales of exchange for the market, 
as well as the management of market outlets for coca and other 
products produced in Chapare.  Subsequent State efforts to isolate 
the coca growers helped feed a ‘cocalero’2 militancy, galvanising 
the internal unity of local unions already so intrinsic to the daily life 
of the Chapare.  This militancy was also encouraged by the arrival 
of ex-miners to the Chapare in large numbers after 1985, bringing 
with them their own radical union tradition and long history of 
resistance to State oppression. (p. 438) 
So it would seem that the tactic of exploiting a nation-state’s vulnerability 
presents itself as a plausible alternate strategy to those that have habitually been 
used by indigenous groups in the past.  Bertrand (2011) joins the discussion and 
offers another example of indigenous groups capitalising on a nation-state’s 
vulnerability, and introduces the story of the Cordillerans of the Philippines and 
the Papuans of Indonesia and focuses on how these two groups were astute 
enough to take advantage of an economic crisis in Asia that, “led to rapid 
economic deterioration” (p. 861), and this combined with a “regime weakened 
under attacks of corruption” (p. 861) provided the opportunity to effect change.  
However it would appear that in this case there was also a significant element of 
sustained agitation on the part of the indigenous groups.  Bertrand (2011) 
elaborates on this stating that, 
                                                            
2 cocalero: a term used to describe the coca leaf growers of Peru and Bolivia 
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In both cases, accommodations came at a time of state vulnerability.  
In the Philippines, concessions to Cordillerans was part of the 
government’s strategy to counter the NPA’s3 on-going insurgency.  
In Indonesia, concessions to Papua were partly driven by attempts 
to find an overall solution to conflicts in East Timor and Aceh, as 
well as Papua.  Autonomy was part of such a strategy. (p. 865) 
I would propose here that picking the right time to prosecute your battles is a 
strong message that comes through the experiences of these indigenous groups, a 
point that Bertrand (2011) makes clear and supplements with a warning by stating 
that, 
The cases of the Cordillerans and Papuans show the particular 
importance of timing, where articulating a position at moments of 
state weakness can create sufficient momentum to constitutionalize 
indigenous peoples’ rights.  When such critical junctures are 
missed, it becomes more difficult to use sustained international and 
domestic pressure to produce such gains. (p. 866) 
In light of these offerings it would seem that all is not doom and gloom for 
indigenous groups and that their fortunes can rise and fall dependent on a number 
of factors, some internal and some external.  I would propose here that most 
significant amongst those factors that can effect change is the capability to discern 
the best conditions for optimum outcomes, and the capacity to bring them into 
being.  In the current political and legal climate, compounded by the very real 
threat of counterterrorism responses, I would argue that, the optimum conditions 
for change do not exist for most indigenous groups.  Instead this should perhaps 
be seen as an articulation of the coloniser’s position and in that find 
encouragement for indigenous groups to look beyond what has always been done 
and explore options outside these arenas.  I propose that nation-states are most 
vulnerable when their systems are shaken, which allows for the relevance of those 
systems to be questioned and challenged by indigenous groups. 
                                                            
3 NPA: New People’s Army 
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4.8 Kia mārama te titiro 
There are messages in all stories.  The skill lies in being able to detect and 
interpret them.  It would be too simple to propose that all indigenous peoples use 
carbon copies of those strategies that have proved successful for one group, in one 
place, at one time, and in one set of circumstances, in the hope they will bear 
similar fruit in a different time, space and context.  Looking at a seemingly 
unsolvable problem without availing oneself of the opportunity to examine it from 
different angles or perspectives, results merely in the perpetuation of the problem.  
To gain a different and/or new perspective of the situation is, I suggest, 
tantamount to solving half the problem then and there.  Why should the 
reclamation of indigenous rights only ever be seen as a political or legal issue?  
Why should indigenous groups allow others to define them, their status and 
condition?  Cronin (2003) recognises this situation and provides an insight into 
this thinking by offering that, 
In order to define their status and the extent of their authority and 
power, Indigenous groups must look to their cultural values, the 
traditions, customs, and institutions that constitute the basis of their 
society.  They must also develop practical ways to exercise that 
authority and power.  Indigenous governance must be based on the 
exercise of authority and power whether it is inherent flowing from 
culture and tradition or delegated by other levels of Governance.  
This is the essence of indigenous governance. (p. 161) 
Indigenous governance, which I proffer, is a synonym for indigenous people’s 
self-determination, demands certain attitudes and behaviours of those who make 
claim to it.  On the other hand it has the potential to capitalise on an existing 
weakness in nation-states, which, I would argue, is its inability to perceive that 
anything other than that which the nation-state promotes could ever have validity 
or credibility.  However, should a group choose to resist this notion and act as a 
self-determining entity in direct opposition to the nation-state it then forces the 
state to be reactive instead of normative, a condition, I propose, it is not designed 
to be, hence a weakness. 
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In light of the recent global recession I suggest there are other areas of potential 
weakness that could be monitored by indigenous groups.  Areas such as growing 
unrest due to economic disparity amongst the citizenry, ill-ease at perceived 
political pandering to big business, a feeling of social inequity between different 
demographic groupings, and even disputations over true national identity.  The 
key however, is to be proactive and not constantly reactive – one, I suggest, 
creates opportunity whilst the other manages threat.  I suggest this indicates a 
need for greater examination of what it means to indigenous groups discerning 
and exploiting vulnerability and of what third space theory can contribute to that 
examination. 
Resistance by its very nature is both opportunity and threat management.  In 
contemplating resistance and the relationship of indigenous groups to land Harjo 
(as cited in Graham & Wiessner, 2011) expands on this notion by offering that, 
Resistance means honouring this relationship, means honouring this 
life force, and those powers of this earth that feed and inspire us… 
We resist by continuing to stand up with integrity for what is 
right… We also resist by writing, singing, making new art; reviving 
and continuing… traditions, by rewriting law, [and] making new 
law. (p. 403) 
That indigenous groups continue to resist nation-state hegemony and prosecute 
their various claims is evident.  Equally evident, I would argue, is that nation-
states are slow to change and are now armed with lethal powers and a 
preparedness to use them.  The manner in which indigenous groups pursue their 
rights is, I suggest, an area worthy of greater consideration by those groups.  
However I propose that more important for indigenous groups is to step away 
from the habit of confronting nation-states within their palaces of power – in the 
political and legal fora.  Here I would encourage the application of the third space 
lens to discern a location where new perceptions and articulations can arise, and 
that location, I suggest, is wherever the nation-state is vulnerable.  In saying so I 
offer up the following location as a possible point of vulnerability currently 
existing in nation-states generally, in their political, economic and conceptual 
confusion (Debelo, 2011) compounded by their fear of terror.  I do not propose 
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that indigenous groups launch into campaigns of terror against their colonisers nor 
do I propose they set about trying to re-educate the citizen majority.  What I do 
suggest is that indigenous groups develop their capability to discern those 
vulnerable points and their capacity to exploit them.  One factor that I contend is 
critical to successfully realising change is that of time, as articulated by Bertrand 
(2011).  Whilst identifying and then exploiting points of vulnerability might seem 
a reasonably straightforward proposition, I would argue that discerning the 
optimum time to act makes all the difference. 
4.9 He kupu whakahiato 
It would appear that despite battling for forty or more years, and with the 
exception of a few nation-wide advances made in South America, little change 
has occurred for indigenous people in advancing their causes.  During this period 
they found visibility on the international stage as part of the post-World War II 
wider global movement to secure human rights for all peoples (Gayman, 2011; 
Graham & Wiessner, 2011), even if as an afterthought to labour and 
environmental concerns.  They built cross-border networks with other indigenous 
groups whose collective representation at the United Nations has seen the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by all member 
states.  However, the sometimes contradictory nature of text of the Declaration 
has led to articulations of doubt as to whether it can ever deliver that which 
indigenous people anticipated (Debelo, 2011; Kariyawasam, 2010). 
In the struggle to advance their causes indigenous people promote their ways of 
being and doing (Cronin, 2003), their tikanga, as a point of difference from those 
of the nation-state citizenry.  They formulate their arguments accordingly when 
seeking redress through the nation-state’s palaces of power – in their 
legal/political fora.  This creates a dichotomy where arguments based on “desires, 
beliefs and irrationality” (Kuppe, 2009, p. 117) of the private sphere are litigated 
in the public sphere of “law and order based on rational decision-making” 
(Kuppe, 2009, p. 117).  These bastions of coloniser power and control appear to 
be maintained through the force of numerical superiority and loyalty to a sense of 
pride in a constructed national identity based on “hegemonic settler sovereignty” 
(J. T. Johnson, 2008, p. 47). 
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Interestingly it has been through achieving momentum via these same forces, 
namely accruing sufficient numbers and fostering loyalty to a common cause, that 
indigenous people have achieved some measure of success (Albro, 2005; Chong, 
2010).  As has been shown in those instances achieving a numerical superiority 
requires the development of coalitions or networks with other groups affected by 
their nation-state’s ambivalence towards them.  It is then understandable how the 
cross-border collective approach of indigenous people and their networks has 
realised success at the international level but stumbles once individual groups 
return to within the borders of their territories within their respective nation-states. 
In pursuing their claims indigenous people have to contend with both external and 
internal forces.  They not only confront the nation-state’s dedication to wealth-
generation and maintenance of power (Debelo, 2011) but also with internalised 
oppression (Gayman, 2011) within the ranks of their membership.  This cultural 
confusion undermines the very cultural integrity that, for indigenous groups, 
forms their point of commonality (Ahdar, 2003; Cronin, 2003; Graham & 
Wiessner, 2011; Kuppe, 2009). 
As has been articulated in this chapter pressing claims for indigenous rights can 
be a risky even perilous venture with some nation-states treating their indigenous 
populations with greater suspicion in the wake of recent acts of terror (Wakeham, 
2012).  By applying the third space lens to this specific situation I propose that 
this fear of terrorism compounded by conceptual confusion, cultural bias, and an 
increased loss of liberties for the wider citizenry presents as a vulnerability in the 
structure of nation-states. 
Bertrand (2011) points out the importance of identifying vulnerability and the 
optimum time to capitalise on them.  This offers indigenous groups a new 
enunciation of their situation and potentially creates opportunity for determining 
new ways of acting and prosecuting their causes.  I suggest here that this is in 
essence reflective of the how JJ’s Māori Incorporation perceives their situation 
and how it has informed their actions.  JJ and his group hold up their tikanga, their 
indigeneity and their sovereignty as the foundation for their being and doing.  
They are part of a nation-wide collective drawn together by their commonly held 
worldviews, values and beliefs.  They reject the opportunity to engage in nation-
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state sponsored political/legal processes such as the Waitangi Tribunal to press 
their claims.  Instead they operate as if they are indeed lords and masters in the 
territory of their ancestors.  Just how they arrived at these determinations is 
explored in-depth in Chapter Six but how they developed these perceptions is, I 
argue, a reflection of third space theory in action. 
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE – THIRD SPACE 
Tuma te mirimiri, tō kai i mihi mai; 
Tīkape te manga, tō kai i rongoā. 
(Taitoko, 1997b, p. 1) 
5.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to present a number of articulations about what third space 
is, why it is relevant to a study of this nature, how it is applied, and what 
relationship it has to tikanga, sovereignty, and indigeneity.  This chapter also 
informs on the relationship third space has to JJ’s Māori Incorporation, positing 
its ways of being and doing as examples of third space in action.  In doing so it is 
anticipated that new understandings can be enunciated about how through third 
space theory tikanga can be recognised as a transformative agent to develop valid 
and credible responses to address contemporary issues. 
Although this study rejected Kaupapa Māori theory as the ideal platform for its 
examination of this kaupapa, I would suggest, it is worthwhile in a separate study 
to look at both Kaupapa Māori theory and the notion of third space, using the third 
space lens, to see what ‘new’ enunciations can be made about that relationship.  
Are they reflective of each other or is one the transformative agent of the other?  
Knowing the answers to these questions could possibly lead to the extension or 
growth of either one or both. 
In an effort to present a cohesive discussion about tikanga, sovereignty, 
indigeneity and third space it is important to grasp what third space theory 
proposes.  Tikanga, sovereignty and indigeneity have already been examined in 
this study and during this chapter there will be regular references made to the 
main aspects articulated in the preceding chapters.  A deliberate attempt is made 
in the following discussion to apply the notion of third space theory by 
interrupting processes, interrogating situations and enunciating new perceptions. 
5.2 Tuma te mirimiri 
Why third space theory and not post-colonial theory?  As has been alluded to in 
Chapter One of this study, post-colonial theory was initially perceived as being 
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the best positioned theory to address a study of this nature.  Eventually that 
perception changed and an alternative was sought as it became apparent to me that 
although post-colonial theory has a contribution to make, I maintain that “it 
struggled to move beyond reinforcing already existing diametrically opposed 
positions” (Chapter One, p.2). 
However I confess that my greatest difficulty with post-colonial theory lies in its 
positioning within the Western paradigm.  Gandhi (1998) recognises this and 
introduces another aspect of what might limit its usefulness when she offers that, 
“Postcolonial theory principally addresses the needs of the Western academy” (p. 
ix). 
Since I shy away from wishing to be seen as colluding with the Western academy 
any more than I am now, doubts formed in my mind as to the efficacy of post-
colonial theory and its appropriateness for this study.  It is this Western paradigm 
positioning, I would argue, that not only hinders post-colonialism’s suitability but 
ultimately disqualifies it from being able to encompass and consider two specific 
notions critical to this study, those of culture and identity.  Again Gandhi (1998) 
recognises this and contributes that, “What postcolonialism fails to recognise is 
that what counts as ‘marginal’ in relation to the west has often been central and 
foundational in the non-West” (p. ix). 
I interpret what counts as ‘marginal’ as a reference to culture, identity, 
worldviews, principles, beliefs, values and aspirations.  The suitability of post-
colonial theory is further challenged by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (as cited in 
Meredith, 1998) who offer that, “In postcolonial discourse, the notion that any 
culture or identity is pure and essential is disputable” (p. 2). 
It is not the intention of this study to argue the points of purity and essentialism of 
culture but it does argue that culture, in the context of tikanga, is fundamental to 
this study. 
N. Mahuika (2011) recounts his initial introduction to post-colonialism and what 
he perceived as its strength when he identifies it as, “an approach that sought to 
destabilize the ‘centre’ by writing back against the grain” (p. 18).  He goes on to 
84 
articulate two aspects of post-colonialism; one that he perceives as having merit, 
the other as a failing. 
On the one hand, it has provided a highly useful way of thinking 
about problems within colonial encounter, while on the other it has 
been critiqued for its failure to accentuate the obvious continuation 
of colonialism within our contemporary context. (N. Mahuika, 2011, 
p. 18) 
This study does not propose to engage in any debate surrounding whether or not 
colonisation continues in the present-day and is only interested in post-
colonialism for what it can offer to the process of examining tikanga, sovereignty, 
indigenous peoples and the kaupapa of JJ’s Māori Incorporation. 
I contend then that it is because of the notions contained in the articulations 
presented above that post-colonial theory is limited in what it can bring to this 
study and for those reasons was set aside.  However before departing from post-
colonialism I feel compelled to acknowledge it for what it has contributed to this 
study.  I gladly confess that it was during my research of post-colonial theory that 
the bulk of information concerning the notions of hybridity and third space came 
into view. 
5.3 Tīkape te mānga 
Third space theory has often been mentioned throughout this study and aspects of 
it briefly described in the preceding chapters.  As has been mentioned in those 
chapters the notion of third space has its origins in the notion of hybridity, which 
itself originates from post-colonialism (Meredith, 1998).  I would argue that it is 
worthwhile taking the time to consider articulations of third space made by those 
much more familiar than I with this theory.  In doing so I suggest that a better 
picture can be gained about what it is and what makes it critically different from 
post-colonialism.  To do that though first the notion of hybridity should be 
examined.  To do this I propose that the following rather lengthy passage from 
Meredith (1998) summarises a lot of what is said about hybridity. 
Bhabha has developed his concept of hybridity from literary and 
cultural theory to describe the construction of culture and identity 
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within conditions of colonial antagonism and inequity (Bhabha 1994; 
Bhabha 1996).  For Bhabha, hybridity is the process by which the 
colonial governing authority undertakes to translate the identity of 
the colonised (the Other) within a singular universal framework, but 
then fails producing something familiar but new (Papastergiadis 
1997).  Bhabha contends that a new hybrid identity or subject-
position emerges from the interweaving of elements of the coloniser 
and the colonised challenging the validity and authenticity of any 
essentialist cultural identity.  Hybridity is positioned as antidote to 
essentialism, or “the belief in variable and fixed properties which 
define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity (Fuss, 1991: xi)”. (p. 2) 
How do these articulations sit with JJ’s Māori Incorporation?  I propose that, as 
will be seen in the following chapter, the kaupapa of JJ’s Māori Incorporation is a 
construct born out of culture and identity during a time of “colonial antagonism 
and inequity” (Meredith, 1998, p. 2).  There are other similarities inasmuch as the 
entity itself is arguably the result of ‘the interweaving of elements of the coloniser 
and the colonised’ ultimately creating a separate being that exhibits aspects of 
both the coloniser and the colonised and yet struggles to find recognition and 
acceptance by either.  This too is examined in Chapter Six. 
It appears that the notion of hybridity is not without its detractors and Meredith 
(1998) offers an insight into some of those articulations. 
The history of hybridity has caused some to consider the 
employment of the concept as problematic, indeed, offensive 
(Mitchell 1997; Werbner 1997).  In colonial discourse, hybridity is a 
term of abuse for those who are products of miscegenation, mixed-
breeds.  It is imbued in nineteenth-century eugenistic and scientific-
racist thought (Young 1995). (p. 2) 
I would argue here that the above criticisms of hybridity seem to be based on 
perceiving race or ethnic origins as the sole determiners of identity.  I would 
further argue that it is this perception that sets hybridity apart from the notion of 
third space.  As Meredith (1998) has noted, Bhabha (1994, 1996) sees hybridity as 
a descriptive process that allows for new identity and cultural constructs to 
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develop.  I contend that Papastergiadis’ (as cited in Meredith, 1998, p. 2) 
comments imply that when this construction is carried out by the coloniser the 
result is less different than it is repackaged.  The contribution that Fuss (as cited in 
Meredith, 1998, p. 2) makes is interesting inasmuch as it argues that hybridity 
allows for the emergence of a new identity to occur through the interweaving of 
elements from both sides.  These three points do not make any mention or 
implication of race or ethnic origin but do address notions of culture and identity 
and it is this difference, I would argue, that leads to third space. 
Here is another example of how JJ’s Māori Incorporation is arguably a result of 
hybridity and of third space in action.  Its origins and its ways of being and doing 
are founded on culture and identity.  Race and ethnic origin hold no sway and as 
will be seen later his group, although working in the first instance for whānau and 
hapū interests, is capable and contemplative of all peoples of the world. 
It seems that all this so far does little more than realign already fixed positions of 
seeing or perceiving the self of either the coloniser or colonised.  However, a 
difference I propose with third space theory is that it recognises the locations of 
those positions and then virtually ignores them instead seeking out an alternative 
space between the two locations.  This situation is, I suggest, something akin to 
creating initiatives to go around an obstacle instead of expending energy and 
resources tackling it head-on. 
This notion would seem to be supported by Meredith (1998) who claims that, “the 
third space is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a productive, and not 
merely reflective, space that engenders new possibility” (p. 3). 
J. T. Johnson (2008) contributes to the locative discussion by noting that, 
Bhabha’s work only implies using thirdspace to describe a politics of 
place.  I see thirdspace more as Butz and Ripmeester describe it, as a 
‘descriptor for particular spaces that have been produced from 
particular types of discourses and social interactions’. (p. 45) 
Hoogvelt (as cited in Meredith, 1998) offers that, 
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In fact the concept of hybridity occupies a central place in 
postcolonial discourse.  It is “celebrated and privileged as a kind of 
superior cultural intelligence owing to the advantage of in-
betweeness, the straddling of two cultures and the consequent ability 
to negotiate the difference” (Hoogvelt 1997: 158). (p. 2) 
Meredith (1998) returns to furnish this study with another articulation of his 
interpretation of how Bhabha perceives the nature of third space, commenting that 
“For Bhabha it is the indeterminate spaces in-between subject-positions that are 
lauded as the locale of the disruption and displacement of hegemonic colonial 
narratives of cultural structures and practices (Bhabha 1994; Bhabha 1996)” (p. 2). 
I propose that from the preceding insights provided by various commentators a 
number of commonalities can be deduced.  Third space is aware of current 
opposing positions.  Third space can be located anywhere within the void that 
separates those two known and fixed positions.  Third space, as an “antidote to 
essentialism” (Meredith, 1998, p. 2), is well positioned to consider matters 
relating to culture and identity.  Third space is a site where a process occurs to 
produce something new and not merely a repackaging of the old.  The process that 
occurs in the third space is interruptive, interrogative and enunciative. 
Just what is meant by interruptive, interrogative and enunciative and to what 
extent is, I would suggest, at the discretion of the instigator of the process.  The 
argument I make here is that the extent to which one goes towards actioning the 
three parts of the interrupt, interrogate and enunciate process is dictated by the 
measure of importance it has to the instigator.  I suggest though that this should 
not be confused with the basic ‘rethink and innovate’ process that arguably only 
delivers the same rhetoric in a creative and as yet unanticipated way.  The actions 
of terrorists are, I suggest, examples of the ‘rethink and innovate’ process 
inasmuch as the same positions of opposing sides are maintained, as are their 
messages to each other but delivered in a repackaged form.  This behaviour, I 
contend, is not third space in action it is merely reinforcing the status quo. 
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5.4 Third space in action 
Who instigates the third space process?  I propose that colonisers cannot as this 
would bring into contention the notion of power and its holders.  Maintaining 
power and the status quo, I argue, precludes the coloniser from contemplating 
shifting their position.  I also suggest that those who recognise their colonised 
condition are the only ones who will also recognise the need to instigate the 
process.  I propose that they simply have nothing to lose and potentially 
everything to gain.  I further propose that the present-day situation that indigenous 
groups, including Māori, find themselves surviving in sees them authorised to 
instigate this process as a means of gaining new perspectives and insights into 
their specific situations, and using those new insights to advance their causes. 
J. T. Johnson (2008) provides this study with another insight that speaks to the 
effects of indigenous groups engaging in this process. 
By reading the landscape for evidence of the exercise of indigenous 
self-determination, it is possible to glimpse places outside of the 
hegemonic control of the settler-state.  These landscapes lie 
somewhere between the settler and colonized, creating thirdspaces, 
holes in the fabric of the state that sit outside of this binary 
relationship. (p. 31) 
J. T. Johnson (2008) continues and articulates what he perceives has brought 
about this need to glimpse the landscape offering that, “As indigenous populations 
have been forced toward the edge of the state, they have been forced to reassert 
their cultural values in order to fundamentally reinvent the relationship between 
colonizer and colonized” (p. 29). 
In the Aotearoa/New Zealand context tino rangatiratanga has for many years been 
the catch phrase on the lips of many who struggle to ‘reinvent the relationship’ 
with the state.  The following commentators discuss tino rangatiratanga and even 
challenge its existence.  However another accepts that it exists in more than the 
minds of those who seek it and locates it in a landscape. 
As Augie Fleras and Paul Spoonley observe in Reading Aotearoa, 
‘Only the exercise of tino rangatiratanga [indigenous self-
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determination] provides tangible evidence of its existence’. This 
exercise of indigenous self-determination does not occur in 
metaphoric “sites of resistance” but in, as Donald Moore states, “a 
politics of place ‘on the ground’. (as cited in J. T. Johnson, 2008, p. 
31) 
Butz and Ripmeester (as cited in J. T. Johnson, 2008) offer an opinion on the 
advantages that engaging in this process can bring to those who instigate it by 
offering that, “a third space sensibility can allow the radically disempowered to 
discursively reconstruct actual spaces in ways that allow them to engage more 
productively in directly oppositional resistance” (p. 45). 
If third space allows for the articulation of new perceptions on culture and identity 
then I argue that tikanga finds a place in this discussion.  I have earlier used the 
pōwhiri process and hongi as examples of tikanga that, I argue, are acting in a 
way reflective of the third space process.  I further propose that the links that 
tikanga has with third space occur at a number of levels.  Short of suggesting that 
tikanga is third space in action I would argue that its very nature makes it a 
transformative agent that naturally occupies the third space. 
5.5 He kupu whakahiato 
In part tikanga is a perception, a product of a society’s worldview, incorporating 
its principles, values and beliefs and third space is about articulating perceptions 
from the perspective of the instigator.  In part tikanga is also an action, a physical 
manifestation of those perceptions and third space is about being a productive and 
not merely reflective space.  The organic and evolving nature of tikanga positions 
it as able to respond to change whilst third space is all about identifying 
opportunities to effect change.  The collective practice of tikanga gives its society 
a sense of assuredness and security which, I would argue, also happens in the third 
space by privileging a society’s worldview, principles, values and beliefs within 
the articulation process.  Tikanga exists to maintain a balance between two worlds 
whilst third space strives to radically redefine the fulcrum upon which the balance 
between two positions is centred.  Tikanga requires that any actions taken are tika 
and pono which serves to validate and give credibility to those actions and ways 
of thinking.  I propose that although third space makes no such requirement it 
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provides the space where the worldviews, principles, values, beliefs and actions 
can be validated and seen as credible.  For these preceding reasons I contend that 
both tikanga and third space are about being and doing. 
Like tikanga, I would argue that sovereignty is naturally positioned as a 
transformative agent in the third space.  Just like tikanga, sovereignty is an 
expression of a society’s self-perception, a perception stored at the heart of a 
society as a sacred contract with past, present and future generations and third 
space privileges that perception.  Acting in a sovereign manner acclaims a society 
as possessing sovereignty, which again third space privileges.  Societies that 
require neither nationhood nor statehood can still be sovereign, which, I would 
argue, is a notion that is valid and credible within the third space.  I propose that 
sovereignty, just like tikanga and third space, is about being and doing. 
Indigenous groups, I suggest, are the physical transformative agents, the 
instigators and the enactors.  The connection between indigenous groups and third 
space is more akin to that of consumer and service provider.  Indigenous groups 
are most likely to be the instigators of the third space process.  They will be the 
ones to populate that third space with their own perceptions, worldviews, values 
and beliefs and determine subsequent actions.  Whilst indigenous groups have 
similar stories they also have differing contexts and third space does not filter or 
censor those perceptions but accommodates all as provided by the instigators.  
Indigenous groups who engage in the third space process generally force the 
coloniser to be reactive and potentially this creates nation-state vulnerability. 
Third space offers an alternative site of engagement for indigenous groups and 
their colonisers, thereby avoiding the palaces of coloniser power.  Indigenous 
groups live with the threat of counterterrorism and whilst third space offers no 
physical safe haven it actively encourages ‘new’ enunciations that could serve to 
defuse any perceived terror threat and thereby mitigate any response of force from 
the coloniser.  Indigenous groups need to develop their capability to discern 
vulnerability and their capacity to exploit those vulnerable points, and third space 
offers a forum for that development to be addressed and planned for.  I propose 
then that indigeneity, just like sovereignty, tikanga and third space is about being 
and doing. 
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I would propose that to a large degree JJ’s Māori Incorporation is an example of 
the practical application of third space theory.  As will be seen in the following 
chapter they challenge dominant perceptions of history and enunciate ‘new’ 
perceptions.  They are founded on tikanga and sacred pacts which influence their 
perceptions of themselves and their location in the New Zealand legal/political 
landscape.  JJ’s Māori Incorporation articulates ‘new’ perceptions relating to a 
number of historical situations and challenges the authority of New Zealand 
governments to govern.  They embrace te ao wairua in their ways of being and 
doing, which influences their worldview.  They claim legitimacy based on 
international agreements, which sees them position themselves in a space outside 
of the current tino rangatiratanga versus settler-hegemony discourse.  JJ’s Māori 
Incorporation accepts the principle of kaitiakitanga and the mutual protection of 
all people, places and resources, which I would argue is an inclusive and 
collectivist approach and not exclusive and individualistic.  JJ’s Māori 
Incorporation takes a clear and controversial position when they enunciate that 
Māori have failed to live up to certain agreements.  They assert that the native title 
to land is unextinguished and dismiss the fiction of negotiating settlements with 
the New Zealand Crown.  Māori Incorporations such as JJ’s have identified what 
they believe to be present-day points of vulnerability and strive to capitalise on 
those perceived weaknesses.  All of the above, I propose, has either occurred in, 
or because of, the notion of the third space. 
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6.0 CHAPTER SIX – MĀORI INCORPORATIONS 
Ko te tāhuhu he hīnau, 
He okiokinga tikanga; 
He ōhākī nō ngā tūpuna, 
Kia kaha, kia māia, tū rangatira. 
(Taitoko & Waitai, 2004, p. 1) 
6.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to present a number of articulations about what Māori 
Incorporations are, and introduces the different notions of ture-Māori 
Incorporations and tikanga-Māori Incorporations, terms I have constructed in the 
process of this study to differentiate between the two types of Māori Incorporation.  
What are Māori Incorporations, what underpins them, and how are tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations positioned in relation to contemporary issues, are some questions 
addressed in this chapter.  In doing so it is anticipated that new understandings 
can be enunciated about how tikanga-Māori Incorporations, such as JJ’s, are 
representative of third space theory in action and therefore perceived as offering a 
new perspective on being and doing that addresses issues confronting present-day 
indigenous groups and others seeking freedom and sovereignty. 
It must be stated here that many of the entities and structures addressed in this 
chapter relating to JJ’s tikanga-Māori Incorporation no longer operate, or do so in 
diminished numbers and capacity.  The reasons for this demise are addressed in 
JJ’s articulations, however it is the worldview, philosophical underpinning, 
principles, beliefs, values, aspirations, and ways of being and doing of this group 
that are of primary interest to this study.  From JJ’s perspective the kaupapa still 
lives even if the physical representations do not and that is how his narratives are 
presented. 
If avenues exist that can lead to empowering and enabling the disenfranchised to 
reclaim and assert their mana then, I contend that, these are worthy of exploration.  
If these paths to restoration already exist within the cultural heritage of whānau, 
hapū and iwi, as well as the cultural legacies of our ancestors, I propose that, these 
should be the first to be sought out, examined, and tested.  It is perhaps wisest 
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then to accept that for the most part the destiny of whānau, hapū, and iwi lies in 
their hands.  As mentioned previously this sentiment is an echoing of that 
articulated earlier by Rangihau (1987).  The challenge, I suggest, is to mauria te 
taki and do the best that we can with the resources available and, I would further 
argue that, the most critical of resources is knowledge.  I propose here that if the 
answer lies within, then why look without?  Pātaihia ngā pou o tō whare.  Ākuni, 
ko reira te whakaeanga ake o te take. 
The kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations is arguably a candidate for 
consideration as a home-grown tikanga-based response addressing matters of 
sovereignty and indigenous freedom.  It is founded on sacred agreements made in 
the nineteenth century and expressly sets out to enact and enable the tenets 
articulated in those agreements, namely guaranteed sovereign independence of 
Māori and the protection of that sovereignty by the British Crown.  The structures 
and processes created by this kaupapa are reflective of tikanga at local, regional 
and national levels and all work towards maintaining the mana of those early 
signatories to those sacred agreements. 
Some, maybe a lot, of what is presented in this chapter will be met with suspicion 
or doubt, or even incredulity.  However, that the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations did, and in some places still do, exist and operate is evidenced by 
documents I possess bearing the signatures of tangata past and present as well as 
the official marks of some of the entities mentioned herein.  I can personally attest 
that I have attended a number of tikanga-Māori Incorporation hui and on one 
occasion have met and spoken with the man that all sources reviewed credit as 
being its founder. 
6.2 Te tikanga me te ture 
Purely for the purposes of facilitating ease of differentiating two types of Māori 
Incorporation I have taken the liberty to refer to one type as ture-Māori 
Incorporation and the other as tikanga-Māori Incorporation.  Those referred to as 
ture-Māori Incorporations are by far the most common and draw their authority 
from New Zealand legislation.  Tikanga-Māori Incorporations are much fewer in 
number and draw their authority from their sovereign whānau/hapū status.  
Despite this difference both types of Māori Incorporation being discussed in this 
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study have their genesis in New Zealand legislation, namely Te Ture Whenua 
Māori 1993 / Māori Land Act 1993.  In section 2(2) the Interpretation of the Act 
states that, 
it is the intention of Parliament that powers, duties, and discretions 
conferred by this Act shall be exercised, as far as possible, in a 
manner that facilitates and promotes the retention, use, 
development, and control of Maori land as taonga tuku iho by 
Maori owners, their whanau, their hapu, and their descendants, and 
that protects wahi tapu. (Te Ture Whenua Māori 1993, p. 18) 
Accordingly this Act mainly deals with matters concerning whenua Māori, 
including the Māori Land Court and the Māori Appellate Court.  It also allows for 
the constituting of five different types of Māori Land Court trusts, as well as 
Māori Reservations and Māori Incorporations.  According to Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) 
(2011c) the five types of trust include: “Ahu Whenua Trusts… a land 
administration trust designed to manage whole blocks of Māori freehold land” 
(para.22) most of which are run as commercial enterprises mainly farming.  
“Whenua Tōpū Trusts… designed to manage land belonging to an iwi or hapū” 
(para.29) and share similar features with Ahu Whenua Trusts.  “Kaitiaki Trusts 
are designed to protect minors or persons under disability who are unable to 
manage their affairs” (para.32).  “Whānau Trusts are designed to hold and manage 
beneficial interests or shares in Māori land or general land owned by Māori” 
(para. 33) allowing “whānau members to bring together all of their interests or 
shares in land for the benefit or advancement of the whānau and the descendents 
[sic] of the tipuna (either living or deceased) named in the trust order” (para.34).  
“Pūtea Trusts… designed to deal with uneconomical smaller share interests within 
a block or within various blocks” (para.37). 
As for Māori Reservations, TPK informs us that they are, “a very common land 
holding structure… (2011b, para. 1)… Typically over land that is culturally, 
spiritually, or historically significant to Māori” (2011b, para. 3). 
Māori Incorporations established under the above Act are constituted by the 
Māori Land Court and can cover “one or more blocks of Māori freehold land 
provided that at least one of the blocks has more than two owners” (TPK, 2011a, 
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para. 1).  They have the powers to act as a body corporate and those powers, “are 
set out in the order of incorporation, constitution and the Te Ture Whenua Māori 
Act 1993” (para. 2).  According to Tanira Kingi (2012), in 2008 there were 129 of 
these ture-Māori Incorporations and 5,201 Ahu Whenua Trusts, covering just over 
fifty per cent of all whenua Māori.  These I refer to as ture-Māori Incorporations. 
Māori Incorporations then are structures based on land ownership or shareholding 
since only Māori land owners and/or shareholders can apply to the Māori Land 
Court for registration as a Māori Incorporation.  Despite the seemingly benign 
nature of the aforementioned entities they are nonetheless processes, structures 
and systems born out of the coloniser’s political/legal context.  By their very 
nature they bind the owners to a structure and process not necessarily 
representative of their own cultural heritage and customary practices, or tikanga. 
There is however a tikanga-based kaupapa that has stepped onto the Māori 
Incorporation stage and countless personal communications with JJ indicate to me 
that he firmly believes it has the potential to see the rise of whānau and hapū as 
the primary authorities in matters relating to resource management and local, 
regional and national governance.  Interestingly this ‘new’ kaupapa also has its 
roots in the establishment and practice of ture-Māori Incorporations constituted 
under the Ture Whenua Māori 1993 / Māori Land Act 1993.  These tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations are also based on Māori land ownership and/or shareholding.  The 
land owners and/or shareholders also apply for registration to become Māori 
Incorporations but not to the Māori Land Court.  Instead they apply to another 
authority they believe supersedes the coloniser institution of the Māori Land 
Court – they apply to the Parliament at Waitangi.  These I refer to as tikanga-
Māori Incorporations. 
Conversations with JJ and others suggest that changes made to the rules and 
regulations in Part 13 of the Act have opened the door for whānau/hapū to now 
establish what I have termed tikanga-Māori Incorporations without having to seek 
constitution through an order from the Māori Land Court.  Instead, these tikanga-
Māori Incorporations organise themselves under tikanga Māori, namely through 
their sovereign status as whānau/hapū with long established ties to specific 
geographical locations.  There can be many tikanga-Māori Incorporations in a 
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single region and representatives from the various local whānau and hapū tikanga-
Māori Incorporations make-up a regional governing collective whose boundaries 
follow those traditionally acknowledged territorial lines of rohe waka tupuna.  
Indeed, as JJ informs, these regional governing bodies, which number ten across 
the country, all take their names from waka tupuna, i.e. Tainui, Te Arawa, Aotea, 
Mataatua, Tokomaru, Mamari, Horouta, Ngā Toki-mata-whaorua, Kurahaupō, 
and Tākitimu.  These regional waka bodies in turn affiliate to a national body 
known as the Parliament at Waitangi, with representatives from the regional waka 
bodies making up the majority of members sitting in that Parliament.  The 
structures, systems and processes of these three bodies will be examined in greater 
detail later in this chapter. 
It appears that it is this affiliation of tikanga-Māori Incorporations to the regional 
waka body and thence to the Parliament at Waitangi that endorses their right to act 
as sovereign entities in their own right, within their own rohe.  More interesting is 
JJ’s assertion that this kaupapa has the potential to effect nation-wide even 
international change for all oppressed and disenfranchised people.  His reasons for 
believing so were articulated in our interviews. 
6.3 He uiui 
As mentioned in Chapter One a series of three one-on-one interviews were held 
with a cousin of mine, JJ, who is the Chairman of the aforementioned tikanga-
Māori Incorporation and of the Tainui waka body.  For some time JJ has been 
encouraging me to use my research and teaching skills to develop information and 
education programmes about the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  It 
seemed appropriate then that when the opportunity arose for such information to 
be collated through this thesis that he be involved as a primary contributor of the 
articulations on what this new kaupapa is all about.  I was grateful not only for the 
opportunity to share time and kōrero with him but also to be able to provide him 
with a structured and reviewable process such as this study in which he could 
invest his knowledge.  That we are cousins is one connection.  That we are 
members of the same tikanga-Māori Incorporation is another.  That we are both 
participants in this study is yet another.  However, that the interview process was 
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done in a tika and pono manner was paramount and served to reinforce those 
existing relationships where both parties were trusting and trusted. 
I propose that having only one informant to participate in the interview should not 
be seen as a weakness in the process but rather that it should be celebrated for 
who that one person was and the quality of information he brought to the study.  
Despite others having been given the opportunity to participate only JJ felt 
comfortable enough to do so and even then with some trepidation.  JJ’s main 
concern was that in discussing this kaupapa he would likely need to address some 
matters concerning te ao wairua that he was not willing to reveal or engage in 
discussion about at this point in time.  Therefore a clear set of boundaries on 
topics to be discussed, supported by specific guarantees around processes and 
procedures were put in place before the first interview commenced. 
Principal amongst these guarantees was the right of review of the recorded 
interviews and transcripts and the option to alter, amend, or veto anything at JJ’s 
discretion.  Equally important was the removal of any content that might identify 
the interviewee and any other individuals mentioned (excepting public figures), or 
the tikanga-Māori Incorporation itself, and any location names that might lead to 
the identification of any or all of the preceding.  For these reasons no real names, 
whether of people, places or entities connected to JJ, are used and where 
necessary the names have been replaced with two-letter codes, i.e. JJ.  The reasons 
for these tight conditions were not interrogated; they were simply accepted as the 
absolute right of the knowledge holder.  After all, I would argue that, in these 
situations it is the knowledge seeker who has the greater need.  In engaging in this 
study I deliberately set out to privilege JJ’s unfettered voice by incorporating 
Kaupapa Māori theory to provide, “a platform from which Māori are striving to 
articulate their own reality and experience, their own personal truth as an 
alternative to the homogenization and silence that is required of them within 
mainstream New Zealand society” (R. Mahuika, 2008, p. 4). 
The information provided by JJ covers a wide range of topics that he believes are 
all interconnected.  JJ tells a compelling story and I have treated these offerings in 
the same vein as I would the narratives of oral tradition, by listening to the story 
and seeking out the messages within, whilst not becoming distracted by, or 
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engrossed in, the decorative detail.  His offerings are representative of Marsden’s 
(1992) articulations on how perceptions are patterned into conceptualisations of 
what reality is and “of what is to be regarded as actual, probable, possible or 
impossible” (p. 3) and accordingly form JJ’s worldview. 
Through the conversations with JJ a number of questions have been left 
unanswered that, I argue, are critical to ever seeing the cause of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations advanced.  These include accessing and reviewing some obscure 
documents identified by JJ relating to his understanding of the early and present-
day relationship between Māori and the British Crown, and an examination of the 
consequences of such discovery, whether proving his position or not. 
The topics are presented here categorised in prominent and/or often recurring 
themes.  These cover the influence of the founder of the tikanga-Māori 
Incorporation kaupapa, who is hereafter referred to as NP; JJ’s understanding of 
the historical and present-day relationship between Māori and the British Crown; 
the establishment and functioning of tikanga-Māori Incorporations and the 
Parliament at Waitangi; JJ’s assertions regarding constitutional matters affecting 
the New Zealand Government; the role and influence of te ao wairua on the 
preceding; and matters influencing future outcomes for whānau, hapū and others 
seeking relief from their present condition. 
6.4 Ko te tāhuhu he hīnau 
I would suggest that critical to understanding what initially led JJ to become 
involved in establishing and leading a tikanga-Māori Incorporation is first 
exploring the nature of the man JJ credits as being his inspiration.  That man was 
NP. 
According to JJ, NP studied law in New Zealand but after refusing to give his oath 
of allegiance he was sent back home by his grandfather.  After a while this same 
grandfather sent NP to study law in England.  After five years of study and a 
further three years gaining experience in international settings, NP’s studies were 
completed.  JJ offers up that at this point in the 1990s NP’s thoughts turned 
towards home and helping all whānau, hapū and iwi.  When queried about exactly 
what it was that NP had to do, JJ offered the following response, 
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He had to teach us about our rights, our powers, our privileges, [our] 
sovereign rights and how [these] can be achieved…  Like I said, [NP 
was] the most intelligent man I’ve ever met … and he was the most 
humble, humble man I’ve ever met too. 
When JJ was asked how it came about that he became involved with NP and this 
kaupapa he replied, 
There was a whānau hui to do with Waitangi Tribunal claims and 
one of the relations informed me of someone he had met, a little Ngā 
Puhi man.  He spoke about this little man’s aims and visions and all 
those things, and obligations and duties and responsibilities, and 
what it [all] encompassed. 
It would appear that whatever JJ’s relative had said to him was enough to 
convince him to go and meet with NP and in the following JJ articulates the 
influence of te ao wairua upon him; an influence that seems to inform his 
worldview and is present in many of his narratives. 
I was going on my way up to Waitangi to meet this man... as we 
drove along … a white rainbow appeared on my side where I was 
sitting… a pure white rainbow.  It’s the first time I’ve seen one.  It 
followed me for about three miles and I knew this man I was going 
to meet was a spiritual man. 
[NP] had spiritual knowledge but he never ever said anything to the 
people about it.  See that was what those white signs were from. 
You see [NP] is a spiritual man.  He had to be to know where he was 
going in his future and to do all those things he had to do.  It was all 
for the Māori people and nothing for him.  He ended up a poor, 
destitute man.  One arm he [could] just hold a cup with a strap 
around, the other arm was completely useless, [and] both his legs cut 
off above the knee.  He had nothing in his life [but was] very clever. 
According to JJ, through NP’s training in England and his experiences in the 
international arena he had acquired specific knowledge he believed could benefit 
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whānau, hapū and iwi.  As will be evident in the articulations presented in this 
chapter, the arrival of NP’s knowledge on the New Zealand sovereignty scene 
created a third space where existing process were interrupted, long-established 
situations interrogated and new understandings of being and doing enunciated.  
When asked about this new knowledge JJ turns to look back into history to 
provide an insight into the notions that underpin this movement. 
6.5 He okiokinga tikanga 
This study has so far deliberately set out to avoid any type of chronological 
examination of events.  However given the nature of the topic of this chapter I 
deem it is necessary to do exactly that.  JJ, in my estimation, is a font of 
knowledge and has an amazing capacity for memory recall when it comes to 
discussing this kaupapa.  Although not directly asked what underpins the kaupapa 
JJ’s responses in other areas seem to provide an inkling of an answer.  It would 
appear that during his time of study in England NP had the opportunity to access 
papers and records of the early nineteenth century, in particular papers relating to 
the Māori people, Nu Tireni/New Zealand, the Privy Council and the British 
Colonial Office.  JJ comments that, 
[NP] saw all the [pre-Declaration] letters written by the Ngā Puhi 
chiefs and the tohunga asking the King if he would take their lands 
and protect it forever, and if he will protect the Māori people as an 
infant state, or as was written, ‘i tō mātou tamarikitanga’, and he 
could protect the laws of the Māori people and their mana. 
It wasn’t until 1820 when Hongi Hika and all those chief[s] in Ngā 
Puhi and the tohunga, actually went to see the King in person and 
presented the last pieces of papers for him to accept all the land and 
taonga of this country and to become the protector and trustee of 
everything that belongs to Māori – their language, their laws, their 
land, ngā mea tuku iho katoa. 
When queried about what the possible significance of these pre-Declaration and 
pre-Treaty period letters and papers might be JJ is adamant that it is about, 
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“protection over Māori people, their mana, and their sovereignty.  Protection is 
what it’s all about”. 
JJ then goes on to link the above with the more well-known events of the time in 
this period of the relationship between Māori and the British Crown. 
The chiefs, the Whakaminenga o ngā Hapū o Nu Tireni, began to sit 
down and work out a plan and that plan eventuated in 1835 with the 
Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand. 
The Declaration of Independence was solely a protection mechanism 
that was granted to King William IV through his House of Lords and 
the Privy Council at the Parliament of Westminster.  They never 
gave him occupation rights or anything of that sort except to be the 
Protector. 
The story of He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835 has been 
well documented elsewhere (Cox, 1993; Durie, 1998; Orange, 1987, 2004) and 
will not be dealt with here except to locate it within the context of this study.  The 
notions of guaranteed sovereign independence and protectorship feature often in 
JJ’s narratives and appear to be fundamental to tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  To 
this end JJ refers to the Standing Orders in Council 1836 which he sees as being 
evidence of the British Crown’s commitment to act as Protector for Māori. This 
perception seems to be based on an extract from a communication between the 
British Colonial Office and the Governor of New South Wales, Major-General 
Richard Bourke, indicating certain understandings between Māori and the British 
Crown regarding mutual protection (The British Crown’s Feudal (Protectorate) 
Title of New Zealand, 1836). 
According to JJ, this guarantee of sovereign independence and commitment to 
protectorship did not automatically transfer to Queen Victoria on the passing of 
her uncle King William IV in 1837.  He asserts that, 
The first thing that Queen Victoria had to do was come and do a 
treaty with the Māori.  It was her wish to do the treaty, not Māori, 
only because King William was no longer able to offer that 
protection over Māori people, their mana, and their sovereignty.  So 
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Queen Victoria required [the] Treaty of Waitangi to fulfil that part of 
the agreement, so she would be the Protector for her lifetime of the 
same things that [were] in the Declaration, which is tino 
rangatiratanga, the unextinguished native title, [and] tikanga Māori 
laws. 
This then presents a picture of how JJ and tikanga-Māori Incorporations perceive 
the importance of the Declaration of the Independence of New Zealand 1835 and 
the Standing Orders in Council 1836, as a recognised statement of the sovereign 
and independent status of Māori under the protectorship of the British Crown.  He 
also offers an insight into how he perceives the role of the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 
and provides explanations as to why the British Crown would want to enter into 
such an arrangement as a treaty with Māori of the time. 
The chiefs had promised in the Declaration to protect all King 
William’s subjects that come to these shores for the purpose of trade 
and that was because King William provided them with the flag4 
they asked for.  So you see the Treaty of Waitangi is only an 
amendment to the Declaration of Independence and that amendment 
was to provide [for] Queen Victoria to be the occupier on behalf of 
all her subjects, and Queen Victoria will become the legal trustee 
and protector of all those things that are included in the Declaration. 
I suggest that we now have an indication of a critical philosophical difference 
between the two types of Māori Incorporations.   Tikanga-Māori Incorporations 
acknowledge the primacy of the Declaration of Independence of New Zealand 
1835 over the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840, which as has been seen in JJ’s comments is 
regarded as an amendment to the Declaration.  Ture-Māori Incorporations 
constituted through the New Zealand government system on the other hand owe 
their very existence to the Tiriti o Waitangi, as alluded to in the Preamble of the 
Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. 
                                                            
4 The Flag of the United Tribes of New Zealand, also known as Te Kara, acknowledged by King 
William IV in 1834. 
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JJ also refers to an additional right that was granted to Queen Victoria in the Tiriti 
o Waitangi and it would seem from JJ’s perspective it is a significant addition and, 
I would argue, a critical underpinning of the tikanga-Māori Incorporation kaupapa. 
In the second part of Article Two it refers to she be given first pre-
emptive rights to purchase the title, or not to purchase the title.  So 
that’s why the title has been protected since right back then to today 
and no-one can ever extinguish the native title except for the British 
Crown.  No-one will ever have any rights to purchase the native title.  
That stopped Americans, [French], Spanish and all these others from 
coming here to attempt to purchase the title because Queen Victoria 
had the first pre-emptive rights above all others and no-one else 
would ever have that chance… and the British Crown has never 
exercised that right by purchasing any land here. 
The pre-emptive purchase rights and the unextinguished native title, which when 
combined with a belief in the sovereign, independent and protected status of 
whānau/hapū are, I propose, fundamental to understanding how tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations perceive issues and situations confronting whānau and hapū in 
present-day Aotearoa/New Zealand.  JJ articulates this perception by offering that, 
Today no-one has yet purchased the native title and when I think of 
this water claim right now, that comes under the unextinguished 
native title, so there is a big con happening right now and no-one is 
talking about the unextinguished native title. 
I propose that a separate examination of JJ’s claims about the unextinguished 
native title and his interpretation of the right of pre-emption would be valuable 
inasmuch as it would generate more debate around these two almost invisible and 
yet rather contentious issues. 
By way of making his point about the significance of unextinguished native title 
in relation to a contemporary issue before Māori, JJ turns to the hui-ā-iwi called 
by Kīngi Tūheitia, and held at Tūranga-waewae Marae on 13th September 2012, to 
discuss iwi rights to wai.  In doing so JJ seems less than sympathetic to those who 
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attended and implies that there is another agenda afoot that has slipped past the 
notice of iwi. 
The worst thing is that they’re being lead around [by the] wrong 
question because people today don’t even know that the Iwi [Leaders] 
Forum [has] been established by John Key, not [by] the Trust Boards, 
not [by] the Rūnanganui, but it’s John Key that has established that 
group of people, and that’s who John Key wants to lead the whole 
kaupapa to do with the wai… John Key is trying to pull the wool 
over the eyes and many, many Māori don’t even know it… They’re 
all looking at the money.  They’re all looking at their pockets, and 
they’re looking at interests rather than the unextinguished native title.  
[The hui is] just a waste of time - completely 100%. 
Whilst it might be argued that the Iwi Leaders Forum is a New Zealand 
Government initiative the existence of an as yet undisclosed agenda on the part of 
the Government is difficult to prove.  However, that JJ feels this way is an 
indication perhaps of the distrustful nature of the relationship that tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations have towards the New Zealand Government.  This relationship is 
probably best summed up in JJ’s reference to the Government as, “the New 
Zealand Crown not the British Crown”. 
Returning to the relationship between Māori and the British Crown JJ shares an 
interesting note that, I suggest, will cause some to reconsider their beliefs about 
the British Crown’s purported failure to honour the Tiriti o Waitangi.  Whilst 
Queen Elizabeth II was touring New Zealand in 1963 she attended the Waitangi 
Day celebrations at Waitangi. 
When they had the celebrations … after the mihimihi and the 
pōwhiri Turi Carroll got up and said to the Queen, ‘It is the wish of 
the people that you whakamanahia te Tiriti o Waitangi’.  Queen 
Elizabeth said back to him, ‘The Māori people must honour the 
Treaty of Waitangi’.  She is exactly right and not one Māori at that 
hui understood what she said.  Yep, she was exactly bang-on.  It is 
Māori that have failed to honour the Treaty of Waitangi.  They had 
promised in the Declaration and in the Treaty they would set up a 
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Māori Parliament and Government but they have failed.  It is not the 
British Crown that has failed in any way, it is Māori. 
It is this notion of the failure of Māori to fulfil their obligations under the 1835 
Declaration that will, I suggest, be most unpalatable for those who have long 
maintained the fault lies with the British Crown.  Moreover, I propose that it is a 
new enunciation that has come from using NP’s knowledge to interrupt an on-
going long-term relationship and to interrogate an existing situation between the 
coloniser and the colonised. 
6.6 He ōhākī tupuna 
It appears from JJ’s narratives that this drive to establish a Parliament at Waitangi 
is mandated by the text of He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 
1835.  Articulating what this means leads to gaining a better understanding of the 
entire structure that tikanga-Māori Incorporations operate under and the processes 
they engage in. 
As best as can be determined from information reviewed the kaupapa of tikanga-
Māori Incorporations appears to be a three-tiered law making process comprising 
local whānau/hapū tikanga-Māori Incorporations, regional waka bodies and the 
national Parliament at Waitangi.  There is one Parliament at Waitangi and there 
are ten waka regions.  There must be no less than seven local tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations in a waka region for it to be considered ready to fulfil its functions 
and duties.  In JJ’s case there were seven local tikanga-Māori Incorporations 
established and active in the Tainui rohe.  Each chairperson of those seven local 
tikanga-Māori Incorporations sat on the regional waka body and represented their 
local tikanga-Māori Incorporation.  From their group they elected a Chairperson – 
in the case of the Tainui regional waka body it was JJ.  All seven members of the 
regional waka body represented their rohe at the Parliament at Waitangi, with six 
sitting in the Lower House whilst the Chairperson represented their rohe in the 
Upper House.  Given that there are ten regional waka bodies in the kaupapa this 
means sixty waka representatives in the Lower House and ten waka 
representatives in the Upper House. 
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The regional waka and Lower House levels take responsibility to manage five 
portfolios which are registered as Charitable Trusts within this structure.  These 
portfolios are designated as Kaitiaki Pūtea Trusts (economic responsibility), 
Kaitiaki Whenua Tōpū Trusts (social responsibility); Kaitiaki Whānau Trusts 
(justice responsibility), Kaitiaki Ahuwhenua Trusts (trade responsibility), and 
Kaitiaki Trusts (environmental responsibility).  The specific responsibility detail 
of each of the five trusts is quite extensive so, for the sake of brevity, only the 
overarching responsibility has been noted here. 
The process of law making in the tikanga-Māori Incorporation system has a 
familiarity about it.  According to JJ Te Ture Whenua Māori 1993/Māori Land 
Act 1993 empowers tikanga-Māori Incorporations to write and pass Special 
Resolutions that can have effect locally, regionally, nationally and even 
internationally. 
The power to make the laws is all in the Part 13 of that [legislation] 
section 268.  Then you transfer that in partnership with section 253.  
So you add them together [and] Māori can write their own laws 
within New Zealand and outside New Zealand. 
Section 268 (3) of the Act states, “A Maori incorporation may, by special 
resolution of the shareholders, alter, add to, or replace its constitution in any way 
that is not inconsistent with any provision of this Act or any regulations made 
under this Act”.  Section 253 of the same Act states that, 
every Maori incorporation has, both within and outside New Zealand, 
in addition to the powers expressly conferred on it by this Part, — (a) 
full capacity in the discharge of the obligations of the trust in the best 
interests of the shareholders, to carry on or undertake any business or 
activity, do any act, or enter into any transaction; and (b) for the 
purposes of paragraph (a), full rights, powers, and privileges. 
It appears that JJ takes these two sections and interprets them in a manner that 
justifies for him the right of tikanga-Māori Incorporations to make their own laws 
through Special Resolutions.  These Special Resolutions then go on to be 
scrutinised and endorsed by the regional waka body.  It is the regional waka body 
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that upon accepting and endorsing the resolutions then tables these in the Lower 
House during the three-month period that the Parliament at Waitangi sits each 
year.  The three-month sitting period of the Parliament at Waitangi runs from 28th 
October, the first signing date of He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu 
Tireni 1835, to the 6th February, the first signing date of the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840.  
These Special Resolutions are then debated in the Lower and Upper Houses, 
where they are either ratified or sent back for further consideration.  JJ explains 
why this process is used. 
They had to have those same three structures like the Westminster 
system, first reading, second reading and third reading.  Māori are 
still apolitical, we still do not follow that process of the Pākehās, and 
we are still apolitical because everything has to be done in 
accordance with tikanga Māori. 
If a whānau wants to bring out a law they pass it by a special 
resolution at an Incorporation hui, then it goes to [the] waka to be 
discussed and if they like it and agree with it they’ll send it up to the 
Upper House for the third reading.  If the waka don’t like it then 
they’ll send it back to fix it up… [but] each waka can only do so 
much now until it gets to the Upper House and then they do the final 
laws because it has to blend in with the kawa. 
In mentioning kawa JJ once again makes reference to the importance of tikanga in 
this process.  It appears that while whānau/hapū tikanga-Māori Incorporations can 
pass special resolutions to suit local conditions and tikanga, those resolutions are 
required to be acceptable at regional and national level.  I suggest that strictly 
speaking JJ is correct in stating that tikanga-Māori Incorporations don’t follow the 
‘process of the Pākehās’ since the process he describes involves local, regional 
and then national scrutiny of proposed laws.  I would argue too that his assertion 
that Māori are apolitical, because they follow tikanga Māori, also has merit 
inasmuch as the scrutinising and endorsement process is done at whānau, hapū 
and iwi levels.  I propose that this is an example of the third space in action 
inasmuch as the three tiers of the structure create space in three different locations 
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for the law-making process to be interrupted, the situation to be interrogated and 
new enunciations made. 
I propose that a more in-depth examination than that carried out here into the 
establishment and functioning of tikanga-Māori Incorporations and the Parliament 
at Waitangi is advisable since it would furnish greater detail and understanding of 
the processes and procedures involved.  A noticeable dearth of published 
information on tikanga-Māori Incorporations and the Parliament at Waitangi has 
been something of a hallmark of this study. 
There are two further aspects of the tikanga-Māori Incorporation structure worth 
noting – namely the role of Ngā Tikanga Māori Law Society (Inc.) o Aotearoa 
(NZ) and the participation of the Kīngitanga.  As with most nation-states, 
including Aotearoa/New Zealand, authority in the tikanga-Māori Incorporation 
kaupapa is exercised through the three branches of governance – the Executive, 
the Legislature, and the Judiciary.  The aforementioned structure of whānau/hapū 
tikanga-Māori Incorporations, regional waka bodies and the Lower and Upper 
Houses of the Parliament at Waitangi describes the Legislature.  The role of the 
Judiciary is fulfilled by Ngā Tikanga Māori Law Society (Inc.) o Aotearoa (NZ) 
which is comprised of members drawn from regional waka bodies (one each) plus 
a Registrar General, the Secretary to the Registrar, the Attorney General, the Chief 
Justice and the Governor-General.  This Society registers tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations, provides legal advice to all three tiers, issues orders and holds 
court sittings, including the Native Assessors Court mentioned earlier.  The 
Executive branch, or Head of State, is reserved for the head of the Kīngitanga, 
currently Kīngi Tūheitia.  The importance of the role the head of the Kīngitanga 
plays in this Parliament is explained by JJ. 
All the laws – everything’s got to go through the Upper House [and] 
in the Upper House sits Tūheitia… he’s there… Every law that’s 
passed up there goes under his signature… His is the mana that gets 
sent to the Queen and only through him can you give the instructions 
on what you want the Queen to do. 
JJ expands on the role of the head of the Kīngitanga by offering an opinion on 
what under this kaupapa could eventuate in the future. 
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The Head of State is his position and not of Māori but it is of all 
indigenous people in the Commonwealth and any other indigenous 
people around the world who wish it to be, they can be in there too, 
we can’t stop them.  That’s [who] the Treaty was done for - all 
indigenous people in the world because the Queen knows she hasn’t 
got mana over the indigenous [people] she only has mana over 
Pākehā people in the Commonwealth. 
When questioned about how much Kīngi Tūheitia did or did not know of this 
kaupapa and his expected participation in it, JJ reveals that nothing has been 
disclosed to Kīngi Tūheitia yet.  When quizzed as to why this is so JJ shares his 
belief that the Kīngitanga was never designed to last as long as it has and that it 
was always intended that its leader would move into the role of Head of State of 
the collective sovereign hapū of Aotearoa.  For many long-time adherents of the 
Kīngitanga, even in my own whānau, the notion that the Kīngitanga would cease 
to exist after so many generations of loyal service would be devastating and 
probably perceived as a threat requiring an immediate and ardent response.  It is 
perhaps then understandable why this subject hasn’t been raised with the current 
leader of the King Movement. 
Ironically it appears that instead of the Kīngitanga ceasing to exist it has been the 
kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations that has suffered that fate.  JJ reveals 
that the status of the tikanga-Māori Incorporation kaupapa has diminished recently, 
especially in light of the passing of NP in 2006.  Considering the Parliament at 
Waitangi he notes that many original adherents to the kaupapa have pulled away 
and why some have done so. 
Once all those fellas didn’t get any money they all pulled out… That 
really blew me away when I realised that… We had seventy 
incorporations register with us and out of the seventy only ten [were] 
the genuine ones.  The [rest] were all there for the money.  So it’s in 
abeyance, in recess… the time isn’t right. 
When asked about the current situation with his own tikanga-Māori Incorporation 
his response informs this study of how it came to be in its current condition and an 
ending similar to that of the Parliament at Waitangi. 
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The time is not right [so] it’s still in recess.  It wasn’t till towards the 
end when I knew we had to go into recess, that’s when those fellas 
went against it but I didn’t blame them because they achieved some 
great things in the courts then all of a sudden they all changed… 
Where they transgressed was when they went into the courts and 
kept challenging… The kaumātua asked that all of our people from 
now on never go into the Pākehā courts, only our Māori Courts, our 
Native Assessors Courts.  It was passed there at home and these guys 
[were] getting gamer you know and big-headed.  Well they were 
challenging the courts and the Police all the time and then they [used] 
our seal.  They were carrying our seal around [saying] this is us, and 
this is our mana.  They went out too far. 
When asked if he sees the kaupapa as part of the sovereignty movement JJ’s 
response gives another insight into his worldview when he responds, “No, not 
even as a tino rangatiratanga movement.  No it’s much more than that.  I see it as 
a tupuna movement because that’s where it came from”. 
I suggest that there are a few aspects of this kaupapa that at first glance are 
somewhat hard to accept.  There are other aspects that clearly challenge the status 
quo.  There are even some things that, I would argue, seem to be occupying the 
third space and are enunciating new perceptions and perspectives.  Just why JJ 
believes the time isn’t right for this kaupapa is explored later in this chapter.  In 
the meantime I contend that to be better able to understand this kaupapa one 
would be well served by understanding the environment that adherents of this 
kaupapa believe exists and that allows the kaupapa to come into being. 
6.7 A lawless vacuum 
A kaupapa such as tikanga-Māori Incorporations and the Parliament at Waitangi 
could only gain traction if certain conditions existed.  To borrow terms from 
criminal investigation vernacular, it would require motive, means, and opportunity.  
I argue that a commitment to upholding and giving mana to the agreements made 
between tūpuna rangatira and the British Crown in both He Whakaputanga o te 
Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835 and the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 provides this 
kaupapa with a powerful motive.  The three-tiered law-making structure via the 
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Parliament at Waitangi, the regional waka bodies and the local whānau/hapū 
tikanga-Māori Incorporations provides the means.  The opportunity, I suggest, 
comes from the lawful, or unlawful, status of post-contact New Zealand 
governments to govern and operate.  JJ is very clear on this aspect and offers the 
following articulations. 
There are no more laws in this country because they repealed the 
1852 New Zealand Constitution Act.  That’s where the Government 
got all their powers to be established in the country.  Before that only 
the Governor had powers to govern this country but not Māori, only 
to govern Pākehā. 
According to JJ The Constitution Act 1986 brought about the end of the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852 of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the 
foundation of New Zealand’s right to establish representative government. 
When queried about the significance of that event and just who carried it out JJ is 
adamant that in 1986 the government of the day, “signed away its constitution to 
govern, its warrants to govern, and of course it went through the Parliament and 
the House of Representatives and they dissolved themselves.  Parliament and the 
House of Representatives [are] dissolved.  It’s gone”. 
This seemingly incredible revelation is difficult to accept especially when it is 
evident that it is business as usual in the Beehive and politicians and matters 
political consume so much media airtime.  Politicians are obviously engaging in 
their duties as Members of Parliament and going about the business of running 
and governing this country.  How can JJ’s claims be true when the weight of 
evidence suggests the contrary?  The point here is that the third space I have 
spoken of previously is occupied here by JJ and others of like mind – acceptance 
by non-adherents is neither here nor there and JJ doesn’t seem fazed.  He 
willingly accepts that the world is still turning but sees it as turning on the wrong 
axis, which it must do so as to create a space where he can position his kaupapa. 
This positioning allows for messages he has gathered over the years to find voice 
in support of the tikanga-Māori Incorporation kaupapa.  In particular he often says, 
“We live in a lawless vacuum, save for the lawful sovereigns”, a statement he 
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attributes to Judge Joe Williams.  When queried further on this JJ indicates what 
he sees as a weakness and a flaw in the current government structure – a vacuum 
created by a lack of authority to govern and make laws. 
It’s gone because after 1986 when they repealed the Constitution, the 
Queen never, ever gave them anymore Royal Assent.  [There is] no 
more Royal Assent in this country.  So they used the Governor-
General to give Royal Assent and the Governor-General only has 
powers to give Regulations Assent, that’s it, not [to] Acts. 
Such a system collapse would not slip past the notice of someone like JJ who 
would quickly identify it as a point of vulnerability and an opportunity to 
prosecute his cause.  If challenging the legitimacy of the government’s authority 
to rule isn’t enough JJ then turns to capitalise on what he sees as another point of 
vulnerability in the New Zealand government system by redefining the authority 
of the person who is generally accepted as the British Crown’s representative here 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand, the Governor-General.  He starts by naming who he 
sees as being the true authority figure of the British Crown in the present-day New 
Zealand government system. 
Sian Elias is the Chief Justice.  She is the highest mana in this 
country in the government system.  She’s the official governor and 
the official government administrator, so she is higher than the 
Governor[-General who] today is an artificial, fictional creature 
created by the Government, [and] whose mana comes from the 
Government. 
Just what consequences JJ sees of this somewhat confusing situation are detailed 
in the following commentary. 
There’s a lot of Acts that the Government have written since 1986 
and in there most times it says that this Act will come into force 
when it receives Royal Assent… and it will never receive Royal 
Assent.  Sometimes they haven’t even put that in there at all and that 
means it’s not a real law.  So if it hasn’t got Royal Assent then it 
isn’t a real law.  It’s only a Regulation or what they call a Provincial 
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Common Law…  So they can’t write [laws] for the country, they can 
only write [regulations] for the Provinces. 
The notion of living in a lawless vacuum and the challenge it represents to the 
New Zealand Government’s authority to govern are subjects whose impact upon 
not only the ruler but also the ruled are, I propose, worthy of a separate study. 
If this perceived condition of governmental impotence is indeed the case then, I 
would argue, it is quite understandable why JJ would see a lawless vacuum.  If 
successive post-1986 Constitution Act governments have been acting without the 
appropriate authority to write laws for the nation and govern the country then, I 
contend, those governments have been acting unlawfully, which is a system 
failure and accordingly they are vulnerable.  If the situation as JJ sees it is in fact 
correct that then imperils the existence of a long list of laws, the loss of which 
would have an unsettling effect on many sectors of society.  The post-Constitution 
Act 1986 period includes every budget produced by every government since that 
time.  To give an idea of the magnitude of the situation, if JJ’s claim could be 
proven as fact, a brief list of ‘unlawful’ legislation from 1987 alone includes the 
Official Information Amendment Act 1987; the Conservation Act 1987;  the New 
Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987; and the 
Māori Language Act 1987. 
It would appear then that this legal vacuum, caused by what JJ identifies as 
stemming from a lack of a lawful constitutional status to govern and an inability 
to acquire Royal Assent, then provides tikanga-Māori Incorporations with the 
opportunity to claim and occupy a space wherein they can activate their processes 
and structures and in doing so fulfil their part in upholding their ancestors’ sacred 
agreement.  This agreement however is not the only area where sacredness and 
spirituality feature in JJ’s articulations of the kaupapa and it presents as a 
significant contributor to his perspectives. 
6.8 Te ao wairua 
JJ is a very spiritual man and constantly refers to aspects of te ao wairua when 
discussing the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  He acknowledges that in 
his whakapapa there are notable tohunga and in the interview he recalls some of 
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those tūpuna and their deeds.  JJ acknowledges others whom he believes have 
similar powers, including one of his daughters, and credits his own mother with 
having that same gift, or what he calls ‘mana’.  JJ himself is sensitive to te ao 
wairua operating in te ao kikokiko and there are multiple examples in his 
statements of his connection to te ao wairua and tūpuna communications that 
guide him.  He believes that his involvement with the kaupapa and with NP was 
pre-ordained by other-worldly powers.  He is also sensitive to what he perceives 
as tohu from te ao wairua, which he sees manifested in dreams and natural 
phenomena, such as the aforementioned “pure white rainbow” (Chapter Six, p. 
99). 
When given the opportunity to provide his own perception of the part wairua 
plays in the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations, JJ offers that, 
There’s the other part, the wairuatanga is the most important because 
the knowledge I was given was called the knowledge of the Whare 
Wairua, not the Whare Wānanga, that’s man’s kōrero.  Just like Te 
Mātorohanga, that’s man’s kōrero.  Whare Wairua is totally tuku iho, 
straight from the top. 
JJ then goes on to link this knowledge with the kaupapa. 
All that knowledge is really focussed on one thing, those customary 
laws, values, practices, priorities, and all those other things: integrity, 
honour, sincerity, truth, honesty and righteousness.  This is what it’s 
all about, what the Whare Wairua is all about.  What’s God’s kawa?  
The retention, maintenance, protection and preservation of the 
natural environment [and] natural order. 
It would appear then that wairua, or wairuatanga, is an integral part of JJ’s life and 
has influenced how he contextualises the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations, by, I would suggest, making it an integral part of normal tikanga-
Māori Incorporation practices and responsibilities.  However he alludes to another 
aspect of wairua that is deserving of acknowledgement and that is the less 
pleasant side of living in a constant state of striving to maintain a balance between 
two worlds.  When asked about how he keeps himself safe JJ offers up that he’s 
115 
protected to some degree by “a korowai of aroha”.  Despite this he goes on to 
explain that sometimes he receives directions and corrections for his own 
transgressions stating that, “Sometimes I am given direction by getting a knock on 
the head, making [me] fall over, tripping [me]”. 
For these transgressions there is a price to pay and JJ pays it both wairua-wise and 
physically-wise, particularly when he divulges knowledge that is too much for 
others to accept, hence, perhaps, his initial hesitance to engage in the interviews. 
Apart from these seemingly negative aspects of living with te ao wairua there 
does come some insight into what the future holds for Māori and the entire human 
race.  When discussing the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the fate of 
the world at the end of the Mayan calendar on the 21st December 2012, JJ offers 
up a different perspective on exactly what awaits the world at that time.  He is 
adamant that “One Loving God” has told him a wairua age is about to come upon 
the world which will see Māori get back all they are entitled to.  Those that don’t 
like it will leave and those who stay will realise “God’s promise of one thousand 
years of peace, love, harmony and unity”. 
It would seem then from his own accounts that JJ has information received 
through his relationship with te ao wairua that lead him to forecast events that 
concern not only the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations but the whole of 
humankind.  His last statement contains a vision and this coupled with his 
previous concerns about the time not yet being right, suggest to me that JJ 
believes we live in troubled times.  Yet his faith in his One Loving God which can 
manifest itself in Māori ways and through tohu Māori is indicative of a dualism 
that Maori have lived with since colonisation.  He seems to accept that a lot of 
harm was done in the past but I propose that he could only accept that if he also 
believed there was something better to move towards in the future.  This is borne 
out in his articulations of the remedies that will be needed to address the woes of 
not only indigenous people and those seeking sovereignty but for all peoples of 
the world. 
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6.9 Time for healing 
Throughout my conversations with JJ he regularly comments about the 
significance of time.  He attributes the failure of Māori to establish the Parliament 
at Waitangi as being due to the time not being right.  He makes the same assertion 
about the Kotahitanga Movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
This too he offers as the reason that the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations 
has failed to achieve that which it set out to do and even states this is why he put 
his own tikanga-Māori Incorporation into recess.  It would appear that time and 
signs from te ao wairua play a critical role in him determining actions. 
Today the most important element of all is time.  It’s time but at the 
moment it’s still not right for me to give out this knowledge, not the 
other knowledge but time is important now.  I won’t do anything at 
the moment because the time is not right but when I am given 
permission then I’ll start giving it out.  The best thing is to make sure 
that the people are fully aware that the time isn’t right to do this yet. 
It would appear then that JJ believes that the salvation of whānau, hapū and iwi is 
preordained by influences originating in te ao wairua and sign-posted somehow 
by time – whether dates or events is never discussed.  JJ was asked if he believed 
that worldview and tikanga, along with mana atua, mana rangatira, mana whenua, 
and mana tangata validated the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  His 
response was, 
Yep, it has to be the whole lot.  It’s all one… the land and 
Māoritanga is always one… We all have those same responsibilities, 
obligations and duties to uphold the integrity, honour, sincerity and 
the truth, honesty and righteousness of our tūpuna.  Yeah, it’s mana 
tupuna alright and it is mana rangatiratanga… [Law making is] all 
still secondary.  The first is always that main structure up the top, 
that’s the main structure, Māori customary laws, values and practices. 
When it was proposed to JJ that the establishment of the Parliament at Waitangi 
was the primary kaupapa he responded, “Yeah that’s our kaupapa, the real 
kaupapa but it’s not ready to start yet mainly because the time is not right”. 
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Perhaps JJ is expressing here his sensitivity to the same notion as articulated by 
Bertrand (2011) when acknowledging the significance of timing as a contributing 
factor in the successes realised by the Cordillerans and Papuans (Chapter Four, pp. 
75-76). 
It seems then JJ is sure that what should not be done at the moment is the 
reactivation of the Parliament at Waitangi and re-commencement of law making.  
However, until the right time does come along he urges whānau and hapū to start 
doing the preparatory work so that they are ready when the time is right.  JJ is 
adamant that the preparatory work that whānau and hapū can do is to set up their 
own tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  This he proposes would see an eventual shift 
in the role of government offering that, “Every marae in the country becomes a 
government.  That’s where the government is, it’s not in an office in Wellington; 
it’s at the marae”. 
It is somewhat difficult to identify exactly what remedies are currently available 
via the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  JJ on the one hand seems to 
offer relief and then qualifies that offer by attaching an undeterminable time factor 
to it.  In the interim he encourages whānau and hapū to set up their own tikanga-
Māori Incorporations in preparation for a time when it will be right for the 
kaupapa to come to the fore.  I would suggest though that this offers little relief to 
those who seek it now.  That a lot of JJ’s articulations have a spiritual connotation 
to them might be a challenge for those who do not share his convictions.  
However, I would argue that, it does bear out the aforementioned commentaries 
on maintaining a balance between two worlds (Chapter 2, pp.28-30).  This I 
contend is what JJ does and has willingly accepted that it applies to his 
endeavours when engaging with the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations. 
6.10 He kupu whakahiato 
Through the articulations provided in this chapter I propose that the kaupapa of 
tikanga-Māori Incorporations can lay claim to being a point where the other 
themes of this study, those being tikanga, sovereignty, indigeneity and third space 
theory, all intersect. 
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JJ’s articulations about the origins and foundations of the kaupapa of tikanga-
Māori Incorporations link it to the knowledge bank of post-contact Māori society, 
which by association aligns it to that society’s worldview, principles, values and 
beliefs.  This then implies a commonality with that society’s expectations and 
aspirations which, as has been argued in Chapter Two, furnish societies with a 
sense of assuredness, collective security, balance and continuity.  That the 
physical structures of the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations no longer 
endure seems neither important nor surprising to JJ, however remaining forever 
tika and pono to the legacy of those tūpuna who established a sacred and enduring 
agreement most certainly is. 
The radical actions engaged in by tikanga-Māori Incorporations, such as the 
issuing of tikanga-Māori Incorporation driver licenses, tikanga-Māori 
Incorporation car registration plates, and tangata whenua passports, as well as 
summoning a District Police Commander to appear before the Native Assessor’s 
Court, all bear testament to the non-static and organic nature of tikanga.  Whether 
as responses to unanticipated situations or as physical manifestations of that 
society’s principles, values and beliefs, these actions were guided by and 
measured against mana and tapu.  No tapu was breached and no mana abused. 
Also representative of the notion that tikanga is organic is the manner in which the 
kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations had the capacity and capability to adopt 
and adapt other ways of being and doing in the establishment of its Westminster-
style structure and processes.  Arguably this would have been little more than a 
straightforward response that enabled the post-contact tupuna society to create a 
space in which they could manage and deal with foreign constructs such as 
declarations and treaties between sovereign entities.  For the preceding reasons I 
propose that tikanga-Māori Incorporations both apply and assert tikanga – their 
ways of being and doing, and they use their collective worldview, principles, 
values and beliefs to accord validity and credibility to those tikanga. 
JJ’s articulations about his sensitivity to te ao wairua indicates that it influences his 
worldview and he has even declared it as a point of difference between his group 
and other tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  Arguably it is his sensitivity to this 
spiritual influence that fomented the parting of ways for some of his group and 
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ultimately led him to make the decision to put the group into recess.  I suggest here 
though that this action of putting the group into recess is JJ’s way of maintaining a 
balance between the temporal and spiritual realms. 
The establishment of the three-tiered structure for the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations is an act attributable to being a sovereign entity as well as a 
mechanism deliberately designed to abet that sovereign status through the making 
of laws.  This kaupapa as a whole is reflective of a society enacting its own 
validated tikanga in a manner that is tika and pono to their collective worldviews, 
principles, values, beliefs, expectations and aspirations, and accordingly is 
operating in a way that proclaims them as being possessed of their sovereignty. 
Everything about this kaupapa – its structure, processes, documents and 
terminology all point towards JJ believing in the extant sovereignty of whānau 
and hapū, and in the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations as a way in which 
their sovereignty finds expression framed in both tikanga and Westminster law. 
In an effort to determine JJ’s tikanga-Māori Incorporation status as an indigenous 
group I return to the definition furnished by Kendrick and Lewis (as cited in 
Debelo, 2011), as presented in Chapter Four (p.57).  The first part of their four-
point definition requires an indigenous people to “have priority in occupancy of a 
particular territory” (Debelo, 2011, p.260).  Since tikanga-Māori Incorporations 
can only register using their ownership of, or shareholding in, whenua Māori and 
therefore are whenua Māori-based entities, it appears reasonable to claim this 
criterion as satisfied. 
The second part requires demonstration of “cultural distinctiveness, continuity and 
attachment to their traditional land” (Debelo, 2011, p.260).  That tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations exercise their culturally distinctive ways of being and doing 
(tikanga) and are linked to the whenua of their tūpuna by whakapapa (continuity) 
has been articulated earlier in this chapter, and therefore meets the burden of proof 
to satisfy this criterion. 
Part three of the definition expects that indigenous peoples “identify themselves 
and are identified by mainstream society and state authorities as distinct 
collectivities” (Debelo, 2011, p.260).  By virtue of their registration as a tikanga-
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Māori Incorporation I contend that groups such as JJ’s have clearly identified 
themselves as a distinct collective and have been acknowledged as such by their 
peer network.  After having been profiled through the mass media, as well as 
having been targeted by Police, having participated in Court matters both legal 
and civil, and having been publicly vilified by the odd politician, I would argue 
that they have well and truly been identified by the wider society and regulatory 
authorities as a collective quite distinctive. 
The final defining criterion requires that an indigenous group is one that has, 
“experiences of subjugation, dispossession, marginalization, exclusion or 
discrimination whether or not these conditions persist” (Debelo, 2011, p.260).  JJ 
is adamant that his tikanga-Māori Incorporation has been undermined, misled and 
dismissed by local authorities, that their sovereign status has been continually 
denied, that they have been marginalised as mere protestors and homogenised as 
Māori, and ultimately excluded from local, regional and national decision-making 
processes.  Although this might not quite be what the drafters of these definitions 
envisaged, I maintain that all the criteria are satisfied and tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations, under the provided definition, are indeed recognisable as an 
indigenous group. 
I contend that from the articulations presented in this chapter tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations not only occupy a third space but are a product of the interrupt, 
interrogate and enunciate formula, and also an example of third space in action. 
The existence of two apposite types of Māori Incorporation creates a division 
between two positions occupied by protagonists who, apart from both being 
whenua Māori-based entities, have little in common and are effectively divorced 
of each other.  This creates a void, a third space, allowing for other voices to be 
heard.  
As mentioned in Chapter Five (pp. 88-89) third space is about articulating 
perceptions from the perspective of the instigator and privileging the instigator’s 
worldview, principles, values and beliefs, no matter how incongruous with 
mainstream thinking.  Tikanga-Māori Incorporations exercise this through their 
observance of He Whakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni 1835 as having 
primacy over the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840, and therein acknowledging a sacred 
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agreement and relationship with the British Crown.  Third space is about being 
productive and not merely reflective (Meredith, 1998).  That tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations have developed structures and processes to accommodate their 
worldview, principles, values and beliefs, indicates that they have reflected upon 
the conditions of the day and produced appropriate ‘new’ responses and not 
merely repackaged rhetoric.  Third space is about effecting change inasmuch as it 
strives to radically redefine the fulcrum upon which the status quo is maintained.  
That groups, such as JJ’s, spurn the status quo is evident and that their opposition 
to it can be viewed as an attempt to radically shift the location of the discussion is 
another example of them acting in the third space.  As an action third space 
behaviour forces the coloniser to be reactive and by tikanga-Māori Incorporations 
avoiding the colonial palaces of power and instead engaging their colonisers at 
different and unusual sites again testifies to their behaviour as being 
representative of third space theory. 
JJ’s contention that tikanga-Māori Incorporations have their foundation in tikanga 
seems warranted and his narratives often mention this.  That they are also founded 
on a sacred agreement memorialised in documents from the early nineteenth 
century is also articulated by JJ.  Whether or not this sacred pact is still in force or 
even enforceable today is a matter for another study to determine, and whether 
others believe it is not necessarily relevant to the beneficiaries of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations, who quite plainly do. 
If Māori made a commitment to the British Crown to establish a Parliament at 
Waitangi then it is evident that, as JJ asserts, Māori have failed.  Just why they 
failed and what the failure means is another area for separate enquiry.  Also 
worthy of further examination is JJ’s contention that the native title to this whenua 
is unextinguished.  If this could be proven and prosecuted effectively then, I 
suggest, it has the potential to throw the entire country into chaos.  This coupled 
with JJ’s assertions that we live in a lawless vacuum compounded by the lack of 
constitutional authority for New Zealand governments to govern leaves the entire 
nation-state vulnerable and maybe it is this vulnerability that tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations could seize upon to further their cause. 
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I have no reason to doubt that JJ believes he is influenced regularly by te ao 
wairua.  His whakapapa links him to it and his articulations lead me to accept that 
he lives with it and strives to maintain a balance between it and te ao kikokiko.  
He clearly allows it to inform his decisions and he believes he is being guided by 
it.  I do not challenge in any way the veracity of his beliefs but am compelled to 
note that I do not know of any tool capable of measuring or gauging this 
phenomenon, except perhaps by one’s own heart and intuition.  This is why I 
muse that maybe he sees the past, agitates the present and has within him an as yet 
unrevealed picture of the future. 
If all the claims made by JJ could be proven and supported by evidence then I 
would contend that this kaupapa is potentially the way forward for whānau, hapū 
and all indigenous groups of the world.  However, on a pragmatic level, which is 
another aspect of valid and credible tikanga (Mead, 2003), that the structures and 
processes of this kaupapa are in recess; that the New Zealand Government 
continues to govern; that even despite living in a lawless vacuum the majority still 
adhere to the law, I suggest that one would be understandably apprehensive about 
committing to this kaupapa.  At the present there seems to be no quick-fix remedy 
available from this kaupapa.  Whilst it informs about who is involved, why it 
should happen, and how to go about it, it delivers a non-committal position on the 
question of timing and when all this should happen, which is reflected in JJ’s 
statement, “I know the end vision … but how we get there?  It’s going to be a 
slow process”. 
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7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN – HE KUPU WHAKAKAPI 
Poua te rongomau, whakatōngia te aroha; 
Whakatinahia, kia māia, kia tū kaha; 
Rapua te mea ngaro, e kake kia ikeike; 
Ārohia te mānia, amioa te whenua; 
Rurukutia te mana, whakaūhia te tikanga. 
(Taitoko, 1997a, p. 1) 
7.1 He kupu whakataki 
This chapter sets out to consolidate the new understandings, articulations and 
enunciations made thus far in regards to the interconnectedness of tikanga, 
sovereignty, indigeneity, and third space through the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations.  This is done with the aim of proposing how these can be applied 
and asserted as credible and valid responses drawn from within a tikanga-based 
society to address contemporary issues. 
Tikanga weaves it way through all themes represented in this thesis.  I contend 
that it is integral to understanding worldviews, deciphering societal beliefs and 
values, and defining identity (Marsden, 1992; Mead, 2003; Paterson, 2008; 
Waitangi Tribunal, 2009).  It is also a mechanism that enables change.  It is not 
static (Mead, 2003) but rather is organic in nature.  It is an action informed by the 
collective wisdom contained in a society’s knowledge bank (Marsden, 1992; 
Mead, 2003).  Its assertion and application is underpinned and determined by 
long-held philosophies (Marsden, 1992; Mead, 2003; Roughan, 2009).  It is of 
human construct yet enables co-existence with the non-human realm (Mead, 2003; 
Paterson, 2008).  It can be collectively or individually enacted, in a formal and 
ritualised manner as well as habitual and commonplace (Mead, 2003).  I contend 
that it motivates expressions of self-determination and is a way of being and doing. 
7.2 Being and doing 
When examining emotive subjects such as culture, identity and the struggle for 
self-determination, I suggest, it is all too easy to fall into the trap of colouring the 
discussion by loading it with terms such as entitlement, righteousness, manifest 
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destiny and fate.  This thesis deliberately set out to avoid such traps and in doing 
so present a perspective of what is and what can be.  That tense and turbulent 
relationships between the powerful (coloniser) and the powerless (colonised) have 
existed throughout the history of humankind is undeniable.  That many 
relationships have ended in great loss for one and great gain for the other is etched 
into the annals of history and is still vividly present in modern times, especially 
here in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
Back in my mid-twenties the reading of post-colonial commentaries on what and 
when something happened, by whom and to whom, all within the context of the 
short history of New Zealand’s colonial existence provided a smorgasbord of 
information well-suited to developing and nurturing an attitude of outrage whilst 
feeding a sense of righteous indignation.  These accounts of abuse of the 
powerless by the powerful resonated very clearly within me, agitating my Anglo-
Protestant upbringing and leading me to make comparisons between those post-
colonial commentaries and the tales and legends of my youth involving the great 
European and religious heroes who stood-forth and confronted their oppressors.  
Boudicca of the Iceni, Joan of Arc, the Swiss William Tell, and David of Israel 
are all great names of the northern hemisphere’s past who many centuries ago 
took up the challenge to meet a fearsome and supposedly indomitable threat to 
themselves and their societies.  To my mind these paragons of virtue found 
comparable contemporaries here in 19th century Aotearoa in the likes of Hone 
Heke, Te Rauparaha, Te Kooti, Tītokowaru and others.  Both groups strove to 
preserve not only life itself but a way of life as well.  Interestingly though in the 
present-day both receive very different press.  The former are broadly 
romanticised and lionised as champions of their people whilst the mere utterance 
of the names of the latter leaves an unfamiliar taste in the mouths of many. 
No matter which group we consider it is evident that the renown of each named 
individual stems from their willingness to defend that which they held sacred – 
their identity, their way of being, and their freedom to be and to do.  But moreover, 
I argue, it is clear that these individuals acted in accordance with the values, 
beliefs and worldviews of their respective societies.  They all drew upon the 
information capital of their own society’s knowledge bank to develop appropriate 
responses conducive to achieving the most beneficial outcome but, as history has 
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proven, not without considerable risk to those very things they sought to protect 
and preserve.  They clearly pushed the boundaries of their respective paradigms 
and, I propose, without exception they chose to act in a manner that was not 
anticipated or expected for their time.  Ultimately, the actions they took served to 
change the tikanga of their own and subsequent eras.  The impact of some of those 
changes can still be discerned to this day especially when recalled as a metaphor 
for extraordinary behaviour. 
I also contend that it is likely that those notable persons all saw themselves as 
belonging to a specific and distinctive group of people who historically occupied a 
particular territory where their authority to determine their own direction was 
sacrosanct.  Their identity, their way of being, and their freedom to be and to do is 
inextricably entwined with their geographic location and was exercised through 
their claims of sovereignty as a people indigenous to that land. 
Indigenous groups across the world and throughout the ages have a track record of 
expressing their self-determination.  I argue that critical to those expressions is 
tikanga, a powerful and living thing that is intrinsic to their culture and identity 
inasmuch as it informs one how to interpret their world and to actualise 
themselves within their societies.  Whilst the particular conditions pertinent to 
specific indigenous groups may vary, I would argue that, it is evident that there 
are commonalities, namely a clear determination to retain their identity, their way 
of being, and their freedom to be and to do. 
Through the establishment of their structures and processes, tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations, such as JJ’s, have shown their willingness to promote a different 
way of being and doing.  These ‘new’ enunciations are based on tikanga and 
international agreements between sovereign entities and present an alternate way 
of addressing issues that have been part of the Aotearoa/New Zealand political 
landscape for over one hundred and seventy-five years.  Although not currently 
active I contend that tikanga-Māori Incorporations and what they stand for present 
the world with an opportunity to see the notion of third space in action. 
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7.3 Te whakatinanatanga 
As stated in this thesis, tikanga is not only a way of thinking and philosophising 
but is also a physical reflection of societal values and beliefs (Marsden, 1992; 
Mead, 2003; Paterson, 2008; Waitangi Tribunal, 2009).  It is all well and good to 
theorise and ponder those values and beliefs but the validity and credibility of 
these beliefs and values can, I suggest, only be tested and realised when asserted 
and applied.  It is at this point that concepts such as tika and pono come into play.  
To act correctly and do honour to the values and beliefs of one’s society tikanga 
must be asserted and applied in a tika and pono way (Mead, 2003).  To do 
otherwise, I propose, is to undermine the very essence of what that tikanga sets 
out to achieve and leaves the individual and their society open to derision and 
attack.  This situation is probably best evidenced by the experience of the 
cocaleros of Bolivia whose initial goals were true to their society’s values and 
beliefs, but who now having achieved those goals, find themselves being urged to 
compromise those very values for the sake of maintaining control of nation-state 
power (Chong, 2010).  Even the Ainu experience where so many deny their 
identity leads the observer to question why anyone should take their calls for 
recognition and self-determination seriously when it is evident some of their own 
have no wish to be identified as a part of that group (Gayman, 2011). 
This too has been the experience of the tikanga-Māori Incorporation examined in 
this study.  In some instances while enacting tikanga reflective of values and 
beliefs of their society some members have not necessarily asserted and applied 
them in a manner that could be recognised as tika and pono, ultimately leaving 
them exposed to derision and ridicule from both within and without, as evidenced 
earlier in Chapter Six.  The actions of a few have led to generalised perceptions of 
the whole group as a collection of tino-rangatiratanga trouble-makers, which 
immediately marginalises them and consigns them to a status of being less than 
genuine or credible, and ultimately threatens to invalidate their ways of being and 
doing.  I suggest that it was this situation that played a large part in JJ making the 
decision to put his group into recess.  Having seen the inability of those members 
to act in a tika and pono way, he did the only tika and pono thing he could do that 
would not breach tapu or abuse anyone’s mana.  It is arguable that this too is 
where JJ gets the idea that the time wasn’t right yet for this kaupapa. 
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The assertion and application of tikanga is an empowering act of resistance and an 
enabling force of resilience.  It provides a rallying point and commonality for 
groups who find little satisfaction in achieving their goals through channels 
established by those who hold all power and control.  It furnishes such groups 
with a connection to their past and an impetus to act in the hope of preserving that 
legacy for their future generations.  I would argue that such has been the 
experience of the groups examined in this thesis, those from Bolivia, Ecuador, the 
United States, Canada, the Philippines, Indonesia and Aotearoa/New Zealand.  In 
the early days of indigenous people’s calls for recognition and self-determination 
this stance could be seen as reactionary and merely responding to a threat.  In the 
latter years, I would argue, it took on a more proactive positioning, almost a 
strategy by building networks and coalitions.  My explanation for this shift 
occurring is that such actions present the coloniser with a situation it is ill-
equipped to deal with since nation-state hegemony struggles to acknowledge the 
significance of difference amongst its citizenry. 
7.4 Rurukutia te mana 
As revealed in this thesis the longevity of tikanga is put forward as a measure of 
its validity and credibility (Marsden, 1992; Mead, 2003; Roughan, 2009).  In the 
case of tikanga-Māori Incorporations where the structures and processes have 
only been around since the return of NP in the 1990s, this seemingly recent 
occurrence must be considered against the longevity of the kaupapa, which JJ 
claims stems from the late nineteenth century.  But more significant than that 
perhaps is his articulation that the tikanga applied and asserted in the structures 
and processes of the kaupapa have their origin in pre-contact times in concepts 
such as mana atua, mana rangatira, mana tupuna, mana whenua, and mana kaitiaki.  
Having such tools as tried and true tikanga at your disposal lends an air of a surety 
and consistency to determining appropriate actions to change conditions. 
However, longevity is not the only factor contributing to determining the validity 
and credibility of tikanga.  One aspect of tikanga that sets it apart from other 
frameworks for being and doing is that it is an organic and fluid thing, which is 
flexible and adaptable enough to respond to the influence of unanticipated 
variables.  As has been noted in this thesis, tikanga changes dependent on the 
128 
times and conditions that societies find themselves in (Chapter Two, pp. 27-28).  
Here again we find tikanga-Maori Incorporations acting in such a manner 
inasmuch as they have adapted their long-held ways of being and doing to suit a 
different context.  This is evidenced in the way they carry out their law-making 
processes by using whānau, hapū and iwi scrutiny to reflect the Westminster 
process of first, second and third readings to achieve widespread acceptance and 
endorsement of their laws.  By doing this the decision-making power is devolved 
back to all strata of their society. 
In addition to the above are those aspects of tikanga which have already been 
alluded to in this chapter, which I assert all attest to its validity and credibility.  
Tikanga has an inalienable association with worldviews, societal beliefs and 
values, culture and identity.  It has its origins in a society’s knowledge bank and is 
underpinned by long-held philosophies of that society.  It has the capacity to 
mediate the points where human and non-human realms interface.  It can be 
ritualised as well as commonplace.  It has the ability to motivate expressions of 
self-determination.  It is tempered by tika and pono and guided by considerations 
about mana and tapu.  It empowers resistance and enables resilience.  It is a 
rallying point and a position of strength for the members of its society.  It is a 
connection to the past and the future.  It is a strategy adopted by indigenous 
peoples worldwide.  All of these aspects accord tikanga the essence of validity 
and credibility.  But what then makes tikanga a valid and credible response to 
contemporary issues?  It is my contention that the answer lies in the ability of 
tikanga to interrupt processes, interrogate situations and enunciate new 
understandings.  This is done by locating tikanga in the third space. 
7.5 Whakaūhia te tikanga 
It is the position of this thesis that the concept of the third space provides 
opportunity for the relationship between the powerful and the powerless to be 
examined in another dimension and/or location, refuting the traditional adversarial 
stance of protagonists reminiscent of post-colonial discourse.  That this has 
already happened can be seen in the very actions of those heroes mentioned earlier 
(Chapter Seven, pp. 124-125).  When confronted with a threat of considerable 
import, all chose to act in a manner that was not anticipated by either their 
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opponents or even their own society’s members.  They each stepped away from 
the norm and sought out an alternate solution.  They took a risk but I would argue 
it was a calculated one.  And I propose that the formula used in those calculations 
was the interrupt, interrogate and enunciate process informed by their tikanga. 
In the struggle between the powerful and the powerless tikanga is a natural 
occupant of the space between opposing opinions.  Where diametrically opposed 
factions stand glaring at each other across the abyss tikanga can occupy the space 
between and set about finding a different understanding of the situation that 
neither side’s paradigm permits them to initially see.  Such, I propose, is the 
situation with the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations.  JJ and his kind saw 
iwi and the New Zealand Crown locked in contest and dispute over rights 
guaranteed in the Tiriti o Waitangi 1840.  In reflecting upon the knowledge bank 
of their particular society they determined that this was the wrong battle being 
fought for the wrong reasons on the wrong battlefield.  They reflected 
Solzhenitsyn’s insight by refusing to participate in the “lie” (Chapter Three, p. 48) 
and instead began to act in a manner and location that neither party orbiting the 
Tiriti discourse could understand.  JJ and his peers’ battles were for sovereignty 
not for resources or compensation and they occurred on the streets in everyday 
life and not in the palaces of coloniser power.  I do not propose that the goal was 
about creating a win-win or negotiated outcome.  Rather it was about maintaining 
the integrity of the sacred agreements made by their tūpuna and in doing so realise 
the freedom to exercise their ways of being and doing.  This situation seems to 
resonate with Kuppe’s (2009) articulations around public and private spheres, 
where aspirations and beliefs are debated in an environment of rationality and 
rights.  JJ’s actions demonstrate his determination to disturb the centre (N. 
Mahuika, 2011) and rattling the status quo by refusing to participate in that arena 
and instead locating it in a different place and space. 
That having been said there are examples, as have been shown in this study, of 
indigenous groups using nation-state tactics to defeat their coloniser and such is 
the story of cocaleros of Bolivia.  When confronted with the existing assumed 
power of the nation-state they organised themselves into collectives around the 
values, beliefs and worldview of their indigenous self.  There they found 
numerical power and eventually gained control (Albro, 2005).  However, I 
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suggest that having engaged and prevailed in that struggle all the cocaleros have 
won in reality is a seat on the back of a beast that only ever respects power 
through numerical superiority and a constructed collective identity.  In essence 
they are the heirs to the oppressive powerbase structure of their colonising 
predecessors. 
It is timely perhaps at this point to contend that tikanga occupies the third space 
for the purpose of engaging in battles of ideas, attitudes and perceptions.  
However it is the subsequent action born out of new enunciations that exhibit the 
fruits of those ideological contests.  This having been said it should also be noted 
that these ideological confrontations can, and do, morph into actual physical 
conflict and the recent history of indigenous people’s struggles is littered with 
such events, as has been presented earlier (Chapter Four, p. 61). 
This thesis proposes that, whether knowingly or not, the tikanga-Māori 
Incorporation focussed on in this study does exactly that – it engaged in an 
ideological contest.  It saw the threat posed by the oppressor and then considered 
conventional options, ultimately choosing to rely on its own strengths – strengths 
which lay in tikanga, mātauranga Māori and international agreements.  It waged 
ideological war in the third space, eliciting amusement and incredulity within the 
enemy camp and, as noted earlier in this study, those efforts resulted in a mixed 
bag of success.  However, it is most encouraging to know that through using 
tikanga it has tangled with and overcome threats to the livelihood of its members 
and their way of life.  As evidenced by the results of the Environment and High 
Court cases (Chapter One, p. 15) the machinery of local and regional government 
was made impotent. 
As an aside, I argue that, the role of the detractors and naysayers, both internal 
and external, should not be underestimated since they provided an important point 
of contest where the rigour and relevance of tikanga could be regularly tested and 
assessed and the fortitude and stamina of its members in the face of adversity 
confirmed.  However, probably more important is the realisation within the group 
itself that the things they have been saying and doing for years have at last born 
fruit and can now be seen as credible and valid responses to those things that 
threatened them and their being and doing in the present day. 
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Tikanga is a tool already at the disposal of cultural practitioners and the culturally 
aware.  I contend that it is real, it is present and it is available.  What remains to be 
seen is what contribution of consequence it can make to others and their struggles.  
Tikanga occupying the third space is not a way of planning but rather, I argue, it is 
a strategy to reconsider, to inform, to influence and to determine action.  
Therefore I propose that as an answer to the principal question that queries if the 
assertion and application of tikanga is a credible and valid response to 
contemporary issues, I must give a qualified reply.  That being, in some regards 
yes and in some aspects no.  The greatest insight gained reveals to me that having 
valid and credible ways of being and doing at your disposal does not necessarily 
translate to effecting change at a pragmatic level. 
The assertion and application of tikanga articulates the being and doing of a 
society however of itself it is not the whole answer.  Looking at the information 
gleaned from investigating the kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations, I suggest 
that although it appears they fit the criteria of asserting and applying tikanga, this 
is done so to guide and validate the manner in which they operate.  Tikanga is not 
clearly seen here as the transformative agent for what they strive to achieve, 
which I suggest is whānau/hapū self-determination and sovereignty.  Tikanga may 
have validated their worldview and aspirations but in the end they still carried 
their fight to the coloniser, albeit on the streets and in everyday life.  Seldom is 
tikanga seen as being asserted or applied in the way in which they challenge the 
status quo which generally occurs in the political and legal landscape.  Since the 
kaupapa of tikanga-Māori Incorporations has already appeared on the radar it 
could be argued that it is already at hand, even if in abeyance. 
The concern for me is that with so many aspects about tikanga-Māori 
Incorporations left unproven does it qualify as a remedy in the context of the 
question.  My answer to that is, currently no, it does not.  What it does offer this 
study is an opportunity to examine it using the lens of third space, a notion that I 
would argue currently potentially holds greater relief to those seeking these kinds 
of remedies. 
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He papakupu 
 
ao hurihuri ever changing world 
ao kikokiko the natural physical realm 
ao wairua the supranatural spiritual realm 
hā breath of life 
haumanutanga revival 
he kōrero tātaki an introductory dialogue 
he kōrero whakakapi a concluding dialogue 
he kōrero whakataki an introduction 
ihi intensity, magnitude, quality 
iwi-kē non-Māori 
kīanga phrase 
reo huahuatau metaphoric language 
mana whakairo hinengaro Māori indigenous intellectual property 
rights 
ture law, regulation 
whai koha respect 
whakahoe indifference 
Whakakotahitanga o ngā Whenua o te Ao United Nations 
whakamā shame borne out of embarrassment 
whakawaimehatanga i ngā tikanga-ā-iwi colonisation 
whakawhenumitanga assimilation 
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